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Abstract 
This thesis is dedicated to uncovering the conceptual and metaphysical entailments of a form 
of phenomenal realism I call Robust Realism. I argue that a maximally non-deflationary 
phenomenal realism of this kind constitutes the only principled form of resistance to Daniel 
Dennett’s eliminativist strategy. I also argue that while Robust Realists constitute a minority 
within the philosophical community, the deflationist majority have reason to be interested in 
the results of such a project, as it promises a way beyond the dialogical impasse marking the 
current qualia debate.  I begin by arguing that the definitive commitments of Robust Realism 
entail a thesis regarding the constitutive nature of phenomenal property instances, that their 
constitutive nature is exhausted by their experienced nature. From here, I argue that 
spatiotemporal inclusion and causal interaction, the two principal means of forging a 
metaphysical connection between experiences and a metaphysically real world, aren’t 
available to Robust Realists. I then argue for a thesis regarding the nature of relations, 
roughly, that relations necessarily implicate their relata. This thesis forms the basis for my 
case against the nascent Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, and combines with 
other considerations to constitute a case for the impossibility of the kind of transcendentally 
real representation of phenomenal properties that Robust Realism is founded upon.    
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The aim of this thesis is to determine the implications of a form of realism regarding 
phenomenal properties I refer to as Robust Realism. The aim of this first chapter is to 
motivate such a project by demonstrating that less committal forms of phenomenal realism 
face dialogic difficulties in resisting Daniel Dennett’s phenomenal eliminativism.  
Section 2 focuses on the passage in Dennett’s Consciousness Explained that, according to 
David Chalmers (1996 p. 190), sets out his main argument for the explanatory adequacy of 
deflationary accounts of consciousness. I argue that Chalmers’ is a misinterpretation, as 
Dennett isn’t advancing an argument, but rather, a potential strategy for the elimination of 
qualia. The strategy (which I call Dennettian Dissolution) explains away phenomenal 
properties by way of an appeal to mistaken judgements to the effect that one encounters such 
properties.  
In section 3, I draw attention to a peculiar feature of the debate between Dennett and his non-
deflationist rivals, its paucity of argument. Dennett offers no direct argument for the claim 
that phenomenal properties are mere intentional objects of mistaken judgements, and non-
deflationary phenomenal realists offer no reasons (conceptually inflected semantic contents) 
in support of their realism concerning qualia. I then outline the desiderata each party relies on 
in theory choice here (an issue that will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2). While 
Dennett places a premium on theory building considerations, non-deflationary realists place a 
premium on acquaintance-based certainty.  
Discussion of the centrality of immediate acquaintance for non-deflationary realism draws 
attention to the transcendentally realistic orientation of the view. This is the focus of section 4 
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of the chapter. Non-deflationary realism has it that experience puts us in immediate contact 
with the transcendental (as opposed to ‘merely’ empirical, epistemic or notional) reality of 
phenomenal properties. Deflationary views, in contrast, postulate a kind of role-theoretic 
mediation that distances us from phenomenal properties in-themselves. Our very concept of 
consciousness is opaque and role-theoretic. I argue that while this distancing move has a 
degree of historical precedent, given the tendency towards epistemic-role essentialism among 
classical sense-data theorists, contemporary non-deflationary realists are properly careful to 
distinguish the distinctively qualitative essence of phenomenal properties from any 
theoretical role properties possessive of such an essence might play.  
In section 5, I then draw attention to an essential connection between physically reductive 
theories of phenomenal properties and Dennett’s strategy. Any attempted reduction of 
experiences to physical properties must, I argue, invoke Dennettian Dissolution at some 
point. In section 6, I argue, if Dennett’s strategy works at all, it works in a wide variety of 
cases. Any objection to Dennett’s eliminativism by reductivists, therefore, is on difficult 
ground. Non-reductive realists have also invoked Dennettian Dissolution on occasions, 
thereby conceding significant ground to Dennett. In section 6.1 I discuss a textbook example, 
the Dennettian Dissolution of phenomenal depth common among earlier empiricists. In 
section 6.2 I discuss a more wide-ranging tendency to invoke Dennettian Dissolution with 
respect to the more cognitive-cum-conceptual aspects of phenomenology, flagging an issue 
that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 – that of the particular relation such 
phenomenology bears to actual cognition and conceptuality.  
Finally, section 7 brings my primary objective in this thesis into focus. Inasmuch as Dennett’s 
eliminativist strategy invites wider application once invoked, a degree of theoretical 
importance accrues to views characterised by a forbearance of Dennettian Dissolution tout 
court. I call acquaintance-based phenomenal realism that outrightly rejects this strategy 
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Robust Realism. The bulk of this thesis then critically considers the implications of this view. 
I close the chapter by plotting a course for subsequent chapters. 
2. The Real Dennett on Real Seeming
In his eliminativist manifesto, Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett offers a highly 
deflationist account of consciousness, one cast solely in terms of notions such as reportability 
and judgement, and, most significantly, making no mention of a peculiar species of 
phenomenal properties. Having done so, he enters into a much-discussed dialogue with his 
doubtful interlocutor Otto. The dialogue centres upon a visual illusion on the book’s dust 
jacket, the appearance of pinkness on a non-pink surface. In short, Otto, Dennett’s 
interlocutor, thinks a theory of consciousness cast solely in terms of notions such as 
judgement and reportability fails to account for such appearances. Dennett (1993a p. 363) 
thinks all that needs to be accounted for here is a false judgement: “there isn’t any pinkish 
glowing ring”. Otto agrees that there’s no pinkish glowing ring, but insists that there seems to 
be one, and it’s “that ring” that remains unaccounted for (Dennett 1993a p. 363). Dennett 
(1993a p.363) replies that “There is no such thing as a pink ring that merely seems to be”. 
Otto then insists he doesn’t just “think there seems to be a pinkish glowing ring; there really 
seems to be a pinkish glowing ring” (1993a p. 363). At this point, Dennett (1993a p. 364) 
makes his crucial move:  
Now you’ve done it. You’ve fallen in a trap, along with a lot of others. You seem to think 
there’s a difference between thinking (judging, deciding, being of the heartfelt opinion that) 
something seems pink to you and something really seeming pink to you. But there is no 
difference. There is no such phenomenon as really seeming – over and above the 
phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the case. 
David Chalmers (1996 p. 190) sees the foregoing dialogue, Dennett’s response in particular, 
as the book’s dialogically pivotal moment. On this much, we are in agreement. It is here that 
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Dennett’s eliminativist strategy is laid bare. But while Chalmers takes Dennett to be putting 
forward a relatively weak argument to the effect that his deflationist theory of consciousness 
accounts for all that needs to be accounted for, I take him to be proffering a potent 
explanatory strategy that promises to solve the problem of consciousness so long as its 
method is accepted. I’ll briefly discuss Chalmers’ gloss on the passage in question before 
explaining why I think it fails to do Dennett justice.   
Chalmers (2010 p. 31) credits Daniel Dennett with being “one of the few philosophers who 
has attempted to give” arguments intended to overturn “prima facie intuitions” to the effect 
that “the question of explaining experience is distinct from questions about explaining 
various functions”. He gleans one such argument from the foregoing dialogue, describing it 
as “perhaps the central argument of Consciousness Explained” (Chalmers 1996 p. 190).  
(P1) A theory of experience needs to explain why things seem the way they do to us. 
(P2) Dennett’s theory explains why things seem the way they do to us.  
(C) Dennett’s theory explains what a theory of experience needs to explain.
Chalmers (1996 p. 190) goes on to describe this as an “elegant argument, with a ring of 
plausibility that many reductionist arguments about consciousness lack”, but maintains that it 
trades on an equivocation: 
[This argument’s] elegance derives from the way it exploits a subtle ambiguity in the notion 
of “seeming,” which balances on the knife-edge between the phenomenal and psychological 
realms. There is a phenomenal sense of “seem,” in which for things to seem a certain way is 
just for them to be experienced a certain way. And there is a psychological sense of “seem,” 
in which for things to seem a certain way is for us to be disposed to judge that they are that 
way. 
Chalmers isn’t the first philosopher to make this distinction. Chisholm (1957 p. 43) flags the 
same ambiguity more than thirty years previously: “Appear words – “appear,” “seem,” 
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“look,” “sound,” “feel,” “smell,” and the like – have many uses”. He goes on to make a 
threefold distinction between the epistemic, comparative and noncomparative senses of 
‘appear’- words (Chisholm 1957 pp. 44-50). Their epistemic sense corresponds to Chalmers’ 
psychological sense, their noncomparative sense to his phenomenal sense,1their comparative 
sense to the sense in which to say ““x appears so-and-so” ... is to compare x with things that 
are so and so” (Chisholm 1957 p. 45).2 Earlier still, Price (1941 p. 288) can be found making 
an exactly analogous twofold distinction between senses of the word ‘appear’, one having 
“reference to judgements or assertions”, the other having “reference to sensations”. 
That ‘appear’-words have a phenomenal sense which needn’t implicate psychological 
categories, intellectual capacities and such isn’t an eccentric view held only by those living 
on the non-reductivist margins. Dretske (1995 pp. 67, 68; 2008 p. 731) distinguishes the 
phenomenal sense of such terms from their epistemic, or, in other texts, their doxastic, sense 
so as to maintain the “distinction between sentience and sapience” he is committed to in his 
work on perception. The commonsensical nature of such a distinction is well encapsulated in 
the following quote:  
The details I experience are not always reflected in my judgements about the world (or my 
judgements, if I make them, about my experience). So my judgements do not always – 
perhaps they never – track my conscious experiences of the world (Dretske 1995 p. 114).   
That those of the non-reductivist minority also endorse such a distinction is a given. To be so 
uncharitable as to afford all their uses of ‘appear’-words intellectualist senses would be to 
render their views so ridiculous that the ongoing engagement with them by the philosophical 
1 When explicating Chisholm’s distinction, Jackson (1977 p. 30) relabels the noncomparative sense thusly. 
2 There will be no further discussion of the comparative sense, but it is noteworthy that even the qualia freak’s 
beloved ‘what it’s like’ locution has a comparative sense (Lewis 1999 p. 265). 
2 There will be no further discussion of the comparative sense, but it is noteworthy that even the qualia freak’s 
beloved ‘what it’s like’ locution has a comparative sense (Lewis 1999 p. 265). 
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community, including Dennett himself, would be a puzzling discredit to all concerned. 
Consider Robinson’s (1994 p. 32) formulation of his ‘Phenomenal Principle’:  
If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible 
quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible 
quality.  
Were the qualifier ‘sensibly’ dropped, and ‘appear’, ‘aware’ and such afforded purely 
intellectual senses, nobody would subscribe to this principle. Nobody thinks, say, that 
whenever a subject is disposed to judge something possesses a sensible quality, there is 
something of which that subject is somehow intellectually aware, aware in the manner that I 
am aware of Big Ben for instance, that possesses it. Someone who doesn’t know that dogs 
have no colour vision might be disposed to judge that their experiences, minds, brains or 
whatever are possessive of sensible colour qualities. That person would be wrong, and no 
other thing would possess such qualities on account of he or she being disposed thus.3 
Is Dennett guilty of such pathological disingenuousness? No. After all, Dennett (1993a p. 
364) acknowledges the prevalence of a belief in a distinctly phenomenal form of seeming,
real seeming, as he calls it, in the very passage from which Chalmers purports to derive the 
foregoing argument: “You seem to think there’s a difference between thinking (judging, 
deciding, being of the heartfelt opinion that) something seems pink to you and something 
really seeming pink to you”. Dennett knows his enemy all too well. He has conceded on more 
than one occasion that it seems as if there are qualia. Given that qualia are phenomenal 
seemings, the real thetic seemings he is at pains to discredit, this is tantamount to conceding 
that it seems, in the purely intellectual sense he sanctions, that things seem some way or other 
in the thetic phenomenal sense he doesn’t sanction. It can intellectually seem that something 
3 Presumably Robinson wants the strength of his conditional to be such that the consequent holds on account of 
the antecedent holding. 
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is so without it being so. Such is the case, according to Dennett, for the qualia freak. He or 
she mistakenly thinks things phenomenally seem some way or other. A fairer appraisal of 
Dennett’s position would emphasise this subordination of phenomenal seeming to intellectual 
seeming. 4 He thinks that how things phenomenally seem to us is sufficiently explained in 
terms of mistaken judgements to the effect that things seem that way. Let us call the 
explanatory technique he proposes Dennettian Dissolution. 
Dennettian Dissolution – The explaining away of things phenomenally seeming some 
way by appeal to it wrongly seeming, in a merely intellectual sense, that things 
phenomenally seem that way. 
The ‘explaining away’ locution is crucial, as is the qualification ‘wrongly’. Dennettian 
Dissolution is not merely the explaining of phenomenal properties in terms of thoughts that 
they are instantiated, such that thoughts to the effect that certain phenomenal properties are 
instantiated somehow constitutively yield instances of those very properties. It is an 
eliminativist strategy, one directly invoking the distinction between the senses of ‘seeming’ 
that Chalmers accuses Dennett of equivocating on.   
4 Chalmers would nonetheless be more than justified in claiming that Dennett exploits the ambiguity of 
‘appear’-words. Dennett’s use of language connotative of phenomenal notions definitely disguises the radical 
nature of his position. For instance, he describes consciousness as a “user illusion”. The term ‘illusion’ does 
appear in doxastic contexts, such as when Frank Sinatra assures us that the belief that love and marriage can be 
separated is an illusion, but it is more suggestive of illusory phenomenal, rather than doxastic, appearances, 
appearances the existence of which he wishes to deny. The term ‘delusion’, on the other hand, has stronger 
intellectual connotations; intuitively one can have illusory phenomenal appearances without being deluded 
inasmuch as one believes them to be just that. To tell one’s readership that they are deluded might be to risk 
offending them, but if in offering a watered down description of their condition, one risks playing to the very 
delusion one is wishing to disburden them of, it might be argued that one should risk offence or just not bother. 
I’ve had more than one conversation with people that have casually read Dennett who make comments to the 
effect that he doesn’t really deny phenomenal experience, proof enough that a less attentive reader, especially 
one sympathetic to naturalism and intuitively sceptical of the so called ‘hard problem of consciousness’, might 
buy in without suffering the buyer’s remorse those of us that are sympathetic to the idea of a sui generis 
phenomenal species of seeming, looking, appearing etc think he or she should. 
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3. Arguments Anyone?
To claim that we merely mistakenly think things phenomenally seem some way or other is 
not to demonstrate that it is so. Is Dennett’s case any better for resting, not upon a question 
begging argument, but upon an unargued assertion (and a counterintuitive one at that)? 
Dennett’s paucity of argument hasn’t gone without comment. Howard Robinson (1994 p. 
198) describes Dennett’s approach as the “Jericho Method”: “He believes that marching
around a philosophical problem often enough, proclaiming what are, plausibly, relevant 
scientific truths, the problem will dissolve before our eyes”.  
But as Chalmers (2010 p. 33) himself acknowledges, Dennett might be in a position to treat 
complaints of this kind, when coming from phenomenal realists, as instances of the pot 
calling the kettle black, as phenomenal realists, likewise, proffer no arguments for the 
existence of their beloved qualia. Arguments like the knowledge argument and the zombie 
argument aren’t arguments for the existence of qualia, but rather, arguments for their 
irreducibility, which take their existence for granted. This is most obvious in the case of the 
zombie argument.5 The possibility of a ‘zombie twin world’, a world that is physically 
identical to ours but lacking phenomenology, is only a threat to physicalism on the 
assumption that such a world wouldn’t be the same as ours in that respect; that is, that an 
identical twin world wouldn’t be a zombie twin world. In other words, it’s a threat to 
physicalism on the assumption of phenomenal realism. The situation with the knowledge 
argument is a little more complicated.6 The thought experiment from which the argument 
derives has it that when Mary, the brilliant colour scientist who has learnt everything there is 
to know about the physical aspects of colour vision from the confines of a black and white 
5 For a sympathetic exposition of the zombie argument, see Chalmers (1996 pp. 94-99).  
6 For the canonical formulation discussed here, see Jackson (1982 p. 130). For further variations on the theme, 
see Jackson (1982 pp. 129, 130) and Robinson (1982 p. 4).  
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room, finally escapes the room and sees a tomato, she comes to know a fact of which she was 
heretofore unaware, namely, what it’s like to see red. The derivation of an argument about 
actual states of affairs from such a thought experiment depends upon the situation it describes 
being appropriately comparable in certain respects to actual states of affairs. While Mary’s 
cognitive capacities are highly idealized, her perceptual capacities, and the world in which 
she finds herself, are supposed to be very much like ours. Most importantly, we are to assume 
ourselves to possess knowledge of the kind Mary only gains upon escape; i.e. we assume 
phenomenal realism. In like manner, the ‘arguments for sense-data’ that pervade early 
analytic epistemology are arguments, not for the existence of sense-data, usually regarded as 
phenomenal particulars of immediate acquaintance, but for their non-identity with physical 
object surfaces. The argument from illusion, for instance, takes for granted the existence of 
phenomenal appearances in certain perceptual cases.7  It is an argument to the effect that, 
given certain doubtlessly existent properties of such doubtlessly existent appearances don’t 
inhere in the surfaces of the relevant physical objects, it is merely the appearances 
themselves, and not the physical objects, to which we have immediate perceptual access. If 
reasons for a claim are conceptually inflected contents, propositions (or, for the more 
nominalistically inclined, sentences)8 from which such a claim can be validly inferred, 
phenomenal realists have historically offered no reason at all for their realism. 
It would nonetheless be an injustice to the sophistication and nuance of the dialogue to reduce 
it to a mere table-thumping match. There is a sense in which, in marching around the problem 
in the manner described by Robinson, Dennett, by his own lights, is securing a solid case for 
eliminativism. Likewise, many resigned phenomenal realists are completely unperturbed by 
7 For a relatively straightforward exposition of the argument from illusion, see Ayer (1969 pp. 1-11).  
8 For now at least let us put to one side the view, maintained, for instance, by McDowell (1994 p. 9), that 
experiences themselves constitute such contents.    
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charges of paucity of argument on their part, as they believe their realism to be more solidly 
founded than any conviction premised upon reasons, taken in the foregoing sense.    
3.1 Integrate or Die: Dennett’s Quinean Imperative 
Turning first to Dennett, his intention, in marching around the problem as he does, is to bring 
the theoretically intransigent nature of qualia into relief. For anyone who subscribes to 
Quine’s (1939 p. 708) famous dictum that “To be is to be the value of a variable”, albeit in 
our best empirical theories, such intransigence alone constitutes grounds for elimination. This 
is the primary motivation for the various forms of deflationism regarding consciousness in 
contemporary philosophical literature. Our best empirical theories, it is claimed, are physical 
theories, and qualia, at least as characterised by realists of a non-deflationist stripe, simply 
won’t integrate. The sentiment has been well articulated by Smart (1991 p. 169):  
It seems to me that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able 
to be seen as physicochemical mechanisms: it seems that even the behaviour of man himself 
will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms. There does seem to be, so far as science is 
concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical 
constituents ... That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course 
with descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together – roughly, biology is to 
physics as radio-engineering is to electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations 
seems to me frankly unbelievable.  
In ‘Quining Qualia’, Dennett (1993b p. 394) makes the case that the ‘limited evidential 
powers of neurophysiology’ are such that even at the ideal limits of enquiry, it might be 
impossible to make a principled judgement regarding the point within the plausibly relevant 
physiological processes where “qualia might appear as properties of [a] phase of [such] 
process[es]”. Dennett (1993b p. 394) asks us to imagine a subject, Chase, whose taste buds 
have been “surgically inverted” in such a way that “post-operatively, sugar tastes salty, salt 
tastes sour, etc” but who has “subsequently compensated – as revealed by his behaviour. He 
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now says that the sugary substance we place on his tongue is sweet, and no longer favours 
gravy on his ice cream”. He then cites two possible explanations. Chase’s qualia might still 
be abnormal, but adjustments in “his memories of how things used to taste” make it such that 
“he no longer notices any anomaly”, or, instead, “the memory-comparison step occurs just 
prior to the qualia phase in taste perception”, so “it now yields the same old qualia for the 
same stimulation” (Dennett 1993b p. 395). Dennett (1993b p. 395) writes, “These seem to be 
two substantially different hypotheses, but the physiological evidence, no matter how well 
developed, will not tell us on which side of memory to put qualia”. He thinks it particularly 
noteworthy that third-personal empirical investigation would fail on this score “in spite of 
being better evidence than the subject’s own introspective convictions” (Dennett 1993b p. 
395). One of the possibilities, after all, involves memory corruption. Even if one were to 
attribute traditional Cartesian infallibility to Chase, such infallibility has only ever extended 
to the experiences one is in fact having, not to those one has had. Chase might have infallible 
access to conscious memory episodes, but this isn’t the same as infallible knowledge of the 
veracity of such episodes. Theoretical indeterminacy of this kind could be said to be 
Dennett’s proposed grounds for eliminativism, Dennettian Dissolution his proposed means.  
3.2 Better Than Reasons: Justification by Acquaintance 
Turning now to those phenomenal realists who insist, without argument, upon the existence 
of phenomenal properties, they are wont to maintain that it is experience itself, rather than 
further conceptually inflected contents,9 that forms the basis for their realism. Chalmers 
(1996 p. 196) writes:  
What justifies our beliefs about our experiences, if not a causal link to those experiences, and 
if it is not the mechanisms by which the beliefs are formed? I think the answer to this is clear: 
9 Once again, I shelve the issue of whether or not experiences themselves constitute such contents. 
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it is having the experience that justifies the beliefs. For example, the very fact that I have a 
red experience now provides justification for my belief that I am having a red experience.  
Chalmers’ (1996 p. 196) reason for ruling out causally mediated ‘reliabilist’forms of 
justification with respect to beliefs about experiences is that “they make our access to 
consciousness mediated ... But intuitively, our access to consciousness is not mediated at all”. 
It is instructive that Chalmers speaks of the fact that he is having a red experience. Positive 
facts presumably supervene on the states of affairs on account of which they are indeed facts, 
the very states of reality that make beliefs in such facts true beliefs. For phenomenal realists 
like Chalmers, every experience directly acquaints us with the truth-maker for the claim that 
it exists, that the particular phenomenal properties and relations it instantiates exist, and truth-
makers for more general claims, that phenomenal properties in general exist, that properties 
of the various phenomenal kinds it instantiates exist, that something exists etc. To ask for 
reasons in such a case is to ask for something less than we have. Why trade the very thing 
that makes a claim true for mere representations, as apt for falsity as they are truth, which 
establish the claim’s truth only if they are indeed true? That we ever rely on such 
representations is testament to our epistemically impoverished predicament; as Kant (cited in 
Allison 1983 p. 23) once wrote, “... God does not require the process of reasoning because, 
since all things are crystal clear to his gaze ... he has no need of analysis as the darkened night 
of our intelligence necessarily has”.  
4. Role-Theoretic Essentialism: Kantian Themes
In the last section I briefly outlined the motivations behind both Dennett’s phenomenal 
eliminativism and the phenomenal realism of such philosophers as Chalmers.  In this section 
I argue that the differing motivations here can be situated within a broader intellectual 
tradition involving the reception of what I will call Kant’s distancing move, a strategy 
embraced by reductivists and rejected by non-reductivists. I will argue that while the historic 
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emergence of such a strategy is unsurprising, given a tendency towards epistemic 
essentialism among classical sense-data theorists, contemporary non-reductive realism is 
premised upon a rejection of the role-theoretic essentialism required for its application.    
It is noteworthy that Henry Allison cites the foregoing passage from Kant as an example of 
how his pre-critical writings embodied the transcendentally realist perspective he would later 
abandon. If Allison’s ‘non-phenomenalistic’ interpretation of Kant is correct, phenomenal 
realism of the foregoing kind is yet another form of the kind of transcendental realism Kant 
wished to dispense with. Kant, according to Allison, maintained that early empiricists like 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume were “guilty of confusing appearances with things in themselves” 
(Allison 1983 pp. 19, 23). Putnam (1981 pp. 62, 63) also attributes such a view to Kant: 
“Kant says again and again, and in different words, that the objects of inner sense are not 
transcendentally real (noumenal), that they are ‘transcendentally ideal’ (things for us), and 
that they are no more and no less directly knowable than so-called ‘external’ objects”. Galen 
Strawson unabashedly avows transcendental realism of this kind: “...we are acquainted with 
reality as it is in itself, in certain respects, in having experience as we do” (cited in Goff 2006 
p. 55). Chalmers’ (1996 pp. 154, 208) view is a little more complicated, as he remains open
to the possibility that while experience betrays, in a direct and unmediated way, the being of 
instances of phenomenal properties, such instances might have non-phenomenal 
‘protophenomenal’ constituent realisers.10 But the being of those property instances, as 
betrayed in experience, is, nonetheless, their being in a transcendentally realist sense, not in 
any ‘merely’ empirical, epistemic or notional, sense. In his publicly available response to the 
Philpapers survey, Chalmers expresses a preference for a correspondence, rather than a 
deflationary, or, more importantly for our purposes, an epistemic, conception of truth (Profile 
10 The coherence of this view will be called into question in Chapter 3. 
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for David Chalmers). The truth-makers for truths aren’t functions of our conceptual 
framework, the ideal limits of enquiry etc. They are aspects of reality as it is in itself. The 
phenomenal properties purportedly functioning as truth-makers for claims about experiences 
are no different. Such properties are, in Kantian parlance, empirically ideal inasmuch as they 
inhere in minds, taken in the broad Cartesian sense, but such inherence is an absolute non-
conceptually constituted inherence in absolute non-conceptually constituted denizens of an 
absolute non-conceptually constituted reality. They are property instances in themselves. If 
they are in fact protophenomenally constituted, they are nonetheless as real as any other non-
fundamental property instances in mind independent reality. Assuming the falsity of 
mereological nihilism, they are perfectly real, an ontological free lunch given the being of 
their constitutive natures. Chalmers makes no distinction between the being for us of 
phenomenal properties and their being in itself.   
My reason for bringing Kant into the picture is not to engage directly with his critique of 
transcendental realism, but rather, because the ‘distancing’ move he makes, in insisting that 
nothing betrays itself, as it is in itself, to the mind, might be said to be the key move in all 
attempts at deflationism with respect to consciousness, both reductivist and eliminativist, that 
have found their way into contemporary philosophical literature.11 If Allison and Putnam are 
right, Kant might have been the first major figure in modern philosophy to endorse a topic-
neutral stance with respect to phenomenal properties, in opposition to the topic-specific 
characterisation endorsed by the early empiricists, along with contemporary philosophers like 
Strawson and Chalmers. The mind apprehends experiences, not as they are in themselves, but 
rather, opaquely, as something akin to placeholders in a conceptual economy.  
11 I will eventually discuss a view that eschews this distancing move but nonetheless has it that experiences are 
exhaustively constituted by physical properties, but I have not actually seen the view endorsed anywhere. Also, 
it is only discussed on account of the fact that it might initially seem to allow for a non-deflationary form of 
physical reduction.  
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Replace the conceptual economy peculiar to Kant’s transcendental idealism with the more 
contemporary, and, more realist, notion of a theoretical economy, and you have, according to 
one popular characterisation at least, the reductivist program of contemporary physicalists. A 
longstanding and widely held view has it that physical theory characterises its entities 
opaquely, as whatever it is that plays such and such a role, remaining silent about what such 
entities are like in and of themselves (Chalmers 2012a p. 348). If phenomenal properties can 
be exhaustively accounted for in terms of such properties, there is no topic-specific aspect of 
experience, qua experience, to be accounted for. The fact of the being of a phenomenal 
property is a matter of the relevant role being realised, not the intrinsic nature of the realiser. 
Of course, since the being of the realisation of the role supervenes on the being of the 
realiser, unmediated access to the being of such a property, the truth-maker for the claim that 
it exists, would still have to be unmediated access to the intrinsic realiser, only in this case, 
the realiser would have no bearing on the nature of the property qua phenomenal. 12 But 
nobody thinks our mind gives us unmediated access to the non-experiential constitutive 
realisers of our experiences. Such reductivists clearly eschew such immediacy, opting instead 
for a Kantian conception of mentality as exhaustively mediated, topic-neutral and 
representational.13  
The viability of this approach is subject to question. Realists like Chalmers and Strawson 
wholeheartedly reject the Kantian claim that phenomenal properties aren’t given immediately 
12 The claim that unmediated access to a property instance entails immediate access to its intrinsic realiser, while 
striking me as somewhat obvious, is nonetheless controversial. Chalmers, as we have already seen, thinks 
immediate access to the being of phenomenal property instances need not entail immediate access to the being 
of their constitutive realisers. I’ll be making what I believe to be a watertight case for the claim in Chapter 3. 
Those that disagree can ignore it for now, as nothing much hinges on it. It remains true, in any case, that role-
theoretic reductivists typically eschew immediate access in favour of a mediated, topic-neutral 
representationalism, and I’ll be discussing the prospect of a physicalism that retains immediate access soon 
enough.  
13 For a classic defense of the topic-neutral approach, see Smart (1991).  
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in experience as they are in themselves.14 As always, they will appeal directly to their 
putative truth-makers, the truth-makers they directly encounter, as their basis for rejecting 
such claims. The take home point of the knowledge argument is arguably not just that no 
amount of physical information yields the kind of topic-specific information given in 
consciousness, but no amount of opaque topic-neutral information of any kind. Mary could 
presumably have a role-theoretically complete dualistic account of phenomenal properties, 
which phenomenal properties covary with which brain states and such, before she escapes. 
She could know all there is to know about phenomenal colour properties short of their 
intrinsic phenomenal natures. But no amount of topic-neutral information will give her the 
topic-specific knowledge born of unmediated contact with those natures. 
Redefinition of qualia’s essence is stock in trade for phenomenal realists with reductive 
ambitions. If phenomenal properties are inherent natures, not subject to further analysis, their 
project is doomed from the get-go. Experience must be explicable in purely role-theoretic 
terms, such that the being of an experience is a matter of something, it matters not what, 
playing the experience role. For phenomenal realists like Chalmers (1996 p. 105), any such 
move constitutes evasion of the real issue: “To analyse consciousness in terms of some 
functional notion is either to change the subject or define away the problem. One might well 
define “world peace” as “a ham sandwich.” Achieving world peace becomes much easier, but 
it is a hollow achievement”.  
4.1 Epistemic Essentialism: Classical Sense-Data Theory 
If role-theoretic essentialism of this kind is so obviously inadequate, what has led so many 
philosophers of good standing to endorse some version of it or another? In the least, a degree 
14 To reiterate, Chalmers merely thinks that phenomenal properties or natures are immediately experienced, not 
necessarily their constituent realisers.  
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of historical sense can be made of such attempts. While Dennett might not be guilty of 
equivocating between epistemic and phenomenal senses of ‘appear’-words, other 
philosophers most certainly have been. Hegel (1977 §90), for instance, gives the initial 
impression of understanding and respecting the distinction at issue – “In apprehending it, we 
must refrain from trying to comprehend it” – but then goes on to treat sensuous receptivity as 
epistemic givenism, “sense-certainty”, and indict it as a means of knowing. More 
significantly, classical sense-data theory, the prominent form of non-reductive phenomenal 
realism directly preceding the advent of such role-theoretic reductionism, lent itself to such 
equivocation.15 Sense-data, on the classical conception, are immediate objects of perception 
that “have exactly the properties they appear to have” (Huemer 2011). The term ‘appear’ is 
presumably to be afforded its phenomenal sense in this instance.16 But sense-data were also 
afforded a unique epistemic role, that of being objects which, by virtue of one’s acquaintance 
with them, conferred justification on one’s empirical judgements, and one occasionally finds 
epistemological role-theoretic considerations being given priority over the dictates of naive 
phenomenology, even with respect to the question of the phenomenal character of sense-data 
(Huemer 2011). 
Consider Ayer’s response to the problem of the speckled hen. The purported problem is that 
when one has the “visual sense-datum which is yielded by a single glance at a speckled hen”, 
“the datum may be said to “comprise” many speckles”, but one might not be able to say with 
any degree of confidence exactly how many (Chisholm 1942 p. 368). The problem is meant 
to be that “the whole purpose of sense data ... is to reify how things look”, and in this case, 
15 Leading proponents of classical sense-data theory included Broad (1925), Russell (1998), Price (1950) and 
Ayer (1969).   
16 When asked by Brian Magee (1987 p. 315) to explain Russell’s influence on his own philosophy, A.J. Ayer 
says, “I still think that one should start with what Russell calls sense data – I now prefer the term ‘sense qualia’, 
because of a technical difference about whether you begin with particulars or with something more general, but 
for our present purposes it comes to the same thing”. 
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there doesn’t look to be any particular number of speckles (Robinson 1994 p. 191). Ayer’s 
(1969 p. 124) response is to bite the bullet - “If the sense-data do not appear to be 
enumerable, they really are not enumerable”. But this bullet clearly need only be bitten if one 
thinks the sense in which sense data “are as they appear”, or “reify how things look”, is 
epistemic, not phenomenal. The common sense view, previously articulated by Dretske, is 
that the manifold complexity of experience is never completely accounted for in judgement. 
So an experienced speckled hen surface might phenomenally seem/appear/look to have a 
determinate amount of speckles, on account of its determinate phenomenal character, 
without intellectually seeming/appearing/looking to have any particular number, i.e. without 
one making a judgement to the effect that that there is some determinate number of speckles, 
or even being capable of doing so with warrant sufficient to constitute knowledge (Robinson 
1994 p. 193).  
Ayer (1959 pp. 93, 94) suggests that “in saying that the sense field [corresponding to the 
surface of a striped tiger] contains a number of stripes, we need be saying no more than that it 
has the Gestalt quality of being striated”, a quality “which is not analysable in terms of a 
numerical disjunction of stripes”. It is not my intention to disparage the invocation of such 
qualities, ones which, in some sense, connote complexity without embodying it. On the 
contrary, there is at least one area in which naive phenomenology dictates that consciousness 
does in fact embody qualities of this kind. As Colin McGinn (2013 p. 93) has recently 
pointed out, conscious entertainment of thoughts involving what are intuitively complex 
concepts needn’t, and generally doesn’t, involve their analytic complexity registering in 
experience. McGinn (2013 pp. 95, 98) goes on to postulate a “mysterious mechanism of 
synthesis”, whereby consciousness unifies the disparate analytic components of such 
concepts in a manner which effaces their disparity. Whether or not this further claim is 
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plausible,17 it does seem true that there is something it’s like to entertain thoughts of complex 
things, or of complexity itself for that matter, and that the complexity consciously considered 
isn’t embodied in the conscious considering. But this is beside the point, as naive 
phenomenology dictates that visually experienced complexity is in fact embodied in visual 
experience. Standing directly in front of an optical art painting containing several hundred 
dots and attempting to visually take it all in, I would describe my phenomenology as follows: 
There are more unambiguous dot appearance instances in the part of the visual field 
constituting the locus of my visual attention alone than I am capable of cognitively 
accounting for. Those unambiguous instances quickly shade into borderline cases, dot 
appearances under some but not all precisifications, but it seems that even the peripheral 
extremes of my visual field, which admit of the least complexity, have more going on than 
I’m capable of cognitively accounting for.     
Admittedly, it’s not clear Ayer himself insists that all sense-data must be cognitively 
accounted for. His rejection of “the possibility of there being sense-data whose existence is 
not noticed at the time they are sensed” has nonetheless been construed as an avowal of such 
a view; ‘noticing’ carries implications of participation in a cognitive-cum-epistemic economy 
(Ayer 1969 p. 125). It is on this basis that Price (1941 p. 288, 289) accuses him of conflating 
what we have been calling the epistemic and phenomenal senses of ‘appear’, and, in doing so, 
having made the “mistake of the idealist who maintained that all cognition is judging, and 
denied the existence of acquaintance”. In his response to Price, Ayer (1959 p. 101) goes some 
way towards distancing himself from this view, endorsing “a sense of acquaintance with, or 
direct apprehension of, sense-data that does not entail the making of any judgement about 
them” (Ayer 1959 p. 101). But he remains adamant that there is no “legitimate use of the 
17 The Constitution Thesis argued for in Chapter 3 rules out any account of the constitution of cognitive 
phenomenology that extends beyond its experienced nature.  
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words ‘look’ and ‘notice’ ... such as to justify ... attaching meaning to the statement that ‘my 
sense-datum of the flower really was sky-blue, but I noticed only that it was bluish’” (Ayer 
1959 p. 102). Ayer’s attempt to explain why not, while less than clear, seems to focus upon 
the need for an “adequate criterion of the characteristics that the physical object appears to 
have, or the sense-datum really has”. Inasmuch as the notion of a criterion in play here seems 
to be a subjective epistemic one, Ayer still appears to be letting epistemic considerations 
trump phenomenological considerations with respect to the question of the character of 
phenomenology.   
4.2 From Explanans to Explanandum: Qualia’s Qualitative Essence 
Given that even the prominent phenomenal realists of the time were sometimes willing to 
compromise phenomenological adequacy so as to force a fit between phenomenal properties 
and the epistemic role they afforded such properties, it is perhaps unsurprising that a wave of 
role-theoretic reductionism followed.18 But it is perhaps equally unsurprising that in the face 
of such a gear change, phenomenal realists were reminded that their initial case for sense-data 
rested, not upon role-theoretic considerations (‘Our best empirical theories postulate 
properties that play such and such a role’), but upon a direct appeal to phenomenology, 
(‘Whether or not some physical object possesses property x, experience makes it patently 
clear that something does’). A new form of phenomenal realism thus emerged, one which 
emphasised the natures thus revealed, taken as they are in themselves, over any theoretical 
load bearing work they might ultimately be capable of performing. The natures themselves, 
not any role they might play, came to be taken as determinative of the essence of 
phenomenality. Chalmers (1996 p.105) writes, “Although conscious states may play various 
18 Early proponents included Smart (1991) and Lewis (1966). Functionalism’s rise to orthodoxy served to 
consolidate the role-theoretic approach, as functional properties are role-theoretic properties par excellence 
(Heil 1998 pp. 89, 96).     
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causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. Rather, what makes them conscious is 
that they have a certain phenomenal feel”. Qualia type subjective states, not on the basis of 
their epistemic roles, but rather, on the basis of how they feel, or, to use the canonical 
expression, what they are like (Chalmers 1996 pp. 11, 359). Phenomenal properties went 
from being unproblematic explanans in epistemic theories to being a problematic 
explanandum in metaphysical theories, properties any adequate metaphysics must properly 
account for. One hasn’t accounted for every aspect of reality if one hasn’t accounted for what 
it’s like to be a bat (Nagel 1979). So little came to be expected of phenomenal properties qua 
explanans that some were more than willing to entertain the prospect of their being causally 
inert epiphenomena (Jackson 1982 pp. 133-135). So much was their epistemic role 
downplayed that one finds Frank Jackson (1977 p. 106), after having built a non-standard 
case for sense-data around the analysis of ‘appear’-word statements, writing, “The conception 
of sense-data as the subjects of those fundamental judgements which form the foundations of 
our knowledge of the world around us is irrelevant for us ... perhaps sense data do have an 
important epistemological role to play, but on our approach that will be a discovery about 
them, not a matter of definition”. 
There are positive things to be said about such an essentially non-epistemic characterisation 
of the essential nature of experiences, appearances and such. It might, for instance, be said to 
cohere better with the varying positions they have assumed in the epistemic order throughout 
philosophical history. Their integration into the machinery of epistemology in early 
empiricist philosophy, as immediate epistemological givens forming the foundations for 
empirical knowledge, was testament to a newfound faith in the furnishings of the senses born 
of the recent successes of the new inductive paradigm within the natural sciences. Turn the 
clock back far enough and one finds Parmenides arguing that they are inherently deceptive, 
the Socrates of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave comparing the light of the sun to that of a flame 
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casting shadows on a cave’s wall, early expressions of distrust regarding the epistemic 
credentials of appearances that cast an enduring historical shadow (Plato 2003 pp. 156-159; 
Palmer 2012). Even in twentieth century philosophy qualia haven’t always appeared in the 
guise of immediate epistemological givens. For Wilfrid Sellars, for instance, knowledge of 
the sense impressions providing perceptions, imbibings of propositional contents, with their 
“raw feel” comes late in the epistemological game (Sellars 1995 "!#$% DeVries 2005 pp. 206-
211). They are third-personal theoretical postulates (Sellars 1995 "!60, 62).19  
But there is an obvious risk of overstating the degree to which this new form of phenomenal 
realism has distanced itself from epistemological concerns. After all, our discussion of the 
very direct manner in which contemporary non-reductive realists think their realist beliefs 
and claims are justified speaks to the peculiar place they take phenomenal properties to have 
in our epistemological life. As Chalmers (1996 p. 196) puts it, “Conscious experience lies at 
the center of our epistemic universe”. Were Jackson’s aforementioned analysis of ‘appear’-
words an exercise in pure linguistic analysis, concerned solely with the various linguistic 
roles such terms play, he couldn’t possibly have made a case for the existence of sense-data 
qua phenomenal particulars, taken in the non-reductive realist’s sense. Rather, he thinks a 
sense-data theory of the kind he endorses best articulates how the indisputably true 
“statements concerning ... looks and images” born of “attention to the phenomenology of 
visual perception” might be understood (Jackson 1977 pp. 106, 107).      
The important sense in which this contemporary form of qualia realism breaks with epistemic 
role essentialism is twofold. Firstly, it is thought possible, by some such realists at least, for 
19 Such a view might initially strike one as being totally at odds with the kind of realism about phenomenal 
properties currently under discussion, premised, as it is, upon an epistemic relation borne of immediate 
acquaintance. In Chapter 2, Sellars’ view will be shown not just to be somewhat compatible with industrial 
strength phenomenal realism of this kind, but a somewhat plausible adjunct.  
&'!
phenomenal properties to be instanced without playing any epistemic role at all. Chalmers 
(2010 pp. 287, 288) writes: 
It is plausible that a subject can have phenomenal properties without having corresponding 
concepts, corresponding beliefs, or corresponding justification ... Acquaintance [with 
experience] is not itself a conceptual relation: rather, it makes certain sorts of concepts 
possible. And it is not itself a justificatory relation: rather, it makes certain sorts of 
justification possible. Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge require not just 
acquaintance but also acquaintance in the right cognitive background: a cognitive 
background that minimally involves a certain sort of attention to the phenomenal quality in 
question, a cognitive act of concept formation, the absence of certain sorts of confusion and 
other undermining factors (for full justification), and so on. 
Chalmers (2010 pp. 285, 301) goes on to describe acquaintance with experience as a 
“nonconceptual epistemic relation”, but it is only epistemic inasmuch as it “carries the 
potential for conceptual and epistemic consequences”. Phenomenal properties need not play 
any epistemic role; they are merely apt to do so, which brings us to the second important 
sense in which the contemporary form of phenomenal realism under discussion breaks with 
epistemic-role essentialism. It is the nature of phenomenal properties that renders them thus 
apt. Their being thus apt isn’t constitutive of their nature.  
For this reason, the recent attempt by Charles Siewert (2011 p. 246) to define the popular 
phenomenal realist locution ‘what it’s like’, and even the term ‘phenomenal’, in terms of a 
property’s aptness for a certain kind of knowledge or curiosity with respect to the property it 
in fact is, is somewhat perplexing.20 The ordinary non-reductive realist would have it that 
what one can at least sometimes come to know by way of acquaintance with phenomenal 
properties, and, more importantly, what reductive accounts of consciousness fail to account 
20 Siewert (1998 pp. 66, 147), for the record, is a phenomenal realist who has shown a degree of sympathy for 
the non-reductivist cause.   
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for, is what they are like, their phenomenal nature. Siewert’s (2011 p. 246) redefinitions have 
it there being something that it’s like to have them is just their aptitude to be thus known, 
their being phenomenal just their being non-derivatively thus apt.21 This falls short of what 
such realists take themselves to have knowledge of when they speak of phenomenal 
properties and what they are like. They don’t think they merely gain knowledge of the 
aptitude of such properties for being known that way. Neither does Siewert (2011 p. 245): 
“The “subjective knowledge” of features invoked is specifically a knowledge of what 
features they are”. But he has shifted the meaning of talk of what such features are like and 
their phenomenal nature so as to refer, not to the features themselves, but their aptness for 
such knowledge. There is nothing to stop him from doing this, of course, but it’s unclear that 
anything has been gained. The key debate centres upon the natures themselves, and if one 
ceases to use the terms already used for them, new ones will be necessary, and those already 
in use don’t have the kind of obvious epistemic connotations that would justify such a 
meaning shift. Siewert (2011 pp. 245, 247) proposes such redefinitions because he thinks it 
preferable to taking the meanings of such locutions as primitive. For some non-reductive 
realist at least, such locutions refer to a nature not explicable in terms of something else, so 
they have to be.22  
There is also a prima facie case to be made that many phenomenal properties might not be apt 
for the kind of subjective knowledge Siewert speaks of. Consider the phenomenology one has 
when one looks at an optical art painting containing more than several hundred dots, making 
a manifestly futile attempt to ascertain at a glance exactly how many appearances of such 
dots inhabit your visual field. One’s total phenomenal state, in such a case, is an incredibly 
21 There’s only derivatively something it’s like to eat durian, but there’s non-derivatively something it’s like to 
have the relevant experience (Siewert 2011 p. 245). 
22 For others, like Chalmers, they might be explicable in terms of a further intrinsic nature. 
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complex phenomenal property incorporating the very amount of dots that it, taken 
holistically, constitutes the phenomenology of failed comprehension of. For one to have 
subjective knowledge of the instancing of this particular property is for there to be a 
somewhat alarming dissociation between phenomenology and cognition, the possibility of 
which, in the least, seems questionable.23  
5. Reductivism and Dennettian Dissolution
In this section I present my reasons for taking a physicalist reduction of qualia to make 
difficult, in the dialogic context, the rejection of Dennett’s own solution to the qualia 
problem.  I do this in two stages.  First, building on the background above I argue that to 
accept the Kantian distancing move (as some forms of physicalism do) is prima facie to 
accept the legitimacy of Dennettian dissolution.  Second, I then argue that other forms of 
physicalism, based on a different characterisation of physical properties, are also vulnerable 
to Dennettian dissolution. 
Suppose one were to be rationally converted in some way from unmediated topic-specific 
phenomenal realism to a mediated topic-neutral conception of the kind discussed previously. 
In such a case, presumably one can only say of one’s prior convictions regarding one’s 
unmediated topic-specific contact with phenomenal property instances that they were 
mistaken. In order to force a fit between experience and whatever it is taken to reduce to, the 
proponent of role-theoretic reduction must trade intransigent features of experience for 
mistaken thoughts that experience has those features. For the avid phenomenal realist, then, 
23 Chalmers (2012a p. 114) touches upon this issue in his recent constructivist manifesto, Constructing the 
World, in the midst of a discussion of his Cosmoscope, a device for delivering fundamental physical, 
phenomenal and indexical truths to an idealized rational subject that might thereby reason its way to most, if not 
all, other truths. Regarding how the cosmoscope might deliver phenomenal information, he writes, “One could 
think of the Cosmoscope as simply inducing the relevant experiences (that is, phenomenal states) in the user … 
But there may be difficulties: if we are simulating certain states of anger or stupor, entering into such a state 
may undermine the capacity for reasoning” (Chalmers 2012a pp. 115, 116).  
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to accept the feasibility of Kant’s distancing move will be one and the same as accepting the 
feasibility of Dennettian Dissolution in this case.      
Were the foregoing characterisation of physical theory as an opaque description of reality 
universally accepted, it would seem that any reduction of phenomenal properties to physical 
properties would be a deflationary form of reduction, one that takes experiences to be 
something less than naive phenomenology would suggest. No amount of topic-neutral role-
theoretic information, the kind of information about red experiences that Mary can be 
apprised of while still in her black and white room, can ever entail the kind of topic-specific 
information about intrinsic natures seemingly betrayed by our actual experiences of redness. 
An endorsement of such reduction would therefore constitute a tacit endorsement of 
Dennett’s strategy. But not everyone accepts such a characterisation of physical theory. Some 
instead maintain that the role-theoretic characterisation of reality bequeathed by a complete 
and correct physical theory would be an exhaustive description of reality. The network of 
role-theoretic relations articulated by such a theory needn’t have further intrinsic realisers. 24 
The network of relations is all there is. Physics, in such a case, is topic-specific.  
An advocate of this conception of physics is still in a position to embrace the Kantian 
distancing move, that is, to endorse a reductivist account of experiencing that eschews its 
topic-specific immediacy, but this would likewise be one and the same as embracing 
Dennettian Dissolution. Might a physically reductive phenomenal realism premised upon this 
conception of physical properties be capable of accounting for the topic-specific acquaintance 
with phenomenal properties that philosophers like Chalmers and Strawson claim to have? 
Chalmers, at least, has no problem with the property instances with which his experience 
constitutes immediate contact having non-phenomenal constituent realisers. What prevents 
24 For a defense of such a view, see Chapter 3 of Ladyman & Ross (2007). 
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physical properties, thus characterised, from being the constituent realisers of such 
properties? Might this form of physicalism be compatible with a non-deflationary 
phenomenal realism, one which at no point invokes Dennett’s strategy?  
In this case, it’s not the mere immediacy of experience that Dennettian Dissolution must be 
invoked to do away with; it’s the properties immediately given. In making his case for the 
irreducibility of experience to physical properties, Chalmers (1996 p. 118) draws attention to 
the essentially structural-cum-dynamical nature of physical theory: 
… the basic elements of physical theories seem always to come down to two things: the 
structure and dynamics of physical processes. Different theories invoke different sorts of 
structure. Newtonian physics invokes a Euclidean space-time; relativity theory invokes a 
non-Euclidean differential manifold; quantum theory invokes a Hilbert space for wave 
functions. And different theories invoke different kind of dynamics within those structures: 
Newton’s laws, the principle of relativity, the wave equations of quantum mechanics. 
Immediately hereafter he provides the grounds for the incompatibility of the kind of 
phenomenal realism he endorses with a theory of reality cast solely in these terms:    
But from structure and dynamics, we can only get more structure and dynamics.  This allows 
the possibility of satisfying explanations of all sorts of high-level structural and functional 
properties, but conscious experience will remain untouched. No set of facts about physical 
structure and dynamics can add up to a fact about phenomenology.  
Taken as intended, Chalmers’ claim that structural-cum-dynamical facts never alone entail 
non-structural-cum-dynamical facts is relatively uncontroversial. The one remotely plausible 
objection to such a claim comes from the advocates of the view opposed to the one presently 
under consideration, who maintain that all facts of the instantiation of structure entail the 
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existence of an intrinsic nature thus structured,25 and sometimes, additionally, that all facts of 
the instantiation of dynamics entail an intrinsic ground for those dynamics.26 Chalmers most 
definitely doesn’t wish to weigh in against such claims.27 His point is rather that there is no 
level of complexity at which purely structural-cum-dynamical facts neatly segue into non-
structural-cum-dynamical facts, and the natures immediately given in experience, he 
maintains, aren’t exclusively structural cum dynamical.  
Consciousness, no doubt, admits of structure. It is phenomenal structure, but it’s not 
immediately obvious that this presents any kind of problem for reduction, so long as the 
constitution of the phenomenal by the non-phenomenal is yet to be ruled out. Structural types 
are constituted by altogether different structural types all the time. Consciousness also 
possesses dynamics, at least in the sense that we experience dynamical temporal phenomena, 
motion, change etc. Once again such dynamics seem distinct from the nomological dynamics 
of physical theory,28 but were consciousness to consist only of said structure and dynamics, 
25 Foster (2008 p. 82), for instance, speaks of “the intrinsic nature of physical space that transcends its 
geometrical structure – that aspect that forms the qualitative nature of the thing that possesses the geometrical 
structure”.  
26 For a structural Humean like David Lewis (1986a pp. ix-xii), the intrinsic grounding of structure suffices for 
the intrinsic grounding of dynamics (Blackburn 1990 p. 65). For others, like Strawson (2008), the intrinsic 
grounding of dynamical facts requires the instantiation of intrinsic non-Humean “propensities” or “powers”.   
27 Chalmers (2012a pp. 350, 352) has expressed a degree of sympathy for what he calls ‘graspable thick 
quiddities’, intrinsic ‘substantal natures’ with respect to which it is possible to form a “quiddistic concept: 
intuitively, one that picks out the property not by its role but by its intrinsic character”.   
28 Our experiences hardly admit of the kind of patterned consistency that would allow some kind of Humean 
nomology to be read off them. Experiences aren’t ordinarily thought to have an internal nomology, but rather, to 
be subsumed within a greater nomological order. (Leibniz’s monads had an internal nomology, appetition, but 
they were hardly straightforward phenomenal manifolds. Each one bore all the complexity of the universe, and 
the majority somehow extended into non-consciousness (trans. Rescher 1991 pp. 18, 19)). Experiences betray an 
appearance of law-like-ness inasmuch as their phenomenal character is such as to give the sense of immersion 
in a nomically well-behaved world, but this is not to be conflated with the law-like-ness of appearance. That our 
experiences don’t admit of non-Humean dynamical features might be thought the upshot of the infamous 
historical catalyst for Humeanism, Hume’s claim that experience never betrays any kind of necessitation relation 
between successive contents. Howard Robinson makes the following comment in response to the Philpapers 
survey question ‘Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?’: “In the empirical world it is Humean, but this is 
underpinned by Divine Will. That is, Berkeley is correct which both is and is not Humean” (Profile for Howard 
Robinson). This view has been challenged recently by Strawson (2006b p. 243), who maintains that the 
categorical phenomenal properties of our experiences are literally identical to non-humean necessitating powers: 
“Energy is experientiality; that is its intrinsic nature”. There are reasons for thinking such a view might not be 
incompatible with non-deflationary acquaintance-based phenomenal realism in the way it might initially appear. 
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what better non-phenomenal constituents could it have than the pure structure and dynamics 
of physical theory? But non-reductive realists are wont to maintain that such structural and 
dynamical aspects of experience don’t exhaust its experiential nature. Whether or not 
physical structure and dynamics have intrinsic realisers, phenomenal structure and dynamics 
do. Chalmers (2010 p. 22) writes, “There are properties of experience, such as the intrinsic 
nature of a sensation of red, that cannot be fully captured in a structural description”. 
Elsewhere he suggests that the structural properties found in experience “may be reducible 
structureless phenomenal properties and their relations” (Chalmers 1995 p. 398). The 
dynamical element in experience, in turn, might be described as the experiencing of change in 
these properties and relations.29  
These intrinsic natures rule against the reduction of experiences to physical properties as 
presently characterised, not only on account of their being non-structural, but also on account 
of their sheer intrinsicality, that is, their stand alone existence. The view of physics under 
consideration is one which admits of massive constitutive interdependency: everything is 
constituted solely by its place in an all encompassing network of role-theoretic relations. But 
acquaintance based realists take themselves to be acquainted with the existence of their own 
experiences without being acquainted with the existence of any larger tract of reality, which 
would suggest that the existence of their experiences is a fact that is independent of any role-
theoretic relations their experiences might stand in with respect to the broader metaphysical 
community.30  
These will be discussed in Chapter 3. I’ll eventually present an argument, albeit in a footnote in Chapter 6, that 
it is thus incompatible. 
29 I think this more primitively dynamical conception of phenomenal temporality is more phenomenologically 
accurate than the “appearance of succession” conception that has gained more traction in the literature. I’ll have 
more to say on this in Chapter 4.  
30 Once again, I am implicitly assuming that immediate acquaintance with the existence of something requires 
immediate acquaintance with something constitutively sufficient for its existence, and Chalmers’ 
panprotopsychism seems in breach of this. Once again, I’ll flag my upcoming defense of this claim in Chapter 3. 
'.!
Just as the advocate of the view that our relation to experiences is mediated must invoke 
Dennettian Dissolution to explain away the seeming immediacy of experience, the advocate 
of a purely structural cum functional account of phenomenal properties, whether or not he or 
she takes experiencing to constitute an immediate relation to them, must invoke Dennettian 
Dissolution to explain away the putatively intrinsic and non-structural aspects of experience. 
Once again, what else can the advocate of such reductionism say about Chalmers’ conviction 
that he is acquainted with non-structural or intrinsic properties other than that he is mistaken? 
It appears that any attempted reduction of phenomenal properties to physical properties must 
involve the invocation of Dennettian Dissolution with respect to some aspect or other of 
consciousness as it is characterised by the more avid realist. David Lewis is clear on this 
score. In ‘Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia’, he claims it is part of “the folk-
psychological concept of qualia” that “we know exactly what they are – in an uncommonly 
demanding sense of ‘knowing what’”. He thinks materialists can help themselves to an ersatz 
notion of qualia, of “imperfect but good enough deservers of the name”, that preserves most 
aspects of the concept whilst eschewing this one, and that “a conservative materialist” might 
therefore be within her or his rights to say that “qualia exist but are not quite as we take them 
to be” (Lewis 325, 329).  
Has Lewis made a compelling case for the feasibility of Dennettian Dissolution? Arguably 
not, as contemporary non-reductive realists would likely accuse him of the kind of 
equivocation Chalmers accused Dennett of at the outset. There is indeed a sense in which 
such realists would say that phenomenal properties are exactly as we take them to be, but it is 
a sense that has nothing directly to do with knowledge. Such a claim, much like claims 
involving ‘seems’, ‘appears’ etc, can be taken in two different ways. The ‘taking’ involved 
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might be intellectual – phenomenal properties are exactly as we think/believe/are-disposed-
to-judge them to be – or experiential –they are exactly as we experience them to be. They are 
most definitely committed to the latter. Experiences are exactly as they are experienced to be, 
that is, they instantiate the very phenomenal properties of which they constitute the 
experiencing. In contrast, such realists would likely consider Dennett a counterexample to the 
claim that qualia are exactly as we think/believe/are-disposed-to-judge them to be. None of 
them, in spite of the jibes, actually believe he’s a zombie. Siewert (1998 p. 179) writes, 
“Philosophy may be unwholesome, but you don’t literally go blind from it”. Rather, they 
think he thinks/believes/is-disposed-to-judge that his experiences aren’t as they actually are.31 
But the fact that qualia aren’t exactly as we judge them to be doesn’t give us licence to claim 
they aren’t exactly as we experience them to be.  
6. In for a Penny, In for a Pound
For now, rather than asking whether any kind of compelling case for Dennettian Dissolution 
can in fact be made, I would instead like to focus upon a more trivial point, namely, that if it 
works at all, it works in a wide variety of cases (Lockwood 1993 p. 70). If one ever allows 
the explaining away of how things phenomenally seem in terms of mistaken thoughts in any 
given instant, one has given oneself over to Dennett’s strategy.32 This seemingly trivial point 
31 Likewise, non-reductive realists would likely agree with Rorty’s (1979 p. 29) claim that “in the case of 
phenomenal properties there is no appearance-reality distinction”, provided ‘appearance’ is taken in its 
phenomenal sense, but if it is taken in this sense, then, contra Rorty, this doesn’t “amount to defining ... a 
phenomenal property as one which a certain person cannot be mistaken about”. 
32 Lockwood (1993 p. 70) contends that even Dennett hasn’t entirely given himself over to this strategy: “After 
all, if it made sense to say what Dennett says about phenomenology, why couldn't one undercut the entire mind-
body issue, by contending that we merely seem to ourselves to be conscious? The appearance of consciousness 
is, so to speak, a cognitive illusion from which our merely unconscious brains are suffering”. Whether or not 
Dennett would be fazed by this possibility is uncertain. Much hinges on how committed he is to the 
‘theoreticians conceit’ I’ll be discussing in Chapter 2. Dennett might well be happy for the very notion of 
consciousness to stand or fall on the basis of theoretical considerations. Having flagged the foregoing ‘solution’ 
to the mind body problem, Lockwood (1993 p. 70) writes, “there are places within the text … where Dennett 
comes within a hair’s breadth of saying just that”. I will continue to characterise Dennett as an unabashed 
proponent of Dennettian Dissolution, though I will also, in Chapter 2, address his seeming reluctance 
acknowledge the potential consequences of his view.  
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is of some significance, as it is not uncommon to find reductive realists criticising Dennett for 
his more thoroughgoing application of a strategy they have already sanctioned. In response to 
Dennett’s claim that “the richness of the world ... does not “enter” our conscious minds, but is 
simply available”, Dretske (1995 p.113), a reductive realist, writes,  
For anyone willing to admit that one object can “enter” a conscious mind, this seems false. 
The ravishing detail of the world does not cease to exist when I close my eyes. My 
experience of this ravishing detail does cease to exist when I close my eyes. 
But for anyone who maintains, as non-reductive realists do, that experienced properties are 
instanced in, not merely represented by, our experiences, that our experiences comprise 
appearances of object surfaces and such, and this is surely what naïve phenomenology 
dictates, Dretske’s reductive representationalism seems equally false. Yet if these purported 
aspects of phenomenology can be subject to Dennett-styled intellectual dissolution, why not 
the aspects Dretske remains attached to? Why can’t it be the case that Dretske merely 
mistakenly believes experiences admit of ravishing detail? Herein lays Dennett’s challenge to 
phenomenal realists of all stripes. If such realists concede that any aspect of phenomenology 
can be thus dissolved, it’s difficult to see how they haven’t set foot on a slippery slope 
bottoming out in Dennett’s view. ‘In for a penny, in for a pound’, he might say. Advocates of 
physicalistic reduction, as we have seen, have little recourse, as they have already embraced 
Dennett’s strategy. Non-reductive realists have shown greater vigilance in this respect, but 
they have also been prone to lapses. We have arguably already encountered such a lapse in 
our discussion of Ayer. Ayer maintains, on the basis of epistemic considerations, that visual 
experience merely connotes epistemically overwhelming complexity without embodying it. 
Presumably, he thinks those that maintain otherwise on the basis of a direct appeal to 
phenomenology are mistaken. In the next section, I’ll discuss a more clear-cut example, that 
of the intellectual dissolution of depth phenomenology. I will then discuss the slightly more 
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complex and multifaceted example case of the historical tendency to invoke Dennettian 
Dissolution with respect to the more cognitive-cum-conceptual aspects of experience.   
6.1 The Dennettian Dissolution of Depth 
At the outset of his article ‘Space and Sight’, A. D. Smith (2000 p. 481) writes, 
One of the most notable features of both philosophy and psychology throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the almost universal denial that we are immediately 
aware through sight of objects arrayed in three-dimensional space. This was not merely a 
denial of Direct Realism, but a denial that truly visual objects are even phenomenally 
presented in depth.   
Howard Robinson is a somewhat rare contemporary defender of this view. Robinson 
maintains that depth is not “bedrock phenomenal”, but rather, a product of interpretation. 
Robinson is both a non-reductive realist and an outspoken critic of Dennett’s approach to the 
problem of consciousness (1994 pp. 193-202). But according to this view, while it 
intellectually seems as if it phenomenally seems that visual experience has depth, this is not 
the case. Our intellect has pulled a swifty on us, a very convincing one, so convincing that 
one could swear depth actually inhered in the manifold of visual appearances, which, we are 
assured, is 2-D. Surely allowing for such a possibility gives Dennett all the leverage he needs 
to likewise dissolve the remaining purported aspects of appearances. Robinson (1994 p. 198) 
suggests Dennett of presents a “false dichotomy”: “either there is a definite timeable 
conscious event in a Cartesian theatre, or consciousness is no more than the redrafting of 
what has been happening in the real world, with no conscious experience”. In defence of his 
intermediate position, which postulates a “phenomenal core”, subject to intellectual 
interpretation, he writes, “The core is needed because without it it is unclear why the various 
[interpretations] should come out as experiences” (Robinson 1994 p. 198). But if Dennettian 
Dissolution suffices to explain the seeming instantiation of phenomenal properties, and 
'(!
Robinson appears satisfied with a Dennettian explanation of the seeming instantiation of 
phenomenal depth, this ceases to be a requirement. Experiences are adequately explained by 
mistaken thoughts that we have them. 
Robinson (1994 p. 206) reassures us that it’s not as though there’s nothing that it’s like for us 
for our intellects to pull the aforesaid swifty on us: “this intellectual difference constitutes a 
real phenomenal difference: it penetrates and structures the experience itself”. If this 
structuring of the experience is a structuring of what the experience is like, how it 
phenomenally seems, then it is unclear what differentiates this position from one where visual 
experience phenomenally seems to have depth.33 If it isn’t, then it doesn’t constitute a real 
phenomenal difference.   
I have, of course, left out another option, that which Robinson is perhaps most likely to have 
meant. The phenomenal difference might be the additional phenomenology of the intellectual 
interpretation, over and above the phenomenology of the visual experience.34 Chalmers (1996 
p. 10) is right in saying “it is often hard to pin down just what the qualitative feel of an
occurrent thought is”, but we are generally inclined to think we can tell the phenomenology 
of intellectual activity from visual phenomenology, and apprehension of depth just doesn’t 
seem, in any sense of the word, like something intellectual. If anything, this story is less 
satisfactory, as the addition of interpretation phenomenology just adds another layer to the 
Dennettian deception. Not only is phenomenal depth being dissolved into mistaken thinking; 
purportedly genuine phenomenology is occluded by this mistaken thinking. Depth seemingly 
inhering phenomenally in the visual manifold is being explained away in terms of properties 
which seemingly don’t but actually do thus inhere leading us to mistakenly think it does. 
33 Such an interpretation in plausibly ruled out by Robinson’s (1994 p. 207) claim that depth is “not given 
qualitatively in experience”. Judgment-based constitutivism of this kind will be refuted in Chapter 3.  
34 This would explain Robinson’s (1994 p. 207 emphasis mine) claim that “It seems to be a phenomenological 
fact that attitudes, beliefs and anticipations can enter into the structure and tone of the basic phenomenal field”. 
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Meanwhile, we are said to experience the intellectual interpretation which, in combination 
with our 2-D visual phenomenology, dupes us into thinking visual phenomenology has depth, 
but having been successfully duped, we would be inclined say we experience no such 
interpretative process. Mistaken thinking is sufficient to explain away seemingly phenomenal 
depth and our phenomenology’s seeming lack of interpretation phenomenology. 
The attempted dissolution of phenomenal depth into mistaken thought makes for a nice case 
study on account of the various reasons that have been invoked in favour of it. Some of these 
reasons are somewhat peculiar to the case itself. Others have a more general significance 
inasmuch as they tie in with the pre-established theme of how the phenomenal realist might 
respond to various theoretical considerations. I’ll briefly discuss two reasons of the former 
kind, if only to show them to be less than decisive, before focusing my attention on issues 
raised by the latter kind. 
Advocates of two-dimensionalism often appeal to the fact that we often interpret 2-D images, 
i.e. paintings and televised images, as 3-D. The contestable point in this situation is that such
apprehension is a matter of interpretation. In this case too, depth genuinely seems to inhere in 
visual phenomenology. A. D. Smith (2000 p. 487) says the following regarding Locke’s 
appeal to this line of argument, 
... it is a very poor reason for drawing his conclusion. Indeed, it is no reason at all ... Locke 
gives no reason for phenomenologically construing seeing a globe in terms of (an unargued 
interpretation of) seeing a trompe l’ oeil painting, rather than construing seeing such a 
painting in terms of (our ordinary, phenomenally 3-D experience of) seeing a real globe. 
Locke’s argument is rendered particularly unconvincing when one considers the canonical 
‘arguments for sense-data’. Locke’s reason for invoking interpretation is that the trompe l’ 
oeil painting isn’t itself three-dimensional. But the principle underwriting the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination has it that whether or not a phenomenally apparent property inheres 
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in a physical object, the property is nonetheless instantiated. Sense-data are therefore 
introduced as the bearers of illusory and hallucinated properties. Non-reductive-realists 
plausibly wish to retain this principle, whether or not they wish to postulate phenomenal 
particulars as bearers of such properties.35   
Another reason for Dennettian Dissolution that is somewhat peculiar to the case under 
consideration is put forward by Robinson. He thinks it “ad hoc and bogus” to “allow that 
depth is some extra inscrutable phenomenal property, not constructed from colour” 
(Robinson 1994 p. 206). This is a perplexing claim, as phenomenologically speaking, none of 
the phenomenal spatial dimensions seem to be constructed from colour. Phenomenal spatial 
properties and phenomenal colour properties might very well stand in a relationship of 
necessary co-instantiation, but this is different from saying that one of the two is the more 
fundamental constituent of the other. Chalmers (2010 p. 32) writes, “It is plausible that if one 
“subtracts” hue from a colour, nothing phenomenologically significant is left, but this 
certainly does not imply that colour is nothing but hue”.36 Likewise, it is plausible that if one 
were to likewise “subtract” colour from phenomenology, nothing phenomenologically spatial 
would be left, but this doesn’t imply that phenomenal space is nothing but phenomenal 
colour. Robinson (1994 p 206) goes on to write, “Depth is supposed to be a further spatial 
dimension; so it must be the same sort of thing as the other two dimensions. It should not, 
therefore, be a sui generis feature of experience, but ought naturally to be the same kind of 
thing as the other dimensions”. But the other two spatial dimensions, from a 
phenomenological perspective at least, are themselves sui generis. Whether or not 
35 One might favor an adverbial analysis of perceptual experience that treats such properties as modifications of 
acts or events of perceiving, sensing, experiencing or the like. For a defense of adverbialism, see Chapter 8 of 
Chisholm. For arguments against adverbialism, see Jackson (1977 pp. 63-69).    
36 Chalmers (2010 p. 32) credits Gregg Rosenberg with having made this point to him in conversation in relation 
to an analogous claim from Dennett to the effect that nothing remains when one subtracts functional facts (a 
claim Chalmers, in any case, thinks there’s no reason to believe).  
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phenomenal spatial properties have further non-phenomenal constituents, they aren’t 
experienced as being constituted by more basic phenomenal properties, as would be the case, 
for instance, with the phenomenal property of being the appearance of a dotted surface. 
Phenomenal depth is certainly no more inscrutable than phenomenal height and width. 
Robinson’s adversary might just as easily treat his decision to single it out for special 
treatment as ad hoc.   
We now arrive at the reasons for the Dennettian Dissolution of phenomenal depth that 
generalise more easily. Were the foregoing Robinson’s only reason for advocating two 
dimensionalism, his adversary might likewise object that it’s simply ad hoc to maintain that 
visual phenomenology is but a two dimensional array of colours when that’s not how it’s 
experienced to be. But Robinson is merely adding further potential reasons for subscribing to 
an established view, one that has often been advocated on the basis of empirical 
considerations.37 Early advocates of two-dimensionalism thought perception’s involving the 
impingement of light upon a two dimensional register confirmed their hypothesis, which 
seems quaint given that possibly all phenomenal realists nowadays who think perceptual 
consciousness the upshot of physical processes would think it an upshot of processing some 
way downstream from this initial impingement (Smith 2000 pp. 489-492). It has also been 
advocated as a means of accommodating certain experimental results, such as those 
concerning “Molyneux subjects” (Smith 2000 p. 493-497).38 But if the results yielded by 
37 Though a soon to be discussed a priori consideration would appear to be Robinson’s (1994 p. 206) principal 
reason for adopting the view. 
38 Molyneux subjects are subjects potentially capable of answering Molyneux’s question, made famous by 
Locke (1961 p. 114). Locke’s (1961 p. 114) friend Molyneux asks whether someone who was born blind but 
had his or her sight restored in adulthood would be capable of recognizing shapes he or she could recognize 
tactually by way of sight alone. I refer the reader to Smith (2000 pp. 493-497) for an assessment of the empirical 
plausibility, or lack thereof, of the various conclusions drawn from such research. I will instead be making 
relatively a priori points regarding the implications of accepting two-dimensionalism on the basis of such 
research.  
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empirical experiments were such as to be able to adequately justify Dennettian Dissolution 
with respect to depth, why not other intransigent aspects of experience? Dennett’s reason for 
advocating such dissolution in the first place, after all, is that there is no place for qualia in 
our best empirical theories, so to make such a concession in the case of depth is to put him in 
good stead to win the qualia war. It’s by no means clear that such a concession must be made. 
To be conclusive, the relevant empirical evidence could be nothing short of an empirically 
revealed fact other than that of how visual phenomenology purportedly seem to us, three 
dimensional that is, that shows it couldn’t reasonably be thought to be that way, a tough call 
given that non-reductive realists tend to offer no clear conception of a fact that might 
necessitate the instantiation or non-instantiation of a phenomenal property other than its 
actual instantiation or non-instantiation.39 The relevant arguments invariably refer to certain 
physical facts, or facts about experiences in certain, oftentimes pathological, cases, neither of 
which, as far as the non-reductive realist is concerned, necessitate any further 
phenomenological fact. It might be argued that it is too much to ask that such evidence render 
two-dimensionalism necessary; it need only render it plausible, or more likely to be the case 
than otherwise. But given non-reductive realists insist on their having experiences as they 
characterise them in spite of the findings of the physical sciences, most notably that those 
sciences reveal no such things, and are unperturbed by the prospect of total zombies, let alone 
subjects whose phenomenologies lack what their phenomenologies in fact have, what it is 
about such arguments that should move them is less than clear. Such realists might also 
suggest that experience itself is the locus of empirical revelation, so to call it into question is 
to call all the empirical facts it reveals into question, including those that supposedly justify 
calling it into question. Russell (1954 p. 7) writes, “We must ... find an interpretation of 
39 Those of a dualistic leaning speak of physical states soliciting phenomenal states by virtue of laws, but laws 
are opaquely characterised as whatever must be superadded for such states to do so. 
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physics which gives a due place to perceptions; if not, we have no right to appeal to the 
empirical evidence”. 
Two-dimensionalism has also been advocated on the basis of logical-cum-conceptual 
considerations. Berkeley (1962 p. 186) objected to the notion of phenomenal depth on the 
grounds that it would constitute a “line turned endwise to the eye,” the implication seemingly 
being that such an idea is somehow incoherent.40 Might taking experience at face value be an 
affront to logic? It should be remembered that phenomenal properties are transcendentally 
real, property instances in themselves, not conceptual constructs. It would be odd to say the 
least if some part of reality embodied logical incoherence in some kind of de re sense, being 
such that there was no way of bringing it under concepts that didn’t result in logical 
incoherence. That phenomenal depth, the depth that experience seemingly embodies, might 
be thus incoherent, incoherent prior to any conceptualisation, is a queer enough proposal to 
warrant a degree of incredulity. Prima facie, it seems far more likely that the manner in 
which it has been conceptualised has engendered confusion. Smith (2000 p. 488) thinks 
Berkeley’s objection trades on “an a priori misreading of the nature of the nature of depth-
perception”. Such a misreading, he suggests, “is corrected simply by turning to our 
experience of such depth. We can appreciate how an experiential awareness of depth is 
visually possible by seeing how it is actual” (Smith 2000 p. 488). A likely explanation for the 
misreading is that ‘depth’ has its original usage in talk about the objective spatial properties 
of physical things, properties which, according to common lore at least, are non-experiential. 
It’s usage for the phenomenal property we have been calling phenomenal depth, like much of 
the phenomenal lexicon, is parasitic upon this more original usage. But this isn’t to say that 
the term means exactly the same thing in each case. Nor is it to say that the properties thus 
40 Admittedly, it’s not clear to me how this is so. 
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depicted behave in the same way. Nobody assumes that phenomenal colour properties are 
disposed to deflect light in the manner of their physical namesakes. In any case, if experience 
did in fact reveal de re inconsistency, it’s unclear why the phenomenal realist’s hand would 
be thus forced. What better reason for realism about de re inconsistency? At the end of the 
first book of Appearance and Reality, which is dedicated in its entirety to argument to the 
effect that all that we ordinarily assume some modicum of familiarity with is shot through 
with inconsistency of this kind, Bradley (1893 p. 132) writes: 
Everything so far, which we have seen, has turned out to be appearance. It is that, which, 
taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be true of the 
real. But to deny its existence or divorce it from reality is out of the question. For it has a 
positive character which is indubitable fact, and, however much this fact may be pronounced 
appearance, it can have no place in which to live except reality.  
6.2 Qualia as a Synthesised Noumenal Backdrop 
As well as being moot for reasons cited previously, Robinson’s complaint that phenomenal 
depth would be an ad hoc addition to visual phenomenology because it’s not constructed 
from colour betrays yet another common mischaracterisation of visual phenomenology, 
namely, that it is but a coloured array. Depth, therefore, isn’t the only component missing 
from his characterisation of visual phenomenology. Is visual phenomenology experienced as 
a three dimensional array of colours? No. As those of the phenomenological tradition have 
always been at pains to emphasise, our visual phenomenology reveals, or, even better, gives 
the sense of immersion in, the empirical world. We experience, not an array of colours, but an 
array of discrete objects, and other worldly phenomena besides.41 What’s more, we 
experience objects as the kinds of objects they are, trucks as trucks, dogs as dogs etc, without 
41 Fog, mist, and smoke count among such phenomena. The earth beneath us and the sky above us are also 
arguably not experienced as object surfaces.   
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prior conscious inference.42 Heidegger (1962 p. 207) writes, “What we ‘first’ hear is never 
noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle”.  
Advocates of the 2D colour array have sometimes appealed to the Kantian notion of 
conceptual synthesis in attempt to reconcile such facts with their account, the idea being that 
the array is conceptually souped up by the mind, understanding or whatnot, so as to be 
empirical-world-giving in the manner thus described. Carnap (1967 § 100) writes: 
The “given” is never found in consciousness as mere raw material, but always in more or less 
complicated connections and formations. The synthesis of cognition, i.e., the formation of 
entities, or representations of things and of “reality”, from the given, does not, for the most 
part, take place according to a conscious procedure. 
The given of which Carnap speaks consists of arrays of qualitatively individuated properties 
distributed in the qualitatively individuated coordinate systems that constitute the possibility 
spaces of the various sense modalities, emotional space etc.43 Cognitive augmentation of this 
qualitative aspect of consciousness, the aforementioned “synthesis of cognition”, purportedly 
has a veiling effect; one can’t see the given for the “connections and formations” thus 
produced (Carnap 1967 § 100). Qualia serves as a transcendental backdrop to synthesised 
phenomena, as a phenomenal variety of noumena, necessary for empirical-world-giving 
phenomena, but obscured by the synthesis producing it. 
If this raw material isn’t found in consciousness as it is, what reason is there for thinking it’s 
in consciousness? What makes one think that such arrays of qualities lie behind the 
smokescreen of cognitive synthesis? They seem very much like the products of 
42 In saying this I am not necessarily endorsing Siegel’s (2006 pp. 481-486) claim that experiences represent 
objective kind properties. Rather, I am acknowledging a form of phenomenology such that our best attempts to 
describe it are liable to invoke objective kind terms. I remain agnostic, for now, about what essential relations, if 
any, pertain between the phenomenology and the objective kinds ordinarily referred to with the terms thus 
invoked. I’ll have a little more to say on the issue of phenomenal representation in the next section, but a 
detailed discussion won’t take place until Chapter 6.  
43 The coordinate system constituting the possibility space of vision is a two-dimensional plane, the relevant 
possibilities being colour arrays (Carnap 1967 § 88, 115).   
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transcendental reasoning to the effect that consciousness must necessarily be the product of 
the synthesising of such a backdrop. What about consciousness makes it clear that this is the 
case? How it phenomenally seems? But isn’t this obscured by cognitive synthesis that makes 
us find conceptual connections rather than ‘raw’ qualia? How it intellectually seems? But 
isn’t this exactly what’s obscuring the backdrop? That the synthesis of the given isn’t a 
conscious procedure might protect this view from the kind of criticism levelled against 
interpretation phenomenology earlier, and make it at least superficially in keeping with the 
phenomenologist’s point that we don’t find ourselves consciously inferring worldly denizens 
from raw qualia, but it seems a straightforward conceptual truth that if it’s not conscious, it’s 
not experienced. So how does it explain experience being empirical-world-giving?  
It’s difficult to make sense of this idea of qualitative phenomena with conceptuality stirred in. 
Strict delineation of the phenomenal and the intellectual makes it difficult to fathom how one 
is augmenting the other. Perhaps, in postulating such a hydrophobic distinction, I’m 
mischaracterising Carnap’s view. It seems unlikely, after all, that Carnap would think that 
there’s nothing it’s like for the given to be conceptually souped up. So we might once again 
have an intellectual difference making a phenomenal difference. Conceptuality might 
“penetrate and structure” the given in much the same way that Robinson (1994 p. 206) claims 
intellectual interpretation does the visual field in the case of depth. Obviously, the same 
pattern of argumentation used in the previous case applies here. If this difference is really a 
difference in what things are subjectively like, then, once again, unless one wishes to reduce 
phenomenal seeming to intellectual seeming, it’s a qualitative difference. Once again, the 
difference could inhere in the phenomenal fields constitutive of the various sense modalities, 
or could be some kind of sui generis phenomenology of conceptuality or intellection. But it 
doesn’t seem, in any sense of the word, as though it’s sui generis. As the phenomenologists 
insist, it seems as though the phenomenal fields themselves open us up to the empirical 
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world, not as though there is a schism between the phenomena of the phenomenal fields and 
the phenomenology of intellectual interpretation, cognitive synthesis, or whatever. Is our 
intellect pulling another swifty, making it intellectually seem as though things phenomenally 
seem different to how they actually phenomenally seem? To concede that the intellect can 
dupe us thus is to make the kind of concession that finds us back on Dennett’s slippery slope. 
There is also a regress problem. We can either think our intellect is duping us thus and there’s 
nothing that it’s like for it to do so, a strange view to say the least,44 or concede that there’s 
something it’s like for it to do so. Where does this phenomenology inhere? In thought 
phenomenology? But it doesn’t seem, in any sense, as though we have such phenomenology, 
so we must postulate a further act of intellectual deceit, and so on. But if the phenomenology 
of synthesis isn’t sui generis, then it inheres in the various phenomenal fields along with the 
pure phenomenology it purportedly obscures; one aspect of what these fields are 
phenomenally like hides another aspect of what things are phenomenally like. The coherence 
of such an idea, of appearances veiling appearances that nonetheless appear, seems 
questionable. 
6.2.1 The Cognitive-Phenomenological Revolution 
This foregoing problematic is born entirely of the intuition that visual phenomenology, qua 
visual phenomenology, must be wholly constituted from canonical sensuous qualia, a view 
that conflicts with how things appear. In visual experience we encounter objects. They are 
coloured, no doubt, but they are also, for instance, discrete. Objectual discreteness is as real 
44 Though it’s interesting to consider what makes such a view, i.e. the view that combines irreducible 
phenomenal seeming with intellectual seeming that misinforms us regarding this phenomenal seeming without 
there being anything that it’s like for it to do so, counterintuitive. One reason might be that to concede that 
occurrent thoughts bereft of phenomenology might successfully misinform us about our phenomenology is to 
rend subjectivity away from the phenomenal in such a manner that it’s hard to see what reason one could have 
for phenomenal realism if one thought such rending away feasible. If one thinks, not just that one could be, but 
that one normally is, totally convinced one’s phenomenology is other than it is by a thought with no 
phenomenology, it’s hard to see what reason one might have for rejecting Dennett’s line of reasoning.   
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and tangible an aspect of visual phenomenology as colour, and any attempt to dissolve such 
an aspect of phenomenology into something intellectual will run into the same problems 
we’ve already encountered. The term ‘phenomenal’ seems to connote the sensuous, but its 
contemporary philosophical meaning is broader, encapsulating all aspects of how things 
subjectively are. Once again, a degree of historical sense can be made of the intuition, 
however mistaken it might ultimately be. The term ‘qualia’ had a life prior to the what-it’s-
likeness debate spearheaded by Nagel, and was generally taken to mean phenomenal 
experience with all the intellectually or conceptually inflected aspects hosed out (Bayne & 
Montague 2011 pp. 6). In a sense, this notion of qualia was tailored to the naturalists. They 
could concentrate on naturalising the important cognitive stuff, and worry about the touchy-
feely qualia bit last (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 p. 108). Hence, naturalists such as Ryle, Smart 
and Putnam heartily endorsed such a conception of the phenomenal, making claims to the 
effect that a subject’s consciousness says nothing about her or his intellectual life, not even 
whether or not he or she has one (Bayne & Montague 2011 pp. 6, 7). It was likewise in such 
naturalist’s best interests to assimilate the newly emergent ‘what-it’s-like’ talk to talk about 
qualia taken in its original restrictive sense. But such assimilation was unscrupulous, and it 
was only a matter of time before champions of the new form of phenomenal realism would 
take it upon themselves to put things right. Cognitive phenomenology, the what-it’s-likeness 
of thinking, is quickly becoming a hot button issue in the philosophy of consciousness, with 
philosophers such as Siewert (1998 pp. 274-283), Strawson (2010 pp. 5-13) and Pitt (2004) 
championing the idea that there is a distinctive phenomenology of thought, understanding and 
such, a distinctively cognitive species of phenomenology.  
But well entrenched metaphysical pictures are hard to shake, and one still finds, even among 
the champions of this cause, mischaracterisations of phenomenology born of a conception of 
the phenomenal manifold as wholly comprising of sensuous qualia and somehow ‘standing 
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before’ a non-phenomenally constituted mind. Consider, for instance, Chalmers’ (2010 p. 
269) talk of the difference between two subjects with identical visual experiences, one of
whom attends to and demonstrates “a red quality in the right half of the visual field, and the 
other a green quality experienced in the left half of the visual field”. He describes the 
difference between the two as a difference in the “cognitive backgrounds” constitutive of the 
respective acts of attention and demonstration, choosing to remain “neutral ... about whether 
such cognitive differences are themselves constituted by underlying functioning, aspects of 
cognitive phenomenology, or both” (Chalmers 2010 p. 269). Chalmers characterisation of 
attention and demonstration betrays the insidious influence of the ‘mind exploring the 
manifold’ conception of introspection, as it characterises visual experience as something that 
might remain static while a mind attended to various parts of it. One might say that it trades 
the phenomena of attention, which, as Sebastian Watzl (2010 p. 1) puts it, involves “the 
structuring [of] one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than 
others”, for attention to phenomena. In the case of visual attention, the structuring at issue is 
that of the visual field itself. The visual field comprises what is attended as attended and what 
is periphery as periphery, the periphery being characteristically ill defined (Watzl 2010 p. 
21).45 In making visual attention a matter of how a visual field undifferentiated in this manner 
interfaces with a cognitive background, Chalmers mischaracterises its phenomenology. 
Pulling the cognitive background within phenomenology is merely a phenomenalising of the 
same perspectival error, akin to the phenomenalising of depth yielding intellectual 
interpretation and Kantian synthesis discussed previously. 
45 Watzl might not agree that they are characteristically ill-defined. He writes, “The reason fringe experiences 
are phenomenally different from central experiences is not that their monadic phenomenal properties are 
different. Rather, they stand in a certain phenomenal relation to the other parts of your experience” (Watzl 2010 
p. 30). I’m not sure I understand this claim. As far as I think I can understand it, I think it’s false. I think
peripheral and attended aspects of experience seem to differ in their intrinsic natures.
(*!
Though it is to be admitted that the foregoing criticism of Chalmers overlooks a possibility, 
namely, that Chalmers might not be trading the phenomenon of attention for attention to 
phenomena, but rather, allowing for the existence of both. As the floodgates are opened and 
philosophers start admitting the existence of various forms of so-called cognitive and 
conceptual phenomenology, the question arises of how exactly such phenomenology is 
related to actual cognition and conceptuality. At one extreme, there is separatism, according 
to which such phenomenology, at most, reliably covaries with certain actual cognitive 
activity, which is non-phenomenally constituted.46 In such a case, a situation like that 
described previously, where one has the phenomenology of failure to account for an 
appearance while one’s completely constitutively separate intellect in fact manages to 
account for it in full, might in fact be possible. The idea that seeming and actual cognition 
might come apart so violently is somewhat intuitively unattractive.47  
At the other extreme there is constitutivism, according to which such phenomenology 
constitutes cognition and its content.48 This view is likewise beset with problems, though I 
will only briefly allude to them here, my comments serving as something of a promissory 
note with respect to the more detailed discussion of such issues in Chapter 6. When one 
speaks of the content of thought, one speaks of intentional content. That experience, in its 
experiential constitution, admits of intentional aspects, while only now gaining significant 
46 Putnam (1981 pp. 17, 18) could be said to be a separatist inasmuch as he acknowledges the differences to 
experience that cognitive factors typically make to phenomenology, but thinks the same phenomenology could 
be had in the absence of the attendant cognitive factors.  
47 It is to be noted that Chalmers (2012a p. 116), as pointed out in a previous footnote, has shown a degree of 
antipathy towards this possibility. He has also stated elsewhere “the mere act of attention to one’s experience 
transforms that experience” (Chalmers 1995 p. 413). I am therefore inclined, as per the previous paragraph, to 
attribute his talk of such purely cognitively differentiated acts of visual attention to an uncharacteristic lapse in 
judgement.  
48 Pitt (2009 p. 121) defends an attenuated constitutivism according to which phenomenal properties constitute 
intentional contents qua types, where “types are themselves mind-independent abstract objects”. In chapter 6, 
I’ll briefly explore a constitutivism according to which phenomenal properties constitute intentional contents 
qua experientially revealed instances.  
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traction within the analytic community, 49 has been a longstanding commitment within the 
phenomenological tradition. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008 p. 116) write, “phenomenology 
contends that consciousness is characterised by an intrinsic intentionality”. There certainly 
seems to be something it’s like to think about things, Spain, one’s neighbours etc.  But there’s 
a case to be made for distinguishing this experienced phenomenon of aboutness, an aspect of 
the thought phenomenology qua phenomenology, an aspect it has solely in virtue of its 
intrinsic phenomenal constitution, and the more realist notion of the aboutness of 
phenomena, an aboutness relation borne by the thought experience to something extrinsic to 
how things phenomenally are for us, Spain, one’s neighbours etc. As discussed previously, 
the cognitive aspects of phenomenology often connote what they don’t embody. 50 Our 
conscious thoughts of Spain seemingly connote Spain without literally embodying Spain. 
Spain, the real Spain, presumably isn’t a constituent part of such thought phenomenology, 
not a phenomenal constituent at least. It doesn’t phenomenally seem as though Spain as a 
whole is instantiated in my phenomenology when I think of it. Not only are the objects thus 
connoted in thought phenomenology not phenomenologically embodied, the intentional 
relation to those objects also isn’t. How, after all, can the fact of the instancing of a relation 
stand apart from whatever constitutes the being of its relata?51 This peculiar ‘phenomeno-
notional’ form of connotation isn’t even connotation in a real sense, as the latter is a relation 
actually borne to the thing connoted. Phenomeno-notional connotation even connotes, as 
opposed to embodying, the relation of connoting. It is, in its entirety, pseudo-relational.  
49 Kriegel 2013 is quite possibly the first significant edited volume on the topic.  
50 Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘embody’ in such contexts to refer to relations of constitutive subsumption,
such that if x embodies y, then y belongs to the constitution of x. A qualification: when referring to experiences 
embodying things, properties etc, the intended meaning is that such experiences embody them qua experiences, 
such that the things, properties etc belong to the phenomenal constitution of the experience. (This last 
qualification becomes superfluous after Chapter 3, in which I argue that those who subscribe to the kind of 
phenomenal realism that is the focus of this thesis must also thereby subscribe to the view that the phenomenal 
constitution of an experience is its constitution proper). 
51 For those that aren’t instantaneously struck by the impossibility of such a scenario, I’ll dedicate significant 
space to arguing for its impossibility in Chapter 5.   
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Anyone with even the slightest realist impulse is likely to balk at the prospect of the 
intentional objects of thought being entirely phenomeno-notionally constituted, there being 
nothing more to their existence than the existence of cognitive phenomenology which, in this 
queer yet perfectly familiar way, ‘suggests’ them. Almost all contemporary philosophers 
have something of a realist impulse, but the most important point for our purposes is that all 
phenomenal realists of the kind under discussion have at least a minimal realist impulse 
inasmuch as they are committed to transcendental realism regarding phenomenal properties. 
If their judgements about phenomenology are phenomeno-notionally constituted, they don’t 
have real intentionality, that is, they don’t really represent anything beyond their pseudo-
relational phenomenological character, including any phenomenology that is constitutively 
extrinsic to their phenomeno-notional constitution. Consider one’s conscious thought that 
there is something that it’s like to experience everything you’re experiencing, a phenomenal 
manifold phenomenally unifying all the various elements of your experience such that there’s 
something it’s like to experience all of them together. Many phenomenal realists have 
thought as much, and naive phenomenology seemingly dictates that they are right to do so. 
But if their thoughts as such are mere components within such a manifold that phenomeno-
notionally suggest a representational relation ‘to it’, without actually embodying such a 
representational relation, they seemingly aren’t the kinds of things that are made true by its 
nature. Siewert (1998 p. 192), an advocate of the view that phenomenology possesses real 
intentionality, writes “presumably, what would make one’s thought or experience true or 
accurate … is what these are about or directed at”. By contraposition, if such thoughts and 
experiences aren’t really about or directed at something, that something doesn’t really make 
them true.52 Transcendentally realist representation is real representation, not pseudo-
52 Though it should be acknowledged that Siewert’s (1998 p. 192) own view is such that the aboutness and 
directedness of cognitive phenomenology to be a function of their truth-aptness, while the current discussion 
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representation. One might suggest that in such a case, the entire manifold is phenomenally 
demonstrated, and hence belongs to the phenomenal constitution of the thought as its 
demonstrated object. But this isn’t convincing, as the phenomenology of demonstrative 
thought is likewise pseudo-relational. When I consciously think about this particular street 
that I’m in, the street doesn’t actually inhere in the phenomenal constitution of my thought. Is 
my conscious thought of this phenomenal manifold any different? Does it somehow 
constitutively subsume the entire phenomenal manifold including itself so as to constitute one 
giant thought of itself? Seemingly not. My thought ‘about’ this phenomenal manifold 
definitely seems to be about this phenomenal manifold, but not in some sense altogether 
different to how my thought ‘about’ this street seems like a thought about this street. It 
merely phenomeno-notionally seems thus.  
This discussion is incomplete as it stands. The foregoing characterisation of intentionality as 
a simple aboutness relation between a representation and that which it represents is 
something of an oversimplification, failing to account for the various forms of 
misrepresentation we assume ourselves capable of (Siewert 1998 p. 242). Proponents of 
phenomenal intentionality typically characterise phenomenal intentional content as a kind of 
‘narrow’ content that makes a constitutive contribution to, but doesn’t ultimately settle, 
‘wide’ referential facts. A more detailed discussion of the issue of intentionality will have to 
wait until Chapter 6. What I wish to highlight for now is that separatism and constitutivism 
mark the extremities of a spectrum of views, and transcendental realism regarding 
phenomenal properties relies on a tenable account of real representation of phenomenal 
properties being located somewhere on that spectrum. If experience is to function as a 
truthmaker for the phenomenal realist’s claims, judgements and beliefs to the effect that 
might be taken to suggest the opposite. A more detailed discussion will have to wait until Chapter 6. For now, I 
merely wish to give a sense of the problematic.   
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experience exists in a real non-notional sense, that it really is as they say it is, and so on, such 
claims, judgements and beliefs must be the kinds of things capable of really representing 
experiences qua transcendentally real existents. This will ultimately prove problematic. 
7. Robust Realism
The foregoing discussion serves to highlight the theoretical importance of views that 
consistently avoid Dennett’s strategy. It shouldn’t be surprising if a committed non-reductive 
realist rejects any case whatsoever for Dennettian Dissolution premised upon considerations 
drawn from physics, or any other empirical theory. Such realists, in classic Cartesian fashion, 
take the existence of their own consciousness to be more certain than the existence of 
anything else, including anything thrown up by ‘empirical’ investigation. They are also likely 
to believe any such theories to be parasitic, epistemically speaking, upon the more primordial 
epistemic relationship borne to consciousness. Let us call acquaintance based phenomenal 
realism that outrightly rejects the Dennettian move in this way Robust Realism.   
Robust Realism – Realism about phenomenal properties that (1) cites unmediated 
access to instances of such properties, rather than conceptually inflected reasons, as its 
justificatory grounds, and, (2) rejects outright all attempts to explain away aspects of 
phenomenology by way of Dennettian Dissolution.  
This thesis is dedicated to the exploration and evaluation of this form of phenomenal realism. 
Although not often explicitly discussed, it is not a novel view. The work of a significant 
minority of contemporary philosophers is seemingly robust realist in spirit, whether or not 
they have ever explicitly formulated their view in such a manner,53 and even if they 
occasionally mischaracterise phenomenology in a manner that might suggest otherwise (as 
53 A list of prominent robust realists writing within the analytic tradition would plausibly include David 
Chalmers, Barry Dainton, Charles Siewert and Galen Strawson. Many, perhaps most, of those working within 
the phenomenological tradition would also qualify.   
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Chalmers seemingly does with respect to attention). One can think experience is exactly how 
it immediately seems to be without thinking one will inevitably make correct judgements 
about how it thus seems, or doing so for that matter. I will now provide a brief summary of 
the content of the subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 2, I make the case that the project undertaken in this thesis should be of interest, 
not just to members of the robust realist minority, but also to their deflationist rivals. The 
qualia debate, at present, comprises a dialogical standoff between two factions who are 
divided on fundamental issues relating to the norms of ontological commitment. While one 
privileges acquaintance-based certainty, the other places a premium on theoretical virtues. 
Members of each faction tend to base the case for their own allegiances, and against those of 
the opposing faction, upon considerations reflecting their own preferred norms. Each faction, 
in turn, has well rehearsed reasons for dismissing, or considering its position impervious to, 
arguments premised upon the norms favoured by the opposing faction. But members of each 
faction occasionally allow considerations referable to their preferred norms to be trumped by 
those referable to the norms of the opposing faction. This suggests a dialogical strategy, one 
carrying the potential to put an end to the standoff. It involves showing that strict adherence 
to such norms of the opposing faction comes at an undesirable cost. I point to the fact that 
there is already some reason to think Robust Realism might incur such undesirable costs, so 
deflationists would do well to abandon the championing of their own norms and start 
exploring the implications of those championed by robust realists.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that the definitive commitments of Robust Realism entail the 
Constitution Thesis, a thesis regarding the constitutive nature of experiences. According to 
the Constitution Thesis, the constitutive nature of experiences is exhausted by their 
experienced nature. The argument I invoke in defence of this thesis has recently been 
criticised by Chalmers. I argue that Chalmers’ criticism only works so long as one interprets 
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the premises in an implausibly ‘intellectualist’ way. The more natural ‘phenomenal’ 
interpretation allows for a successful demonstration of the Constitution Thesis’s entailment 
by fundamental robust realist tenets.  
Spatiotemporal inclusion and causal interaction are the two principal means by which non-
deflationary realists attempt to forge connections between experiences, as they characterise 
them, and a metaphysically real world. In Chapter 4, I argue that Robust Realism rules out 
both of these possibilities. First, I use the Constitution Thesis to argue that given some 
relatively commonplace assumptions about the nature of objective space and objective time, 
Robust Realism rules against experiences being located in such dimensions. I then explore 
more outré conceptions of the nature of space and time, and of the potential relations 
experiences might bear to these dimensions, arguing that the more plausible ideas here are 
ruled out by phenomenological considerations that the robust realist is forced to take 
seriously. Finally, I then turn my attention to causal interaction, arguing that given the lack of 
any prior spatiotemporal relations, two available accounts of causation remain, sustaining 
causation and a counterfactual theory premised upon a primitive conception of modality. I 
argue that the former is incoherent and the latter is queer enough to warrant dismissal 
pending any plausible arguments in its favour. The conclusion of the chapter is, then, that 
robust realism entails both that experiences are not located within a metaphysically real 
world, and that they cannot causally interact with such a world from without. 
In chapter 5, I argue for a second thesis that will be used to draw further consequences for 
Robust Realism. According to the Relations Thesis, the pertaining of any relation must 
involve, for each relatum, something that would suffice as a truthmaker for the claim that it 
exists, or, if one’s ontology allows non-existent things, that there is such a relatum.  
In Chapter 6, I then use the Relations Thesis to argue against the central tenet of the recently 
emergent Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, that experiences are possessive of a 
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kind of narrow world-representing content qua experienced. An upshot of this is that 
cognitive phenomenology cannot constitute the transcendentally truth-apt representations of 
phenomenal facts that Robust Realism is premised upon. I therefore turn to an evaluation of 
the plausibility of the claim that the immediate acquaintance relation underwriting Robust 
Realism is a relation borne to experience by a constitutively extrinsic intellect. The Relations 
Thesis, in combination with results argued for in Chapter 4, likewise rules out this possibility. 
In a brief afterword, I discuss how the robust realist might respond to the arguments I have 
presented. I suggest that a path of resistance to Dennett might still be open, but it requires 
abandonment of transcendental realism regarding qualia for a kind of Kantian non-
cognitivism.   
8. Conclusion
Dennett’s eliminativist strategy is somewhat more powerful than his detractors have typically 
acknowledged. It is an essential component in any physically reductive theory of 
consciousness, and has even been invoked on occasions by non-reductive realists. Robust 
Realism is acquaintance-based phenomenal realism that rejects all attempts to explain away 
aspects of phenomenology by way of Dennettian Dissolution. This thesis is dedicated to 




In the previous chapter, I made the case for the theoretical importance, as a form of principled 
resistance to Dennett’s eliminativism, of the variety of acquaintance-based phenomenal 
realism that I have dubbed Robust Realism.  I have not as yet established that Robust Realism 
does in fact constitute a principled form of opposition to Dennettian Dissolution, as I have not 
yet established that its outright rejection of Dennettian Dissolution is sufficiently plausible in 
itself. I do not need to make such a claim for the purposes of this thesis. Instead, I am 
claiming that if naturalists advocating various degrees of deflationism with respect to 
phenomenal consciousness are to have any hope of converting the more devout non-reductive 
realist, they would do better to abandon the well worn method of appealing to various 
empirical and theoretical considerations, in favour of an exploration of the implications of 
Robust Realism. The situation as it stands is that of a dialogic standoff between two parties, 
each of which either doesn’t take the other’s evidence seriously, or at least not as seriously as 
the other thinks it should. There is more than a little truth to the comments from David Lewis 
to be found on the back cover of Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind: 
Legions of materialists are no doubt busy writing their rejoinders; but there will be few points 
left for them to make that Chalmers hasn’t already made. We of the materialist opposition 
cannot go on about how he has overlooked this and misunderstood that – because he hasn’t. 
All we can do is to disagree about which way the balance of consideration tilts. 
I intend to capitalise on the kind of metaphorical language Lewis invokes here, that of the 
‘weight’ of dialogical considerations causing the balance of considerations to tilt. This 
metaphor is utilised to some effect by John McDowell (1994 pp. 8, 9), who claims that 
epistemically speaking, we oscillate on a dialogical seesaw between what he takes to be an 
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intolerable epistemic givenism and a coherentism bereft of all empirical constraint and 
content. It is my contention that the participants in the metaphysical debate regarding qualia 
are likewise oscillating on an allegorical seesaw.  
Section 2 considers how Dennett’s exchange with Otto might have played out if Otto were 
more truculent in his Robust Realist convictions. Otto can plausibly insist that the existence 
of phenomenology is far more certain than that of the mistaken judgments Dennett posits. 
Dennett can in turn insist that any such claim to certainty is merely a key commitment in a 
dud theory. Otto’s contention here seems right inasmuch as phenomenal facts are the only 
facts thought to be given with the kind of immediacy that might adequately found certainty 
regarding them. Dennett’s contention in reply seems right inasmuch as the concept of 
experience upon which the qualia debate rests seems very much like the product of 
philosophical reflection, a fact which might seem to undermine the epistemic immediacy that 
Robust Realism is premised upon.  
In section 3, I argue that Robust Realism can accommodate the late epistemological arrival of 
phenomenal concepts. The phenomenal character of experience is ‘diaphanous’, giving a 
subjective sense of immediate contact with worldly objects, as opposed to appearances 
thereof (Moore 1922 p. 25). There is no reason why it must occur to someone who has been 
disabused of the belief that he or she has unmediated contact with the world that he or she is 
nonetheless in immediate contact with appearances. 
In section 4, I point out that while robust realists need not be concerned as to when, if at all, 
the concept of qualia is arrived at, they are committed to a particular account of what 
acquisition of the concept of qualia involves if and when it occurs. The peculiar nature of 
their account of phenomenal concept acquisition comes into view when one considers Wilfrid 
Sellars’ myth of the genius Jones. A robust realist interpretation of Sellars’ myth is liable to 
treat Jones more like a Zen master than a theoretician, inasmuch as his teaching method is apt 
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to prompt a realization that takes one beyond the very concepts it deploys. In section 4.1, I 
suggest that the schism one might imagine to emerge between Jones’s conservative acolytes, 
who merely see him as a brilliant theoretician, and his Zen acolytes, who take his teachings to 
transcend theory in the foregoing manner, precisely mirrors that between deflationists and 
non-deflationists in the contemporary qualia debate. In section 4.2, I discuss the peculiar 
brand of ‘tough talk’ each party has developed so as to inoculate its position from the 
standard criticisms levelled against it by opponents, noting that any compromise here risks 
tilting the aforementioned balance of consideration in favour of one’s opponent.  
In section 5, I argue that inasmuch as both parties have shown a wavering commitment to 
their tough talk, a dialogical strategy suggests itself, that of holding one’s opponents to their 
tough talk and showing such a commitment to carry unpalatable consequences. Obviously, 
this method is only viable inasmuch as there are such consequences. I make a provisional 
case for thinking deflationists have the upper hand here, and flag some of the heavy 
theoretical costs of Robust Realism that I’ll be arguing for in Chapter 4. In section 6, I note 
that deflationists who take the time to familiarize themselves with Robust Realism might 
reasonably hope to uncover something even more damning than metaphysical costliness, 
namely, logical inconsistency. I flag the arguments developed in Chapter 6 to the effect that 
experiences, as Robust Realism characterizes them, cannot support the model of justification 
regarding phenomenal judgments that Robust Realism is premised upon.  
2. Dennett and Otto Return
To get a better sense of the nature of this standoff, consider how the dialogue between 
Dennett and Otto might have played out if Otto showed the courage of his robust realist 
convictions, rather than begrudgingly allowing himself to be browbeaten into submission, as 
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he is in Dennett’s actual dialogue.54 In response to Dennett’s claim that “there is no such 
phenomenon as really seeming”, Otto might simply reply, “Of course there is. We really have 
experiences, and how things phenomenally seem is how those experiences really are”. 
Dennett, of course, will insist that Otto just wrongly believes it to be the case that things 
really seem however he thinks they do to him, and will maintain that such mistaken beliefs 
are explicable on his own theoretical terms. In doing so, he hasn’t won. Otto might just as 
easily reappeal to his putative truthmaker, maintaining that phenomenal consciousness seems 
far more of a sure fire thing than the non-phenomenal judgements of which Dennett claims it 
is a mere intentionally inexistent object. Of course, Dennett would likely put any such 
incorrigibility claim down to confusion, hubris or some combination of the two, rejecting any 
such epistemic foundationalism in favour of a kind of naturalising coherentism. He would 
likely reply that the epistemic immediacy of experience is merely a key commitment in a dud 
theory.55 Regarding the thesis that we are able to directly identify our qualia, Lewis (1999 p. 
328) says that while others “think it gets built into folk psychology because it is so obvious”,
he thinks “it seems obvious because it is built into folk psychology”. Such is Dennett’s view, 
a view well summarised by Putnam (1981 p. 102): “qualia belong to our ‘second class 
conceptual scheme’”. Still, at this point, the balance of consideration is not yet tipping. As we 
shall see, there’s more to be said in favour of the considerations cited by both parties – in 
favour, that is, both of Otto’s claim that the existence of phenomenology seems more certain 
than non-phenomenal judgement and of Dennett’s claim that our notion of phenomenal 
consciousness is born of theory, not immediate acquaintance. I will begin by setting out 
Otto’s case, addressing considerations cited by Hintikka for the somewhat different 
54 Lockwood (1993 pp. 67-70) utilizes the same rhetorical strategy, though to somewhat different ends.  
55 The term ‘theory’ is to be afforded a relatively inclusive sense in what follows, meaning something like an 
‘intellectual take’ on something, however rigorous and well developed. A ‘ways of seeing things’, inasmuch as 
the ‘seeing’ involved isn’t the having of visual phenomenology, but rather, the having of an intellectual 
perspective, counts as a theory in this broad sense.      
),!
conclusion that Cartesian certainty can only be had with respect to intellectual activity, (not, 
for instance, the sensory aspects of consciousness), and arguing that they are unconvincing. I 
will then make the case that there’s something to Dennett’s claim as well, as the concept of 
qualia seems only to emerge in the wake of certain forms of critical reflection. I will then 
make the case that Robust Realism is perfectly compatible with this possibility, but that the 
robust realist must endorse a particular account of what happens when the concept does thus 
emerge, differentiating the ‘Zen’ account they must endorse from the deflationism friendly 
‘business as usual’ account.  
2.1 Is Phenomenology More Certain Than Judgement? 
Otto’s contention, at the least, has historical precedent. Cartesian certainty has never been 
thought to extend to unconscious thought. On the contrary, some have argued for the 
existence of cognitive phenomenology by way of an “appeal to the role that cognitive-
phenomenological properties might play in accounting for the kind of epistemic access we 
have to our conscious thoughts” (Bayne & Montague 2011 p. 23). Joseph Levine (2011 p. 
118) writes “If we do indeed have indubitable knowledge – if I can tell without possible
doubt from the inside that I’m genuinely thinking, with genuine content – then I would be 
inclined to accept that this somehow must be a matter of phenomenal access”. If, by genuine 
content, Levine means real representational content, we have already come upon reason to 
think such phenomenal access problematic. But the claim that if any such certainty were to be 
had, it would be had by virtue of such immediate access, has a degree of plausibility. 
Experience, after all, is the only form of epistemic access that is thought to place a subject in 
an unmediated relationship with what constitutes the pertaining of particular facts regarding 
reality. Hence Chalmers’ (1996 p. 196) appeal to the fact of his having a red experience as 
justification for his belief that he is having it. To the degree that one falls short of an 
immediate relation to what constitutes the truth of a claim, one has fallen foul of certainty, 
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being beholden instead to various forms of epistemic mediation (Chalmers 1996 p.195). If 
genuinely contentful thoughts aren’t immediately given in experience, Cartesian certainty 
plausibly doesn’t extend to them, or, at least, it shouldn’t. Descartes himself, as Robinson 
(1994 p.11) points out, was still very much “operating within a scholastic framework”, and 
was “quite clear that ideas possess what he calls ‘objective reality’, which means that it is 
part of their essential nature to have an object—that is, to be of something”. Robinson (1994 
pp. 1, 11) contrasts this with the “classical or empiricist conception of sense contents” that 
historically followed, and to which he is more sympathetic, which has it that “sense-contents 
possess no intrinsic intentionality”. In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed an 
intermediate view, which has it that experience does admit of an intrinsic intentionality of 
sorts, but it is no more like real objective intentionality than the so-called colours intrinsic to 
experience are like objective colours. A comparative evaluation of these views will have to 
wait until Chapter 6.  What matters for now is that a plausible Cartesianism will treat the 
phenomenal, not the mental in some more intellectual sense, as the arena of certainty. Hence 
one finds Chalmers responding to Bayne’s (2001 p. 414) contention that we can’t ever be 
certain that the requisite non-phenomenal “background conditions” for “full justification” of 
our phenomenal judgements are in place, as follows: 
Even if an acquaintance theorist accepts that we can’t be certain that we’re justified, that 
merely shows that one can’t rule out skeptical scenarios in which one’s belief in the 
experience is not fully justified; it doesn’t show that one can’t rule out sceptical scenarios in 
which the experiences are not present. Presumably an acquaintance theorist can hold that 
we’re certain about qualia but not about such cognitive matters as full justification, so that we 
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can rule out skeptical scenarios without qualia, but not those without full justification 
(Chalmers n.d.).56 
Hintikka has argued that a proper understanding of Descartes’ famous dictum, ‘cogito ergo 
sum’, yields virtually the opposite conclusion. He claims that Descartes took advantage of the 
fact that “the meaning of the verb cogitare was traditionally very wide” in order to “smuggle 
more content into his “result”: “the word cogito may still be replaced by such verbs of 
intellection as dubito (or profero) but not ... by verbs referring to arbitrary mental acts such as 
volo or sentio” (Hintikka 1991 pp. 161-164). His reason seems to be that only an act of 
thought can yield what he calls “existential inconsistency”, where “p is existentially 
inconsistent for the person referred to by a to [think or] utter if and only if ‘p; and a exists’ is 
inconsistent (in the ordinary sense of the word)”. He takes such inconsistency to be what 
turns Descartes’ act of doubting his existence into a demonstration that he does in fact exist.  
That the act of doubting itself constitutes a demonstration is the key issue for Hintikka, as he 
is attempting to advance a performative interpretation of Descartes’ dictum (as opposed to the 
inferential interpretation that its surface grammar naturally suggests). He acknowledges that 
the inferential interpretation, which treats ‘I think’ as the premise from which ‘I am’ is 
inferred, “expresses one of the things Descartes had more or less confusedly in mind when he 
formulated his famous dictum”, but thinks it “important to realise that this interpretation is 
defective in important respects. It does not help to elucidate in any way some of Descartes’s 
most explicit and more careful formulations” (Hintikka 1991 p. 149). He maintains that the 
“most interesting interpretation” is one according to which the dictum expresses the insight 
born of a particular kind of performance.    
56 Let it be noted that not only does Chalmers think an acquaintance theorist can hold this view, he in fact does 
hold this view, rejecting what he calls the “CJ” thesis, which is “analogous to the “KJ” thesis that knowledge 
requires knowledge that one is justified, but with certainty instead of knowledge” (Chalmers n.d.). 
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The inferential interpretation is straightforward enough. The singular premise, ‘I think’, takes 
the form ‘Pa’, and the conclusion, I am, the form ‘(Ex)(x=a)’ (Hintikka 1991 p. 147). The 
conclusion follows from the premise in classical first order logic on account of the fact that 
‘Pa!(Ex)(x=a ^Px)’ is a provable formulae, from which ‘Pa!(Ex)(x=a)’ can be derived, 
from which, in conjunction with the premise, the conclusion can be deduced by modus 
ponens (Hintikka 1991 pp. 147, 148). Unfortunately, the conclusion doesn’t follow from the 
premise because thinking entails existence, but because classical first order logic has built in 
“existential presuppositions”, i.e. it behaves as if “all singular terms ... designate actually 
existing individuals” (Hintikka 1991 p. 148). One cannot so easily derive ‘I am’ from ‘I 
think’ in a free logic, which contains no such presuppositions (Hintikka 1991 p. 149). And 
this is plausibly the kind of logic applicable in such a situation, where something’s existence 
is at issue. Hintikka (1991 p. 149) writes, “Hamlet did think a great many things; does it 
follow that he existed?”         
In contrast, Hintikka’s performative interpretation of Descartes’ dictum rests upon the 
aforementioned notion of existential inconsistency. On this interpretation, ‘Cogito ergo sum’ 
expresses the insight born of a performative act, Descartes’ doubting of his own existence 
(Hintikka 1991 pp. 154, 155). The idea seems to be that the absurdity of such doubt is made 
manifest in the act of doubting, such an act being, in Hintikka’s (1991 p. 151, 152) words, 
“awkward”, or “curiously pointless”. But why should this be so? The absurdity of an 
existentially inconsistent thought or utterance is seemingly due to the content of the thought 
or utterance tokened being a denial of the very conditions of its tokening, Descartes’ 
existence supposedly being a requisite condition of the instancing of the doubtful thought. 
Descartes’ assumption that his existence was in fact a requisite condition of the instancing of 
such a thought has proven contentious. Georg Lichtenberg famously objected that at most, 
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Descartes had demonstrated the existence of thinking (Newman 2014). Sidestepping entirely 
the vexed issue of what constitutes the being of a self or subject, does the instancing of a 
thought that constitutes a denial of the very conditions of its tokening amount to a 
demonstration of its falsity? Seemingly not. Such a situation might pertain without being 
manifest in such a way as to constitute a demonstration of its own absurdity. If a dualist 
thinks that thoughts aren’t physically constituted when in actual fact they are, or a physicalist 
thinks thoughts aren’t non-physically constituted when in actual fact they are, a thought is 
instantiated, the contents of which constitute a denial of the conditions facilitating it. The 
thinking of such a thought need not, and plausibly would not, constitute a demonstration of 
falsity of that very same thought for the subject that thinks it. For inconsistency of this kind to 
serve as a demonstration of the indubitable existence of thought, as opposed to the self, it 
must be manifest that one is thinking when doubting the existence of thought. Descartes 
(1988 p. 130) considered this unproblematic, as he thought it “self evident” that “there can be 
nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware”. This thesis 
seems true of the phenomenal mind, inasmuch as it seemingly comprises a unified 
phenomenal manifold such that one is immediately phenomenally aware of all of it at once. 
In contrast, it’s less than clear that it applies with respect to intellectual awareness. In fact, the 
idea seems prima facie problematic. Presumably, to be intellectually aware of something is to 
somehow be thinking of it. We have no other readily available conception of intellectual 
awareness. So this principle, if applied to extra-phenomenal intellectual awareness yields an 
infinity of thoughts of thoughts. Not all such regresses are vicious of course, but it also 
happens that the idea that every thought is in turn thought also isn’t widely accepted. In fact, 
one popular deflationary conception of phenomenal properties has it that they are the 
particular aspects of our mental activity that have a ‘higher order thought’ directed upon 
them, the implicit assumption being that there are aspects of our mental activity that don’t 
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(Chalmers 2010 p. 531). At the least, the advocate of such a view bears a significant burden 
of explanation.  
But even if sense can be made of such a view, it is unclear how this would threaten Cartesian 
certainty with respect to phenomenology, both intellectual and non-intellectual. It is clear 
from the foregoing that what matters for such a performative demonstration is not the fact 
that the existentially inconsistent thought denies the conditions of its tokening, but that its 
falsity is manifest to the subject entertaining it in entertaining it. Such would be the case if 
one were to entertain the thought that one doesn’t have visual phenomenology in spite of 
having immediate phenomenological contact with the ‘falsity maker’ for such a claim. It 
would appear that if anything presents a problem for such existential inconsistency, it’s the 
possibility of the false thought itself being manifest. Hintikka might be right that the ‘think’ 
in Descartes’ dictum can’t be replaced by verbs ‘sense’ or ‘feel’, but he is wrong in saying 
that it was unscrupulous of Descartes to maintain that his method of demonstration secures 
certainty with respect to non-intellectual phenomenology.  
2.2 Is the Concept of Qualia Arrived At Theoretically? 
The foregoing section should suffice at least to establish that there are considerations that can 
be cited in favour of Otto’s claim that the existence of phenomenology is more of a sure fire 
thing than the existence of the non-phenomenal mistaken judgements invoked by Dennett in 
his attempt to explain it away. What of my fictitious Dennett’s claim that our notion of 
phenomenal consciousness comes by way of theory, not immediate acquaintance? The truth 
in this claim becomes clear when we consider what is wrong with the following 
characterisation of bona fide phenomenal realism by Galen Strawson (2011 p. 288): “A good 
way to convey what it is to be a real realist about experience is to say that it’s to continue to 
take colour experience or taste experience, say, or experience of pain, or of an itch, to be 
what one took it to be wholly unreflectively – what one knew it to be in having it – before 
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one did any philosophy, e.g. when one was five”. Such talk of our five year old selves having 
a correct knowledge of the nature of our experiences that was somehow corrupted by later 
philosophical reflection is dubious, inasmuch as our five year old selves were unlikely to 
have any concept of experience in the sense intended. Plausibly, many adults without a 
philosophical background don’t, at least not in an explicit way.57 Strawson (2011 p. 288) 
writes “Some doubt whether five year olds have the concept of experience, or sensation, at 
all. The way to remove this doubt is to discuss pins and needles or other odd sensations with 
them, or indeed with younger children”. But the fact that children use certain words deployed 
by phenomenal realists to refer to phenomenal consciousness, or aspects thereof, doesn’t 
mean they have the same concepts. Whether or not it ultimately constitutes a problem for 
them, J. L. Austin was right in accusing phenomenal realists of using countless terms in non-
standard ways.58 ‘Experience’, in everyday parlance, doesn’t neatly cordon off a peculiar set 
of essentially qualitative properties. One can experience being deceived, love, a war and so 
on. Similarly, the folk concept of a sensation is plausibly that of a bodily happening, not a 
modification of experience as the phenomenal realist conceives it. The idea of a person going 
through his or her entire life without entertaining the concept of experience upon which the 
qualia debate is centred doesn’t seem at all incoherent. This possibility might be thought to 
stand at odds with the supposed epistemic immediacy of phenomenal consciousness. If our 
knowledge of phenomenal properties is born of the most immediate and intimate epistemic 
relationship conceivable, why does our thought only turn to them after at least some degree of 
philosophical deliberation? In this sense, they seem very much like the products of theory. 
57 David Lewis (1999 p. 326), as we shall see, thinks the concept might already have been possessed inexplicitly 
by those that eventually arrive at a more explicit conception.  
58 This was one of the central themes of his Sense and Sensibilia (1962).   
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3. Diaphanous Experience and the Fall from Eden
But the robust realist is arguably in a position to explain the foregoing conundrum without 
conceding that phenomenal properties are merely theoretical postulates. In fact, their very 
commitment to the principle of fidelity to the nature of experience arguably forces them to 
acknowledge an aspect of experience that plausibly explains the situation. Moore (1922 p. 
25) long ago plausibly suggested that experiences are diaphanous. We don’t experience our
experiences as experiences, phenomenal properties as phenomenal properties. Experiences, 
in their intrinsic nature, seemingly, in a phenomeno-notional sense of ‘seemingly’, constitute 
a world-bound subjectivity. A sincere attempt to take experience at face value will plausibly 
acknowledge that our experiences phenomeno-notionally connote all manner of things other 
than phenomenology, except, perhaps, in those rare circumstances where we have the 
phenomenology as of entertaining thoughts about phenomenology.  
The robust realist might appeal to the diaphanousness of experience in order to explain how 
our concept of experience might arrive relatively late in the epistemological game, in spite of 
our bearing the most immediate and intimate of all epistemic relationships to it. Experience 
seemingly (in a phenomeno-notional sense, once again) puts us in immediate contact, not 
with itself, but with a world. The world it thus puts us in contact with is much like Eden in 
Chalmers’ (2010 p. 381) epistemological adaption of the biblical myth of the Fall:  
In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly 
acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were presented to us 
without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory. 
In Chalmers’ (2010 p. 381) myth, the fall from Eden occurs when we eat from the “Tree of 
Illusion” and the “Tree of Science”. The Fall, in this case, of course, is epistemological, not 
literal. We don’t cease living in the world we lived in previously. We are disabused of the 
mistaken belief that we ever did live in such a world. It is perfectly compatible with Robust 
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Realism for somebody to be disabused of this idea without it immediately occurring to them 
that they nonetheless have unmediated contact with something. Questions like the one that so 
bothered the early sense data theorists – “What are the immediate objects of perception?” – 
need never arise (Jackson 1977 p. 6). Historically, of course, they did arise, but the possibility 
of them never arising for subjects who are nonetheless in unmediated contact with 
phenomenal properties doesn’t threaten Robust Realism in the least.  
4. The Genius Jones: Theoretician or Zen Master?
The robust realist might just as easily endorse an account of phenomenal knowledge that has 
it arrive relatively late in the epistemological game, as is the case in Sellars’ myth of the 
genius Jones. Wishing to account for the rationality of human behaviour “not only when their 
conduct is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes … but also when no detectable verbal 
output is present”, Jones postulates inner episodes, “built on the model of [already 
understood] speech episodes”, thoughts (Sellars 1995 §56). Soon after, he postulates 
“episodes which he calls impressions” (Sellars 1995 § 60). Impressions are modelled on “the 
idea of a domain of “inner replicas” which, when brought about in standard conditions, share 
the perceptible characteristic of their physical source” (Sellars 1995 § 61). These replicas 
aren’t what subjects perceive when they perceive that p, but are nonetheless ‘in’ subjects 
when they do so, the commonality between perceptual takings such as seeing that p and it 
appearing to one that p being explained in terms of them. Jones’s ideas are new to the 
members of his community, the Neo-Ryleans.59 We can assume the Neo-Ryleans to be a post 
Fall community who, after being disabused of the belief that they had direct unmediated 
access to the world, never thought to ask what, if anything, they did have direct unmediated 
59 They are Neo-Ryleans because they have abandoned the strict behaviourism of their forebears, the Ryleans, 
by allowing theoretical discourse that resists behaviouristic reduction (more on this below). The Ryleans, in 
turn, are Ryleans on account of their strict adherence to the philosophical behaviorism espoused by Gilbert Ryle 
(1949).    
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access to. Jones’s suggestion might be what prompts them to finally take cognizance of their 
immediate conscious experience, thereby realising that they have been directly acquainted 
with the sense impressions he speaks of all along.    
It is nonetheless noteworthy that this robust realist gloss on Sellars’ myth relies on Neo-
Ryleans being prompted towards a realisation by Jones’s theoretical musings, as opposed to 
merely taking his psychological theory on board qua psychological theory. While it is of no 
particular consequence for the robust realists when, in the scheme of things, the concept of 
qualia is acquired, they are very much committed to a particular view of what it is to acquire 
it. Lewis (1999 p. 326) writes: 
... despite the lack of a folksy word or phrase, I still say that the concept of qualia is somehow 
built into folk psychology. My reason is that when philosophers tell us very concisely indeed 
what they mean by ‘qualia’, we catch on. I think they never say enough to introduce the 
concept from scratch to someone who doesn’t already have it (whether or not he has the 
qualia themselves). But maybe they do say enough to serve as a reminder to someone who 
has the concept already, even if he has it in some inexplicit way.  
In contrast, a robust realist will maintain that if one actually does ‘catch on’ with respect to 
qualia talk, one becomes explicitly cognitively aware for the first time, not of an implicit 
theoretical commitment, but of phenomenology itself. Robust realists will likely cite the very 
considerations that lead Lewis to believe that qualia tacitly belong to our folk theory of mind 
as considerations in favour of their own view. Enough is never said to introduce the concept 
of qualia from scratch because nothing ever could be said that would suffice to do so. No 
amount of mere description of phenomenal colour properties will allow Mary, from the 
confines of her black and white room, to make the transition from an opaque role-theoretic 
conception of such properties to a topic-specific conception of their intrinsic phenomenal 
natures. It’s hard to imagine how else one might gain topic-specific knowledge of an intrinsic 
nature other than by way of some kind of immediate contact with the nature at issue, or, 
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perhaps, with natures similar enough to make some kind of imaginative extrapolation, as 
would be the case if one managed to imagine the colour that would occupy a blank space in 
an otherwise continuous spectrum of shades of blue without ever having encountered that 
shade of blue before.60 This makes for a somewhat queer connection between the acquisition 
of the concept of qualia and the reflection seemingly prompting such acquisition, as no mere 
‘line of thought’ can ever, by itself, yield the concept of qualia.  While for the conservative 
Neo-Rylean who is merely impressed by the explanatory power of Jones’s theory qua theory, 
Jones is merely a masterful theoretician, for the Neo-Ryleans who take themselves to be 
made cognitively aware, for the first time, of what they have been in immediate contact with 
all along, he is more akin to a Zen master. It is a central theme within Zen philosophy that the 
words and concepts deployed in canonical Zen texts and such are but means for moving 
beyond those very words and concepts. Such conceptually inflected material, it is said, is but 
a “finger pointing to the moon”. Shigenori Nagatomo (2010) writes, “Zen insists that there 
should not be a confounding of the moon with a finger. In Zen language, the moon 
metaphorically designates an experience of enlightenment and the finger a linguistic or 
reflective endeavour”.  In Zen master Jones’s case, the moon is experience in general and the 
finger is his theory of thoughts and sense impressions. 
4.1 The Schism 
Let us imagine that a schism thus emerges among Jones’s Neo-Rylean acolytes. More 
conservative Neo-Ryleans maintain that Jones has done something impressive, but perfectly 
continuous with the enterprise of theory building already established within their community. 
Neo-Ryleans have already intellectually progressed beyond their primitive Rylean forebears 
60 Though once again we run into the issue of whether any real representational relation pertains between such 
an imagining and the actual, and presumably different, phenomenal property it is experienced as if to be an 
imagining of.  
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inasmuch as their language has been ‘enriched’ by the “addition of theoretical discourse”. 
Sellars (1995 § 51) writes,  
... the fundamental assumptions of a theory are usually developed ... by attempting to find a 
model, i.e. to describe a domain of familiar objects behaving in familiar ways such that we 
can see how the phenomena to be explained would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing. 
The essential thing about a model is that it is accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary 
which qualifies or limits – but not precisely nor in all respects – the analogy between the 
familiar objects and the entities which are being introduced by the theory. 
Conservative Neo-Ryleans will say Jones is doing exactly this and nothing more. Jones has 
put forward a theory intended to explain the aforementioned empirical phenomena (rational 
behaviour unaccompanied by overt verbal and the semantic commonality of locutions such as 
‘seeing that p’ and ‘it appearing to one that p’). Business continues as usual. His theory 
stands and falls on the basis of its theoretical worth, and all the qualifications of the 
accompanying commentary Sellars speaks of are to be in aid of this objective. To add a 
qualification, for instance, to the effect that when such ‘inner episodes’ occur, the subject 
they occur ‘in’ bears an absolutely unmediated relation to certain property instances they 
instantiate, would be an act of sheer perversion from the conservative Neo-Rylean 
perspective, unless, of course, such a qualification can be shown to have some form of 
explanatory cash value. In contrast, advocates of the Zen interpretation will insist upon such 
an immediate relation with property instances, as that’s what Jones has brought them to a 
realisation of.  
The standoff thus described is, of course, the very standoff we find in the contemporary 
philosophical literature on consciousness, but with the considerations upon which each side 
places a premium brought into stark relief. To the conservative Neo-Ryleans, who place a 
high premium upon theoretical virtues, the Zen Neo-Ryleans are flying in the face of good 
science. Conservatism is a theoretical virtue in and of itself, and in breaking with the 
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‘business as usual’ approach to theory building, they have given themselves over to a 
scientifically unscrupulous mysticism. Zen Neo-Ryleans will likely maintain that there’s 
nothing mystical about the immediate experience they speak of, and that to become aware of 
it is, at the same time, to be made aware of a heretofore unacknowledged, but nonetheless 
essential, aspect of the very theory building the conservative Neo-Ryleans cite against them. 
It is to be made aware of the source of empirical revelation. Conservative Neo-Ryleans will 
likely take this to be but a further delusion built upon the initial delusion, maintaining that 
conservative scientific methodology has yielded a perfectly serviceable, and much more 
explanatorily edifying, account of so-called empirical revelation, a causally mediated one, 
involving light being deflected from objects onto the eye and such. Zen Neo-Ryleans might 
remind conservative Neo-Ryleans of the Fall, and that the prevailing view of perception was 
originally one of unmediated contact. They might therefore suggest that if, when perceptual 
contact with physical objects was shown not to be immediate, theorists had thought to ask 
what they were in immediate contact with instead, they would have arrived at the very 
realisation Zen master Jones’s teachings, properly understood, invokes. Conservative Neo-
Ryleans might in turn reply that to discover that physical objects aren’t immediately 
apprehended isn’t to discover that something else is. All that is left is for the Zen Neo-
Ryleans to appeal to the truthmakers for their claims, the truthmakers their Zen-like 
realisation has made them aware of. Conservative Neo-Ryleans will in turn deny them their 
realisation, perhaps saying that old world-views die hard. ‘It’s time to let go of Eden’, they 
might say. They might then go on the attack with respect to the theoretical indeterminacy of 
the properties the Zen Neo-Ryleans speak of, demanding that they offer a description 
adequate to individuate them. The Zen Neo-Ryleans will in turn reply that no mere 
description is up to the task. They will maintain that the terms they use to depict these natures 
depict them not on the basis of their relations to other terms in a theory or language, but by 
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virtue of their being appropriately related to the instances of the natures themselves. The 
semantic finger is pointing at the extra-semantic moon. What such properties lack in 
theoretical determinacy, they more than make up for in ontological determinacy.  
4.2 Tough Talk and Tipping Points 
There is clearly no chance of further dialogical progress here, as neither party places enough 
of a premium on the considerations cited by the other. Conservative Neo-Ryleans reject the 
purported ‘evidence’ cited by Zen Neo-Ryleans out of hand. Zen Neo-Ryleans will only 
countenance the empirical considerations cited by the conservative Neo-Ryleans inasmuch as 
they are interpreted in a manner that already assumes the truth of their view, as considerations 
born of experience as they characterise it. Each tribe can amass as many arguments of their 
preferred kind as they like, filling journals and monographs with anti-conservative or anti-
Zen diatribes. The combined body of work thus produced won’t constitute a debate, as both 
parties are wilfully talking at cross-purposes. The balance of consideration can only be tilted 
by considerations, and neither party believes the other to be citing considerations that 
genuinely constitute any kind of threat to the view they hold. Each party has its own way of 
talking tough, of declaring its position impervious to the considerations cited by the other. 
Zen-Neo-Ryleans have the Cartesian conceit that their certainty regarding immediate 
experience is more certain than any consideration born of what Husserl (1999 pp. 33-37) 
called the “natural attitude”, including the metaphysical realism it is premised upon. The so-
called ‘evidence’ cited by conservative Neo-Ryleans is premised upon the assumption that we 
have perceptual access to a mind independent real world, an assumption open to doubt in the 
way that the existence of immediate experience isn’t. The conservative Neo-Ryleans, in turn, 
have the theoretician’s conceit. They will insist on a kind of radical ontological pragmatism 
whereby existence shouldn’t be predicated of anything, experience included, that doesn’t earn 
its explanatory keep.  
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That such tough talk is, for the best part at least, merely talk is evidenced by the fact that in 
the actual literature on phenomenal consciousness, few, if any, defend either of the two 
foregoing positions with the ruthlessness one would expect of someone one hundred percent 
committed to either side. Instead, J.L. Austin’s (1962 p. 2) famous words ring true: “There’s 
the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back”. Turning first to the Cartesian 
conceit, it is noteworthy that Descartes’ hyperbolic doubt didn’t last long. Having doubted 
away everything but his own thinking self, he all-too-quickly won the world back by 
relatively specious means. While few have been moved by his case for certainty regarding the 
world built upon prior certainty in the existence of a god that would not deceive him, it might 
nonetheless be suggested that his impact upon the history of philosophy would have been far 
slighter if he hadn’t won it back at all. Would Chalmers (1996 p. 75) have had the same 
impact on the contemporary landscape if, rather than giving himself “the physical world for 
free”, he only did so after having attended to various sceptical problems? In particular, would 
he have had the same impact if he had shown that his Cartesian commitments rendered the 
possibility of a transcendentally real empirical world problematic? I think it doubtful. 
Denying the reality of the whole of the world is a reliable path to philosophical obscurity.61 
Even Berkeley afforded the world full-blooded existence, albeit in the mind of God.62 As was 
seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of the various reasons invoked for the Dennettian 
Dissolution of phenomenal depth, some acquaintance-based realists have allowed 
considerations born of theory (premised upon the assumption of the natural attitude) to trump 
considerations born of direct acquaintance. Such a concession would tilt the balance of 
61 Such denial doesn’t guarantee philosophical obscurity. It’s unclear, for instance, that Bradley affords the 
world full-blooded existence.  
62 Foster (1982 pp. 28, 29) points out that “the perceptive role of God takes on a new significance” in the Three 
Dialogues that it didn’t have in the Principles: “Berkeley claims not merely that God may perceive physical 
objects at times when we do not, but that he actually does”. The mature Berkeley thus characterises the physical 
world as “a spatiotemporal arrangement of sensible qualities which exist as the object of divine perception” and 
“serve as a blueprint for divine volition” (Foster 1982 p. 111). 
+'!
consideration in favour of the conservative-Neo-Rylean view, giving them their gotcha 
moment. Let us call such a possibility a dialogical tipping point.  
Turning now to the theoretician’s conceit, it seems that even those who talk the toughest have 
the bit where they say it and the bit where they take it back. For instance, the following 
passage from Dennett (1993b pp. 382, 383) ...   
My claim, then, is not just that the various technical or theoretical concepts of qualia are 
vague or equivocal, but that the source concept, the ‘pre-theoretical’ notion of which the 
former are presumed to be refinements, is so thoroughly confused that, even if we undertook 
to salvage some ‘lowest common denominator’ from the theoreticians’ proposals, any 
acceptable version would be so radically unlike the ill formed notions that are commonly 
appealed to that it would be tactically obtuse – not to say Pickwickian – to cling to the term. 
Far better, tactically, to declare that there simply are no qualia at all.   
...  is prefaced by the following disclaimer: 
Everything real has properties, and since I do not deny the reality of conscious experience, I 
grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person’s conscious 
states have the experiential content they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences 
something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of 
something happening in them at the time.  
But the latter could be taken to be a straightforward avowal of phenomenal realism. 
Phenomenal properties, after all, are simply meant to be the properties of experience, and to 
comprise the experiential content he speaks of. Dennett (1993b p. 382) assures us that “these 
properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be 
grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia”. But phenomenal properties 
aren’t just imputed to consciousness by seriously committed phenomenal realists. They are 
thought to be of the essence of consciousness. Dennett might as well be saying that the 
properties he imputes to the totality of our phenomenal properties aren’t phenomenal 
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properties. This, of course, isn’t what he means. For all his eliminativist bluster, he is 
behaving very much like a reductivist, proposing a naturalistically respectable ersatz for 
conscious experience, an “imperfect deserver of the name” (Lewis 1999 p. 325). This ersatz 
consciousness is bound to possess significantly different properties from the consciousness of 
the non-reductive realist. Every such proposed ersatz does - hence the non-reductive realist 
accusations that reductive realists are engaging in “bait-and-switch” tactics (Chalmers 2010 
p. 6).
Even Dennett doesn’t want to outrightly deny the existence of conscious experience. At the 
same time, he acknowledges, “the price you pay for the possibility of empirically confirming 
your assertions is the outside chance of being discredited” (Dennett 1993b p. 392). Dennett, 
of all people, is in no position to appeal to his own conscious experience in support of his 
postulation of conscious experience as he characterises it. Rather, like Jones’s conservative 
Neo-Rylean acolytes, he must be impressed by its explanatory power. Some of the most 
infamous and tough-talking conservatives seem to be surprisingly won over by the theoretical 
worth of some kind of watered down notion of consciousness. Even Churchland (1985 p. 28) 
who is more than open to the prospect of outright eliminativism with respect to propositional 
attitudes, nonetheless takes a softer, reductivist stance towards qualia: 
I suggest then, that those of us who prize the flux and content of our subjective 
phenomenological experience need not view the advance of materialistic neuroscience with 
fear and foreboding. Quite the contrary. The genuine arrival of a materialist kinematics and 
dynamics for psychological states and cognitive processes will constitute not a gloom in 
which our inner life is suppressed or eclipsed, but rather a dawning, in which its marvellous 
intricacies are finally revealed – most notably, if we apply ourselves, in direct self-conscious 
introspection.    
But from a conservative perspective, the very same considerations he cites in favour of 
eliminativism with respect to propositional attitudes seem equally applicable in the case of 
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consciousness. Arguably, they are more applicable. Propositional attitudes bear a stronger 
conceptual connection to observable behaviour, and Churchland (1981 p. 68) will admit that 
their postulation enables “the average person ... to explain, and even predict, the behaviour of 
other persons with a facility and success that is remarkable”. Churchland (1981 p. 69) 
nonetheless maintains that such a postulation is only “credible to the degree that it is 
successful in this regard over competing hypotheses”. He’s more than open to the possibility 
of it being “too confused and too defective to win survival through intertheoretic reduction” 
with whatever ultimately proves the best kinematic theory of human organisms, that is, the 
most efficient theory with respect to predicting human behaviour.63 There are theoretical 
postulates, explanatory load bearers, within contemporary cognitive science that would seem 
to have the requisite degree of isomorphism with the ‘folk psychological notion’ of conscious 
experience that would render them apt to constitute its theoretical reduction, to be good 
enough deservers of the name. An example would be the notion Chalmers (2010 p. 21) refers 
to as “awareness”, which he describes as a “process” involving “contents that are directly 
accessible and potentially reportable, at least in a language using system”.64 But theories of 
cognitive architecture that postulate such operations over representational contents are more 
often than not defended by way of an appeal to the nature of propositional attitudes. Classical 
computationalism, for instance, is often subscribed to on the strength of the language of 
thought hypothesis, the plausibility of which derives, in part at least, from purported syntactic 
and semantic similarities between propositional attitudes and linguistic forms of 
representation (Fodor 1987 pp. 139, 148, 149). Obviously, for those whose theoretical 
63 It should be noted that what constitutes the best theory isn’t just a matter of predictive accuracy but also 
practical utility. The best theory will be the one which, in Dennett’s (1998 p. 119) words, involves the right 
“trade-off between ease of use and immunity from error”.      
64 The very fact that Chalmers takes structural isomorphism between phenomenal consciousness and awareness 
to be a guiding principle in the development of a non-reductive theory of consciousness lends weight to this 
claim. “Adequate mimicry” of the objects or properties of an antiquated theory in a new, superior, theory is all 
that’s required for theoretical reduction (Churchland 1985 p. 10). 
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reduction of consciousness is premised upon an account of cognitive architecture, which they 
in turn premise upon realism about propositional attitudes, their theoretical reduction of 
consciousness is only as credible as their realism about propositional attitudes.  
The explanatory merit of experiences would appear to be asymmetrically dependent on the 
explanatory merit of the representational theory of mind. It’s less than clear how, for 
instance, the dynamical conceptions of cognitive architecture, which supplants the 
“configurations of tokens of symbol types” with rule-governed evolutions of numerical states, 
might yield an adequate reduction of conscious experience (Van Gelder 1995 p. 369). 
Instead, Tim Van Gelder (1995 p. 381) suggests that the dynamical approach might offer an 
explanation of how the “post-Cartesian agent manages to cope with the world without 
necessarily representing it”. Yet Churchland (1981 p. 84) and Dennett (1998 p. 120), who are 
both open to the possibility of the ultimate demise of “propositional kinematics”, though 
disagreeing with respect to its likelihood,65 never straightforwardly flag their openness to the 
possibility of the ultimate demise of conscious experience. Churchland, as we have seen, 
seems more certain of the existence of conscious experience than he is of propositional 
attitudes. But why?  
We have seemingly arrived at another dialogical tipping point. Anyone who professes to take 
theoretical worth as the sole criterion for ontological commitment is not in a position to 
attribute existence to conscious experience unless a deserving counterpart for it can be shown 
to feature in a worthy theory, the most likely candidate theories being the behavioural 
kinematics of particular organisms. Zen Neo-Ryleans get their gotcha moment if conservative 
Neo-Ryleans cling to Jones’s postulates in the face of the advent of a better theory, one that 
65 Dennett (1998 p. 120) writes, “A truly general purpose, robust system of pattern-description more valuable 
than the intentional stance is not an impossibility, but anyone who wants to bet on it might care to talk to me 
about the odds they’ll take”. 
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better predicts human behaviour. It would appear, in such a case, that for all their tough talk, 
the conservative Neo-Ryleans’ motivations for postulating conscious experiences weren’t 
purely theoretical after all. Of course, given that such a theory may never be forthcoming, 
such a gotcha moment might never be had. Computationalism continues, after all, to be a 
widely held view within cognitive science. The foregoing discussion nonetheless shows 
reluctance on the part of some of the more tough talking philosophers to straightforwardly 
embrace this consequence of their view.  
In any case, members of the Zen camp needn’t await the potential demise of Jonesean 
representationalism to get their gotcha moment. They need not catch conservatives out 
clinging to the existence of consciousness in the face of a lack of any purely theoretical 
motivation. It would suffice to catch them clinging to a particular property of consciousness. 
There’s arguably a gotcha moment already to be had here. What benefit could there possibly 
be in postulating an explanatory gap between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts if 
phenomenal concepts are merely theoretical concepts postulated to explain physical 
behaviour?66 It would be incredibly strange if the best explanation of an organism’s physical 
kinematics essentially relied upon the postulation of properties which, while physical, were 
somehow resistant to physical explanation. Reductivists regarding phenomenal properties 
who nonetheless concede that there is an explanatory gap between our concepts of such 
properties and our physical concepts are wont to maintain that the gap itself can be explained 
by appeal to the special kind of epistemic relationship we bear to our phenomenal states 
(Chalmers 2010 p. 311). But such talk about a special epistemic relationship seems 
suspiciously like Zen talk. Lewis (1999 p. 327) takes the thesis that “we identify the qualia of 
our experience”, such that we “know exactly what they are ... in an uncommonly demanding 
66 For the canonical defence of the explanatory gap view, see Levine (1983). 
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sense of ‘knowing what’”, to be the key aspect of the supposed folk theory that the materialist 
must abandon: “If qualia are physical properties of experiences, and experiences in turn are 
physical events, then it is certain that we seldom, if ever, identify the qualia of our 
experiences. Making discoveries in neuroscience is not so easy!” Given that impressions are 
postulated in Jonesean representationalism to explain the semantic commonality between 
appearance talk and straightforward perceptual reports, the archetypal conservative Neo-
Rylean theorist, let’s call her Con, would likely think it reasonable to afford a degree of 
reliability to a reporter, let’s call him Rep, with respect to indicating the instantiation of his 
own sense impressions, but this need not involve special knowledge of what his reports 
reliably indicate. Con might also be sympathetic to the idea of a reliabilist epistemology, and 
therefore attribute knowledge of the instantiation of sense impressions to Rep. In such a case, 
she would have to concede that Rep’s knowledge of his own sense impressions comes by 
way of a different ‘mode of presentation’ to her knowledge of his sense impressions, but 
knowing things under a mode of presentation is not the same thing as knowing the mode of 
presentation under which one knows those things. Con need not think that the mode of 
presentation itself enters into Rep’s knowledge in some altogether special way, such that Rep 
has any special authority with respect to the nature of the mode of presentation or the 
impressions thus presented. Rather, she might think it a tenable working hypothesis that 
impressions are neural events given under a peculiarly neurological mode of presentation, 
and think herself better equipped, thanks to her special training in neuroscience, to determine 
exactly what kind of events they might be, and, in turn, what’s involved in the mode of 
presentation. Con need not take every aspect of the reports from Rep seriously. If she did, 
she’d be taking Zen talk of unmediated access to instances of intrinsic properties seriously. 
Rather, she will likely supplement her theory of what such reports accurately indicate with 
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various attributions of error, charitable reinterpretations and so on.67 Her intention isn’t to 
explain a form of incorrigible knowledge, but rather, the noteworthy affinity between certain 
publicly observable speech acts. She would likely take reported intuitions of an explanatory 
gap as indicative of thoroughgoing ignorance on the part of reporting subjects with respect to 
the nature of their own impressions. Affording subjects special epistemic authority on non-
theoretical grounds would be tantamount to abandoning her conservative scruples and going 
Zen.  
5. Calling Your Opponent’s Bluff
It would appear that members from both sides of our standoff have unwittingly given the 
considerations cited by their opponents more credence than their tough talk would suggest 
that they were willing to. If it is in any way plausible that Zen talk of certainty regarding 
immediate experience trumping the natural attitude is mere posturing, or that conservative 
talk of theory building considerations trumping experiential considerations is mere posturing, 
a potential strategy opens up for opponents of each respective position. It is one thing to 
express a willingness to bite a bullet, another to actually do it. As it stands, neither faction 
really believes it must pay the metaphysical cost it proclaims to be willing to pay. If it could 
be demonstrated that those metaphysical costs actually were entailed by their view, they 
would be forced to show the depth of their convictions.  
This strategy promises a road from the present standoff back to genuine debate, but it requires 
that one know one’s enemy well enough to be capable of discerning the unpalatable 
67 Con’s method will be recognised by those familiar with Dennett’s work on consciousness as 
heterophenomenological in spirit. Rep is allowed the freedom to describe a “heterophenomenological world ... 
populated with all the images, events, sounds, smells, hunches, presentiments, and feelings ... [he] sincerely 
believes to exist in his ... stream of consciousness” (Dennett 1993a p. 98). But Con ultimately decides on 
conservative third-personal theoretical grounds which items in Rep’s heterophenomenology, given a degree of 
“metaphorical slack”, might be said to exist, and which, in contrast, are mere “confabulations” (Dennett 1993a 
pp. 94, 98).  
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metaphysical costs internal to their view. Genuine dialogical progress requires that each party 
abandon arguments premised upon principles only they accept in favour of arguments 
premised upon principles those in the opposing camp might accept. To explore the 
implications of Cartesian realism regarding consciousness is likely to strike those of a 
conservative persuasion, at first blush, as an act of sheer perversion, but the Zen view, 
premised, as it is, upon the Cartesian conceit, is impervious to the standard empirical 
considerations conservatives raise against it. What’s more, such an exploration is already an 
implicit part of the conservative research program. Researchers like Con need only consider 
the implications of the less empirically plausible aspects of data provided by subjects like 
Rep, what would be the case if their testimonials regarding their experiences were true. 
Exploring the kinds of deflationist accounts of cognitive architecture conservatives are wont 
to defend might likewise strike some Zen adherents as an exercise in futility, but 
conservatives will be as blithely dismissive of their ten thousandth appeal to unmediated 
access to truthmakers as they were of their first. Also, inasmuch as many Zen adherents seek 
an understanding of the metaphysical connection between conscious and physical states, and 
generally think the kind of brain states conservatives are likely to identify with conscious 
experience are somehow involved in this connection, such exploration is likewise an implicit 
part of their research. Obviously, one can only successfully demonstrate that a view entails 
some metaphysical cost if the view does in fact entail such a cost. It is by no means obvious 
that either of the two views under discussion entail the metaphysical cost they claim a 
willingness to incur, but the tendency for members of each side to traverse the previously 
discussed tipping points suggests a lack of appreciation of the nature of the standoff they find 
themselves in, and, consequently, what they themselves are committing to in taking the 
position they take. Also, with respect to each faction, there is at least some reason for 
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thinking their view might incur a heavier metaphysical cost than they have heretofore 
acknowledged.  
The major problem for the robust realism with respect to experience endorsed by those in the 
Zen camp is how it might be brought into harmony with the realistic picture of the world born 
of the natural attitude. Attempting to answer the question of how this might be done is 
perhaps the most active research project within the Zen camp, and every canonical solution 
has its canonical problems, for traditional interactionist dualism, the causal closure of the 
physical, for epiphenomenalist dualism, the very idea of epiphenomenalism, for Russellian 
views, the combination problem.68 There is nonetheless an overriding conviction that the 
problem of integrating consciousness into a metaphysically realistic picture of the world is a 
problem with a solution. But we have already seen that there is a tendency among those in the 
Zen camp to afford considerations born of the natural attitude more weight than their stated 
position actually allows. Might their insistence upon the metaphysical marriage of non-
reductive phenomenal realism and non-skeptical realism with respect to the world reflect a 
tacit unwillingness to pay the price that they claim to be willing to pay for their metaphysical 
commitments? An ambitious and committed conservative would do well to search for as 
many obstacles to the metaphysical integration of experiences (taken in the robustly realist 
Zen sense) and the world as possible, in hope that a watertight case against such a possibility 
might be made out.   
There is also at least some reason to think conservatives might need to pay the kind of heavy 
price with respect to consciousness that the theoreticians conceit would have that they are 
willing to pay, though it must be admitted that it is somewhat more of a long shot. It is true 
that non-representational accounts of cognitive architecture have gained some degree of 
68 See Lewis (1999 pp. 282-285) for a succinct statement of the argument from causal closure and an unargued 
rejection of epiphenomenalism (albeit an attenuated form that survives the postulation of a Humean 
parapsychology). For more on the combination problem, see Chalmers (forthcoming b).  
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traction, but there is little prospect of such account becoming so well developed as to 
supplant even folk psychology, let alone representationalism in general, as the preferred 
kinematical explanation of human and animal behavior. And even if an ambitious Zen 
disciple did manage to show conservatives that there were simply no plausible theoretical 
grounds for postulation of a theoretical entity or property complex sufficiently isomorphic to 
the folk notion of conscious experience to deserve to be called such, victory would come with 
a sting in its tail. The desire for there to be some such physical complex is also shared by 
most members of the Zen camp. Without it, they lose any strong metaphysical intersection 
point between consciousness, as they characterize it, and physical reality.69 In severing such a 
connection, they bring themselves much closer to a situation where they might have to make 
good on their own tough talk.  
It would appear that inasmuch as the foregoing strategy offers a way beyond the present 
impasse, it places conservatives at an advantage. The possibility of Zen adherents having to 
make good on their tough talk seems far more likely, as much of the writing is already on the 
wall, and in calling members of the Zen camp out on their tough talk, conservatives incur no 
cost themselves. In any case, I will only be concerning myself with the conservative version 
of the foregoing strategy in this thesis. Over the following two chapters, I will attempt to 
demonstrate that Robust Realism, the strong form of phenomenal realism endorsed by those 
of the Zen faction, rules out the possibility of experiences existing spatiotemporally ‘within’ a 
transcendentally real physical world, or causally interacting with one from without. 
Spatiotemporal inclusion and causal interaction are the two primary means by which robust 
realists have attempted to forge metaphysical connections between experience, as they 
characterize it, and the physical world. Without them, it would seem that the most intimate 
69 Chalmers (1996 pp. 222, 223), for instance, subscribes to what he calls “the principle of structural coherence”, 
according to which “various structural features of consciousness correspond directly to structural features that 
are represented in awareness”. 
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fundamental metaphysical relationship that might pertain between them is mere coexistence, 
albeit in complete isolation from each other.70 In such a case, it’s difficult to see what 
justification experience, the robust realist’s sole source of empirical revelation, could 
possibly provide for the existence of such a world. It would be incumbent upon robust realists 
who continue to subscribe to transcendental realism regarding the physical world to explain 
why they do so without any reason whatsoever, why they don’t just bite the bullet the 
Cartesian conceit has it that they are willing to bite. 71  
6. Seeking Inconsistency
I think it plausible that a good number of robust realists would take genuine entailment of a 
radical disconnect between experience and the world as reason for reconsidering their 
Cartesian commitments. But there is always the possibility that some robust realists aren’t 
just talking tough, that they sincerely subscribe to the view that if the loss of the real world is 
a cost of their acquaintance based phenomenal realism, it is a cost they are forced to incur. I 
see very few philosophers openly choosing this path, if only on account of the social cost. I 
also think that if the robust realist community comprised only a handful of world-denying 
eccentrics, conservatives would be far less likely to afford them the kind of baseline 
70 I will flag one other possible way in which such a connection might be forged, but it depends upon a peculiar  
blend of presentism and phenomenal constitutivism regarding the physical world. I imagine few robust realists 
would be keen to adopt such a view. If they did, robust realists would have something new to defend, and 
deflationists, something new to attack. Such a significant change in the overall dialectic might itself be said to 
constitute a degree of progress.   
71 Admittedly, it’s not clear to me that they are altogether without recourse. They might, for instance, present a 
case not unlike the one David Lewis (1986b pp. 3-5) presents for real possible worlds, in spite of their having no 
bearing on the actual world, and, therefore, on the empirical data available at the actual world. They might 
suggest that in spite of the fact that it has no bearing on the course of experience, the actual physical world is 
nonetheless an explanatorily edifying theoretical postulate. The fact that they don’t give theory-building 
considerations absolute primacy doesn’t mean that they don’t think theoretical considerations should play a 
significant part in determining one’s ontological commitments. They might maintain that a theory that postulates 
something with its structure, in conjunction with the postulation of special theoretical relations associating 
certain physical state types it instantiates with certain phemonenal state types, still serves as the best possible 
explanation of the course of experience, albeit a purely structural, as opposed to a causal, one. In such a case, 
once again, robust realists would have something new to defend, and deflationists, something new to attack. I 
won’t dedicate any significant space to such a view in this thesis, as it currently has no proponents, and I think 
few would find it attractive.  
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credibility one affords a genuine philosophical opponent. But insomuch as one has taken the 
time to explore the implications of Robust Realism in the first place, one might hold some 
hope of uncovering something even more damning than an incompatibility with realism 
regarding the world. They might hope to uncover implications of the view that undermine the 
fundamental tenets of the view itself. If Robust Realism were self refuting in this way, 
subscription to it wouldn’t merely be eccentric, it would be straightforwardly irrational. In the 
final chapter of this thesis, which is primarily concerned with the relation between 
phenomenal states and representational states, I give reason for thinking that experiences, as 
Robust Realists characterises them, cannot feed into a transcendentally real account of 
concept formation and representation in the way they must do if they are to serve as 
transcendental truthmakers for phenomenal judgements. Robust realism, it will be 
remembered, is premised upon an acquaintance-based model of justification regarding 
phenomenal judgements, according to which experiences provide direct non-inferential 
justification for such judgements on account of their being what makes them true. It would be 
something of an indictment of the view if this proved impossible by its own lights. 
7. Conclusion
So long as deflationists and non-deflationists continue to base the case for their respective 
positions upon their own norms of ontological commitment, the qualia debate is likely to 
remain in a state of perpetual stalemate. There is reason to think neither party are as 
committed to the norms characteristic of their view as their tough talk might have one 
believe. It is strategically prudential, therefore, to uncover whatever costs might be entailed 
by strict adherence to the norms of one’s opponent. There are already prima facie reasons for 
thinking Robust Realism might face substantial costs. Deflationists would therefore do well 




In this chapter, I argue that robust realists are committed to a thesis regarding the constitutive 
nature of experiences I call the Constitution Thesis, according to which the constitutive 
nature of experiences is exhausted by their experienced nature.  
I begin with a discussion of the comparative reliability of the dual desiderata governing the 
project undertaken in this thesis, those of phenomenological adequacy and coherence with the 
fundamental tenets of Robust Realism. In section 2, I acknowledge that while 
phenomenological adequacy is, according to Robust Realism, the primary constraint on 
theory-choice, the truth of Robust Realism doesn’t entail that our phenomenal judgments are 
infallible. Indeed, I argue that we are prone to systematic error. In section 3, I flag that there 
are significant results to be obtained by the consideration of the conceptual entailments of 
Robust Realism. Such a method, relying, as it does, upon a shared understanding of relatively 
familiar concepts, is both more reliable and less controversial than that of appealing to the 
character of phenomenology. 
In section 4, I introduce the Constitution Thesis, differentiating it from the somewhat similar 
claim that has already been established as a fundamental commitment of Robust Realism, the 
claim that experiences are exactly as they are experienced to be. Most robust realists, while 
endorsing this latter claim, reject the Constitution Thesis, holding that experiences possess 
constitutive natures that outstrip their experienced natures. The only potential constituents 
that have been decisively ruled out at this point are physical constituents.  
In section 5, I discuss the tendency among robust realists who afford experiences a 
constitutive nature that outstrips their experienced nature to appeal to our general ignorance 
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regarding the potential constituents they cite. This might seem at odds with the explanatory 
goals of metaphysics, but Robust Realism already entails the rejection of any strong 
conceptual connection between existence and explanatory worth.  
But in some case of some constituents, our understanding of them does seem sufficient to 
indicate that they cannot play the required theoretical role. In section 6, I argue that this is the 
case with respect to Chalmers’ protophenomenal properties, as the constitution of one non-
structural substantial substrate by another seems impossible, as does the composite 
constitution of a non-composite simple. But several other potential constituents remain. 
What’s more, such a case against protophenomena is premised upon a phenomenological 
appeal to a somewhat nebulous aspect of certain phenomenal properties, their ‘positive 
simplicity’. An argument for the Constitution Thesis premised upon the fundamental tenets of 
Robust Realism promises to prove more by less contentious means.  
In section 7, I introduce the Revelation Argument,72 an argument for the Constitution Thesis 
in the literature. The Revelation Argument purports to derive the Constitution Thesis from the 
experiential revelation of phenomenal natures. I then consider Chalmers’ recent attempted 
rebuttal of this argument. I explore an ambiguity in the Revelation Argument, and in sections 
7.1 and 7.2 present reasons for thinking this vitiates Chalmers’ case. 
2. The Perils of Descriptive Phenomenology
Robust Realism is a form of realism regarding phenomenal properties premised upon the 
purportedly immediate experiential givenness of phenomenal property instances, one which 
refuses to countenance any explaining away of given instances by way of appeal to mistaken 
judgements, beliefs and such. Put simply, it is the view that there are phenomenal properties, 
72 I take the name from Chalmers (forthcoming b pp. 12). 
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we know this because we experience them, and they are as they are experienced to be. So any 
exploration of the metaphysical implications of Robust Realism must take the desideratum of 
fidelity to experience very seriously. If experience exhibits properties of a given character, 
such properties exist and must be accounted for in metaphysical theory if it is to constitute a 
complete description of reality. We have already seen how this desideratum informs the 
metaphysics of more devout phenomenal realists in chapter 1. The rejection of any attempted 
reduction of phenomenal properties to physical properties by such realists was shown there to 
be premised upon the impossibility of certain characteristics of experience being adequately 
accounted for by physical properties. We considered the two opposing conceptions of the 
properties depicted in physical theory that have emerged in philosophical literature. One has 
it that such properties are topic-neutral properties realised by reality’s intrinsic nature, with 
respect to which physical theory falls silent.  The other has it that such properties don’t 
characterise reality opaquely at all, that there’s nothing to reality beyond the structure and 
dynamics depicted in physical theory. Devout phenomenal realists reject the former because 
experience, they say, affords an immediate topic-specific relation to properties which no 
amount of opaque topic-neutral description can adequately account for. They reject the latter 
because experience possesses structureless phenomenal properties that no amount of purely 
structural-cum-dynamical properties can yield, and a stand-alone existence which is at odds 
with the massive constitutive co-dependency that is characteristic of the view in question.  
While fidelity to experience will serve as a key desideratum in the ensuing metaphysical 
explorations, it must be acknowledged that Robust Realism has it that experiences are exactly 
as they are experienced to be, not exactly as we would be sincerely inclined to describe them 
as being. Sincere phenomenological reports can be wrong.73 Of course, such phenomenal 
73 Contemporary non-reductive realists typically eschew strong infallibility with respect to phenomenal 
judgements. Siewert (1998 pp. 14-19), for instance, makes it clear that while he thinks there is a distinctive kind 
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realists must think they’re getting some things right on this score. Were they to have 
absolutely no idea what intrinsic properties their experiences instantiated, their rejection of 
the topic-neutral conception of experience as a ‘something, we know not what’ would seem 
rather spurious. But we have already encountered aspects of phenomenology that can serve as 
obstacles to phenomenological description. A relatively straightforward example would be its 
manifold complexity. Experience admits of more detail than we’re capable of cognitively 
accounting for. A more complicated host of problems are born of the fact that the natural 
attitude, if nothing else, is natural, our epistemological default setting. Experience, as we 
have seen, doesn’t immediately betray itself as experience. Phenomenally constituted 
appearances appear as non-phenomenally constituted objective phenomena. Even in the 
aftermath of the emergence of the concept of consciousness, there is a natural tendency to 
conflate the phenomenal and the objective.  
A particularly common error is that of taking phenomenal aspects of phenomenology for non-
phenomenal objective aspects of phenomenology, the mistaking of the appearance of x for the 
x of appearance. The most commonly cited instance of this kind of inversion, owing 
originally to William James (2008 p. 643) but often associated with Husserl, is the purported 
confusion of the phenomenal appearance of temporal succession with an objective temporal 
succession of phenomenal appearances.74 But I believe inversions of this kind to be far more 
ubiquitous in the philosophy of consciousness. I have already cited other instances of this 
kind of inversion, the conflation of the intentionality of appearances with the appearance of 
intentionality and the conflation of attention phenomenology with extra-phenomenal attention 
of first person warrant accruing to phenomenal judgements, he “neither asserts nor denies” their necessary 
infallibility. Chalmers (2010 pp. 277, 281) defends a highly attenuated infallibility thesis with respect to what he 
calls ‘direct phenomenal beliefs’, but is sure to make clear that “although direct phenomenal beliefs are 
infallible, subjects are not infallible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief”.  
74 Christopher Hoerl (2013 p. 373) writes, “Often when a slogan of this type is used, Kant is a key influence. But 
it is actually quite difficult to find a clear-cut example in Kant’s own writing. The closest he comes is probably 
in the note to the preface of  the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where he writes that ‘the 
representation of something permanent in existence is not the same as permanent representation’”.  
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to phenomenology.75 We will see in the next chapter that the same kind of inversion has 
occasionally been made with respect to spatiality (the conflating of the phenomenal 
appearance of spatiality for the objective spatiality of phenomenal appearances). In fact, I 
believe the succession example is a bad example, as I believe experience, taken at face value, 
reveals nothing fitting the description of an appearance of temporal succession, at least not in 
any direct non-phenomeno-notional sense. Instead, I think the philosophers who speak of 
such succession, many of whom write in the spirit of Robust Realism, have inadvertently 
allowed a certain conception of temporality, born of theory premised upon the natural 
attitude, to distort their characterisation of the kinds of temporal phenomena experience does 
in fact reveal. I will make my case for this view in the following chapter. What matters for 
now is that being thus misled is plausibly another way in which sincere attempts at 
phenomenal description can be undermined by our natural inclination towards the natural 
attitude. In any case, somebody, be it me or the Robust Realists that speak of phenomenal 
succession, is surely wrong, and it is just this possibility that I wish to bring into relief. 
Sincere attempts at phenomenological description can get things completely wrong. Were this 
not prima facie plausible, phenomenology would never have emerged as a specialised field. 
Nonetheless, so long as one is exploring the metaphysical implications of Robust Realism, 
the possibility of error cannot constitute sufficient reason for shying away from appeals to 
what one takes to be characteristics of consciousness. Robust Realism, after all, is realism 
about phenomenal property instances defended by way of a direct appeal to such instances. 
To have a propensity to get things wrong is not the same as being radically mistaken in every 
respect. That we are thus mistaken is Dennett’s thesis. I have already appealed to putative 
aspects of phenomenology, phenomenal depth, empirical-world-giving and cognitive-
75 I also cited another in a footnote, the conflation of the appearance of law-like-ness with the law-like-ness of 
appearance.  
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phenomenological characteristics, in distinguishing Robust Realism from weaker forms of 
phenomenal realism that play into Dennett’s hands. I will make further appeals at various 
stages in the ensuing exploration. Most characteristics of consciousness I appeal to are 
relatively canonical, aspects of consciousness endorsed by a significant number of 
philosophers writing in the spirit of Robust Realism, the intrinsicality of phenomenal 
properties, the phenomenal unity of consciousness and such. I will nonetheless, on occasions, 
depart from majority opinion on the grounds that I think it has gotten the phenomenology 
wrong. Obviously, in all such instances, my case for whatever metaphysical implications I 
defend by way of such appeals will only ever be as good as my phenomenological 
descriptions are accurate.   
3. Conceptual Analysis: A Less Perilous Path
But many of my arguments for particular metaphysical implications of Robust Realism will 
make no appeals to particular characteristics of consciousness at all. Instead, they will be 
arguments to the effect that certain metaphysical conclusions are conceptually entailed by 
those commitments already taken to be definitive of Robust Realism. In fact, I’ll have arrived 
at some metaphysical results of some significance before I make any direct appeals to 
particular aspects of consciousness. I shall argue, without any such appeal, for instance, that 
Robust Realism rules out the possibility of experiences taking up position in space or time, so 
long as spatial dimensions and temporal duration are characterised, as they most often are, as 
metaphysically primitive non-phenomenal properties. Such results hinge upon appeals to a 
priori entailment relations between concepts such as those of reality, existence and 
constitution. For metaphysically informative results to be generated by mere conceptual 
analysis might strike the reader as an unlikely enough prospect to engender a degree of 
distrust, but the results will only be informative for Robust Realists insofar as they have 
failed to attend to the logic of their core commitments in the first place. It turns out that 
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Robust Realism places significant logical constraints on the metaphysics of consciousness 
before the apparent nature of phenomenology constrains it even further. Our agreed upon 
understanding of familiar concepts plausibly makes for a less perilous, and, less 
controversial, argumentative platform than that of direct phenomenological description, so it 
would be advantageous to derive as many informative metaphysical results by such means as 
possible. 
There is nonetheless a risk of overstating the degree to which we are sidestepping appeals to 
phenomenology by arriving at results in such a way. The fundamental tenets of Robust 
Realism, it will be remembered, are themselves premised upon an appeal to phenomenology. 
Robust Realism, once again, is realism about phenomenal properties that cites unmediated 
access to instances of such properties, rather than conceptually inflected reasons, as its 
justificatory grounds. What’s more, it is a claim to the effect that we do in fact have 
unmediated access to phenomenal property instances, a claim premised entirely upon a direct 
phenomenological appeal to the property instances themselves, that will ultimately prove, 
upon analysis, to yield significant metaphysical results. What matters, for our purposes, is 
that we are already bound to the claim in question so long as we are exploring the 
metaphysical implications of Robust Realism, and although its justification supposedly 
resides in the fact of the instantiation of particular phenomenal properties, the claim itself 
will be somewhat general, admitting of no specific details regarding the particular kinds of 
properties that are in fact instanced. Metaphysical results deriving from analysis of the claim 
alone will therefore be immune from errors concerning the specific kinds of properties found 
in experience. They will only be wrong if Robust Realism, in broad outline, is wrong. 
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4. The Constitution Thesis
The metaphysically significant results cited previously hinge upon the prior establishment of 
a thesis regarding the constitutive nature of experience, which will ultimately be established 
as a consequence of Robust Realism without appealing to any particular characteristics of 
consciousness: 
The Constitution Thesis – The constitutive nature of any phenomenal property instance 
is exhausted by its phenomenal nature qua instance of said property, and, qua its 
experienced manner of instancing. 
It is the business of this chapter to establish that the Constitution Thesis is entailed by the 
core commitments of Robust Realism.76 The above formulation is a little awkward, on 
account of the two qualifications, each prefaced with the term ‘qua’, that have been added so 
as to decisively rule out certain peculiar accounts of the constitution of phenomenal property 
instances which do in fact appear in the literature and which might otherwise be thought to be 
in keeping with the thesis. The ‘qua instance of said property’ qualification is added so as to 
disallow experiences or their properties having phenomenal constituents they don’t 
themselves comprise the experiencing of. Some philosophers, Galen Strawson (2006b p. 261) 
for instance, reject the possibility of anything experiential being constituted by something 
altogether non-experiential, but allow that “experiential realities may be said to … function as 
non-experiential but experience-constituting realities for other experiential realities”. The 
Constitution Thesis rules against this possibility just as decisively as it does the possibility of 
experiences having non-phenomenal constituents. The ‘qua its experienced manner of 
instancing’ qualification is invoked to disallow any constitutive account of consciousness that 
76 Though to avoid confusion, I should mention that some intermediate arguments that do involve direct 
phenomenological appeals will be considered along the way. 
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appeals, say, to phenomenal properties qua abstract universals, or to the phenomenal property 
instances existing in some capacity other than that in which experience finds them. Gregg 
Rosenberg’s (2004 pp. 165, 168, 246) account of the ‘becoming’ of phenomenal states, if I 
understand it correctly, has it that complexes of phenomenal properties which manifest in 
experience as constitutively interdependent and inseparable, like phenomenal shape and 
colour properties, are in fact the constitutive product of the bonding of pure ‘context 
independent’ instances of such properties located, not in actuality, but in an abstract realm of 
possibility. The Constitution Thesis, as formulated above, rules out such an account.   
The Constitution Thesis isn’t entirely without precedent. Philosophy was first bequeathed a 
phenomenally constitutive conception of consciousness by Descartes. Strawson (2006b p. 
204) writes, “His root – radical – idea about the nature of the subject of experience or soul is
that it is somehow wholly and literally constituted of experience”. Identification of the being 
and appearing of experiences went on to become a definitive feature of classical empiricism. 
Hume (1969 pp. 240, 241) claimed that, “all actions and sensations of the mind ... must 
necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear”. But historical 
precedence alone doesn’t suffice for justification. Arguments for the Constitution Thesis are 
relatively thin on the ground. Some, like Strawson (2006a p. 21), are happy to let their 
rejection of certain possibilities that are at odds with the Constitution Thesis, in his case, the 
constitution of phenomenal properties by non-phenomenal properties, rest upon “unargued 
intuition”, while allowing other possibilities that are equally at odds with it, like the 
constitution of experiences by other altogether different experiences.  
One might be under the impression that a conceptual connection between Robust Realism 
and the Constitution Thesis has already been established, as Robust Realism has already been 
characterized as the view that experiences are exactly as they are experienced to be. This is 
not the case. To say that experiences are exactly as they are experienced to be is not to say 
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that they are only as they are experienced to be, that their phenomenal nature exhausts their 
constitutive nature. It remains open for a robust realist to maintain that experiences are 
possessive of the very phenomenal nature they are experienced to possess, but that their 
constitutive nature isn’t exhausted by it. David Chalmers, for one, thinks the possibility of 
phenomenal properties being constituted by non-phenomenal “protophenomenal” properties 
“cannot be ruled out a priori” (Chalmers 1996 pp. 154, 298). The only account of the 
constitutive nature of experience that has been ruled out at this early stage is one according to 
which it is wholly constituted by physical properties. Whether or not Robust Realism is 
ultimately compatible with consciousness being more than it appears to be, it definitely has it 
that consciousness is at least as it appears to be, and its topic-specificity and intrinsicality 
jointly serve to rule out both conceptions of physical properties that have currency in the 
literature. All other prospective constitutive accounts of experience remain on the table until 
reason is found for dismissing them, or for favouring some particular account.  
There are several such prospective accounts to be found in the literature. Some, as we have 
seen, think experiences can be constituted by altogether different experiences, others that they 
can be constituted by different ontological modes of the properties they instantiate, by the 
very same phenomenal properties qua universals or the very same property instances qua 
‘pure’ context independent possibilia. Others, like Chalmers, postulate non-phenomenal 
intrinsic natures capable of constitutively yielding phenomenal intrinsic natures. Another 
possibility is constitution by altogether different mental properties. Robust Realism rejects 
Dennettian Dissolution, the explaining away of phenomenal properties by way of appeal to 
mistaken judgements, but we are yet to rule out an intellectualist account of the constitution 
of phenomenal properties. In defence of the view, held by some idealists, to the effect that all 
mentality consists solely in judgement, Ayer (1959 p. 100) writes, “It is open to the idealists 
to [maintain] that the making of a judgement is a necessary part of what constitutes the 
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object’s being given”. 77 Of course, this won’t work if one endorses a physically constitutive 
account of judgement, as physical properties simply cannot constitutively yield phenomenal 
properties as Robust Realism characterises them. But at this stage, it remains open for those 
that endorse a non-physical constitutive account of judgement to endorse an intellectually 
constitutive account of experience.  
5. Appeals to Ignorance
The how and why of such a constitutive account remains altogether mysterious, but such 
mysteriousness is quite often embraced by proponents of such accounts. After all, it is 
supposedly our positive understanding of the nature of physical properties and what they are 
capable of constituting which allows us, assuming Robust Realism, to positively rule out the 
physical constitution of phenomenal properties. In contrast, the properties cited in the 
foregoing constitutive accounts all rely upon a degree of ignorance regarding the constitutive 
capacities of their respective constituters. Who knows, for instance, what the ontologically 
sui generis judgements or spirit minds postulated by some idealists might be capable of 
constituting? Chalmers is quite clear on this score. Regarding his protophenomenal 
properties, non-phenomenal intrinsic realisers of physical properties which might potentially, 
at the same time, serve as the fundamental constituents of experiences, he writes: 
One might object that we do not have any conception of what protophenomenal properties 
might be like or of how they could constitute phenomenal properties. This is true, but one 
could suggest that this [is] merely a product of our ignorance. In the case of familiar physical 
properties, there were principled reasons (based on the character of physical concepts) for 
denying a constitutive connection to phenomenal properties. Here, there are no such 
principled reasons. At most, there is ignorance of a connection. Of course, it would be very 
desirable to form a positive conception of protophenomenal properties. Perhaps we can do 
77 Ayer (1959 p. 101) does not himself subscribe to the view. 
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this indirectly by some sort of theoretical inference from the character of phenomenal 
properties to their underlying constituents, or perhaps knowledge of their nature will remain 
beyond us. Either way, this is no reason to reject the truth of the view (Chalmers 2010 pp. 
135, 136). 
It is for this reason that Chalmers (forthcoming a p. 15) can, in good conscience, reject 
arguments against protophenomenal constitution premised upon the same epistemic gap, 
which pertains between physical and phenomenal properties, likewise pertaining between 
protophenomenal and phenomenal properties. As he points out, the case against physicalism 
isn’t premised upon an epistemic gap born of mere ignorance, but rather, upon “a more 
specific gap between the physical and the phenomenal” born of an understanding of the 
constitutive capacities of physical properties and the nature of experience (Chalmers 
forthcoming a p. 15). Contra Yujin Nagasawa (2002 p. 217), there is no reason to think that if 
Mary had complete protophenomenal knowledge from the confines of her black and white 
room, that she couldn’t thereby deduce all the relevant phenomenal facts as well. Whether or 
not she could gain complete protophenomenal knowledge in such a situation is another 
question. Experience is the only unmediated form of contact with intrinsic natures that we 
possess, and it is the intrinsic topic-specific natures of protophenomenal properties that Mary 
must comprehend if she is to have a complete account of how consciousness, according to 
panprotopsychism, is constituted.78 If Mary were capable of inferring the nature of the 
underlying constituents of her experiences from their phenomenal character, as Chalmers 
(2010 p. 136; forthcoming b p. 11) suggests might be possible, and if those very same 
constituents comprise the kinds of phenomenal colour properties that she would experience 
78 This point seems to be lost on Nagasawa (2002 p. 219), who claims that panprotopsychism “can merely 
provide structural and functional explanations of phenomenal properties in terms of their underlying 
protophenomenal properties” and takes this as a refutation of Chalmers’ (1996 p. 107) claim that “explanation of 
consciousness is not just a matter of explaining structure and function”. It is no such thing. A panprotopsychist 
explanation of consciousness is an explanation of consciousness in terms of the structuring (and functioning?) of 
a specific intrinsic nature. 
-+!
upon escape, there’s no reason to think she couldn’t arrive at the concept of such properties 
from the confines of her black and white room. Whether or not Mary the protophenomenal 
expert is possible, we are most definitely nothing like her, but one doesn’t need the kind of 
superhuman knowledge attributed to her to understand the problem besetting the view that 
experience is constituted by physical properties. 
It might be objected that acquiescing in mystery is anathema to the explanatory goals of 
metaphysics. This might be true, but as we have already seen, Robust Realism is somewhat at 
odds with the view that existence should only be predicated of things that earn their 
explanatory keep. Phenomenal properties, as Robust Realism characterises them, are 
something of a metaphysical nuisance, having no clearly delineated role qua explanans. 
What’s more, we shall see in the following chapter that to deny our experiences a ‘hidden’ 
constitutive nature beyond their experienced nature is to incur a significant metaphysical cost, 
namely, to lose all significant metaphysical connections by means of which experiences 
might be tethered to a transcendentally real world. Plausibly few robust realists, Cartesian 
‘tough talk’ aside, would be willing to pay this price. It is therefore in the interests of such 
robust realists, who have already, after all, rejected any kind of conceptual entailment 
between existence and theoretical fecundity, to embrace a degree of mystery at the cost of 
explanatory edification.   
6. Chalmers’ Panprotopsychism: Problematic Intuitions
In spite of there being a degree of mystery surrounding the various constitutive accounts 
under consideration, enough is understood about some of the potential constituents cited to 
render the prospect of their constituting experience problematic. I would like to temporarily 
focus specifically upon Chalmers’ panprotopsychism. With constitution by way of physical 
properties out of the picture, this is the constitutive account that is likely to appeal most to 
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contemporary sensibilities, inasmuch as it is the account that is most closely aligned to 
straightforward naturalism. Essentially, Chalmers thinks physical stuff, might be capable of 
constitutively yielding experiences, not solely by way of the structure and dynamics it 
realises, as depicted in physical theory, but by way of its nature qua the kind of stuff it is, its 
intrinsic nature (Chalmers 1996 pp. 153; forthcoming a p. 11). For naturalists already 
committed to there being physical stuff, in addition to physical properties as depicted in 
physical theory, to accept such a view doesn’t constitute any change with respect to the basic 
furniture of the world. Unlike some, Strawson (2006a p. 21) for instance, Chalmers (1996 p. 
154) doesn’t think the intrinsic nature of physical reality must itself be phenomenal in order
to yield phenomenal properties. One need not, therefore, endorse an intuitively unpalatable 
panpsychism, according to which phenomenality is present at ‘ground floor’ of physical 
reality. Panprotopsychism is a far less controversial view that has it that properties capable of 
constituting experiences are ubiquitous, present throughout the entirety of physical reality. 
All naturalists believe this. 
Chalmers’ case for panprotopsychism in The Conscious Mind proceeds by way of a detour. 
He first makes the case for panpsychism, noting that if reality admitted of nothing but the 
structure and dynamics articulated in physical theory, “it would contain only causal and 
nomic relations between empty placeholders with no properties of their own”, and suggesting 
that it might be “more reasonable to suppose that the basic entities that all this causation 
relates have some internal nature of their own, some intrinsic properties, so that the world has 
some substance to it” (Chalmers 1996 p. 153). Physics falls silent about the intrinsic nature 
many believe to underlie the structure and dynamics it posits, and “there is only one class of 
intrinsic, nonrelational property with which we have any direct familiarity, and that is the 
class of phenomenal properties” (Chalmers 1996 p. 153). The idea that such properties might 
fill the void naturally suggests itself. But in such a case phenomenality would be absolutely 
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ubiquitous, an intuitively unpalatable consequence prompting him to step back from 
panpsychism, instead suggesting panprotopsychism (Chalmers 1996 p. 154). 79  
It is noteworthy that Chalmers (1996 p. 153) suggests this possibility directly after having 
suggested that phenomenal properties might be the intrinsic properties ensuring “that the 
world has some substance to it”. No comments are made to the effect that while panpsychism 
kills two birds with one stone by providing physical reality with much needed substance, 
panprotopsychism kills three, by also providing phenomenology with much needed 
substance. Phenomenology already possesses an intrinsic nature qua phenomenology. If an 
intrinsic nature doesn’t suffice to afford experience a substantive constitutive nature, it might 
reasonably be asked why it should do so in the case of the physical world, why physical 
reality, replete with an intrinsic nature, shouldn’t stand in need of yet further constitution, and 
the relevant constituents in need of yet further constitution, and so on. Given Chalmers’ 
(2010 p. 472) penchant for ‘deep’ metaphysics, e.g. his openness to the idea that our world 
might be a giant computation implemented in the “next world up”, which presumably might 
also be a giant computation, it is not entirely clear he’d be bothered by such a regress. It 
might nonetheless be thought that the possibility of such a regress somewhat undermines the 
case for positing an intrinsic aspect to physical reality in the first place. We are working 
within a dialogical context, however, which eschews any kind of pragmatist entailment 
relation between existence and explanatory worth, so this doesn’t constitute any kind of 
decisive objection. 
But there is plausibly a stronger objection that might be raised, premised, once again, upon 
the intuition that the intrinsic properties of physical reality might constitute its substantial 
79 The more recent ‘Hegelian’ case put forth in his ‘Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism’ likewise arrives at 
panprotopsychism by way of a dialectical movement which first yields panpsychism, with respect to which 
panprotopsychism constitutes a new ‘antithesis’.  
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nature. As we have seen, Chalmers himself avows such an intuition. Strawson (2006a p. 28) 
is even more forthright on this score: “One needs to grasp fully the point that ‘property 
dualism’, applied to intrinsic, non-relational properties, is strictly incoherent ... insofar as it 
purports to be genuinely distinct from substance dualism, because there is nothing more to a 
thing’s being than its intrinsic, non-relational propertiedness”. It is to be remembered that it is 
intrinsic properties of experiences which, in W.S. Robinson’s (1995 p. 153) words, have “no 
structural expression”, that disallow the reduction of experiences to physical properties. Such 
properties seem very much like the stuff bearing the less metaphysically problematic 
structural properties that experiences have qua experiences, the “geometry of the visual field” 
and such (Chalmers 1995 p. 398). Such structural properties, Chalmers (1995 p. 398) 
suggests, “may be reducible to structureless phenomenal properties and their relations”.  
But much as we feel we have the kind of understanding of structural facts that allows us to 
rule out the possibility of any amount of purely structural facts ever entailing non-structural 
facts about substance, our intuitive understanding of substance is such that no substance, or 
collection thereof, can yield another altogether different substance. To be clear, by 
‘substance’ I mean non-structural but structure bearing intrinsic properties. In everyday 
speech, all manner of macroscopic physical types are referred to as substances, and it is 
entirely uncontroversial that combinations of such substances can yield other such 
substances. Flour and water, for instance, can constitutively yield dough. But the yielding of a 
non-structural substratum by an altogether different substratum is not the same thing. 
Intuitions to the effect that this is impossible plausibly account for the seeming incongruity 
between the Edenic world betrayed by the senses and the world as depicted by science. 
Jackson (1977 p. 120) writes:  
It is commonplace that there is an apparent clash between the picture Science gives of the 
world around us and the picture our senses give us. We sense the world as made up of 
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coloured, materially continuous, macroscopic, stable objects; Science and, in particular, 
Physics, tells us that the material world is constituted of clouds of minute, colourless, highly-
mobile particles.  
Intuitively, the Lockean solution of relegating the primitive colour qualities our Edenic 
forebears took to directly inhere in object surfaces to subjective experiences, where instead 
they directly inhere in object surface appearances, serves to somewhat resolve the tension 
between these two views. The mind body problem, however unpalatable, might nonetheless 
be thought preferable to the ‘microscopia macroscopia problem’ that would seemingly 
pertain if such Edenic properties were still thought to inhere directly in physical objects in the 
manner they appear to, as there is a strong intuition to the effect that no aggregating of things 
in which no such Edenic colour properties inhere could constitutively yield something in 
which they do (Chalmers 2010 p. 399). Intuitively, this could only be so if the colourless 
constituents magically changed in their intrinsic nature when attaining some level of 
structural complexity. If anyone who did not wish to allow for such a possibility nonetheless 
insisted upon microscopia which lack Edenic colour properties and macroscopia which 
possess them, it is difficult to see how they could be endorsing anything other than a kind of 
dualism, featuring the brute non-constitutive emergence of primitively coloured surfaces 
wherever certain structural properties are constitutively yielded by colourless microscopia.    
The foregoing intuition mongering might strike some as a little fast and loose, but it can be 
tamed somewhat. There is plausibly a more basic intuition upon which it is premised, one 
very similar to that on account of which robust realists rule out physical properties as 
prospective constituents of experience. As we have seen, one of the principle reasons cited by 
robust realists for insisting that experiences can’t be constituted by physical properties alone 
is that experiences possess properties that no amount of purely structural description can ever 
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account for. Such properties appear, in the thetic phenomenal sense, to be simples,80 and 
robust realists are committed to the view that if that’s how they phenomenally seem, that’s 
how they really are. But if such properties are constitutively yielded by the structuring of 
other intrinsic properties, or even by their mere combination, they aren’t really simples at all. 
Is it not every bit as certain as the fact that structure can never yield non-structure that 
something non-composite can never be arrived at by way of composition? Any reply to the 
effect that such properties are only simples qua phenomenology arguably constitutes a 
stepping back from Robust Realism, as it reintroduces a distinction between how phenomenal 
properties phenomenally appear and how they really are, thereby giving the game to Dennett. 
Why, after all, can the same strategy not be invoked with respect to other aspects of 
experience, its immediacy, intrinsicality and such?  
Do the foregoing considerations serve to vindicate the Constitution Thesis? Perhaps not. 
Firstly, such arguments are premised upon our intuitive understanding of constitution by way 
of intrinsic substrata. We might well have enough of an understanding of the notion of 
intrinsic substrata to rule out the constitutive yielding of one by another, but other forms of 
constitution remain on the table. In particular, it is open to robust realists to retreat even 
further into mystery. Ontologically sui generis minds, for instance, are a mysterious enough 
notion for all bets to be off regarding what they might be capable of constitutively yielding 
and the means by which they might do so. Without a solid understanding of the principles 
governing ‘spiritual’ constitution, we can’t rule it out by the same means. Spiritual 
constitution might not involve any aggregation of distinct components or component 
properties. The idea seems far-fetched, but Chalmers (1996 p. 307) has at least flagged the 
possibility that phenomenology might have its own peculiar mode of constitution: “We tend 
80 This is the feature Levine (1983 p. 359) is appealing to in his argument for an explanatory gap between 
physical and phenomenal facts.  
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to think about this in terms of a physical analogy ... Perhaps phenomenology is constituted in 
a different way entirely”. It’s not prima facie obvious that there couldn’t be modes of 
constitution distinct from physical mereology. As a matter of fact, a form of non-
mereological constitution already has currency in contemporary literature; a popular form of 
contemporary realism about universals has it that universals are constituents of states of 
affairs, but not proper parts thereof (Armstrong 1989 pp. 91-93).  
Of course, if we are to speak of altogether inscrutable modes of constitution, we had best at 
least have some conception of what makes the relation between something and its purported 
constituents a constitutive relation, as opposed to some other type of relation. I will return to 
this point shortly. But it would certainly appear that the war has not yet been won. It won’t 
do, for instance, to argue from the fact that experiences don’t appear to have mysterious 
hidden constituents, along with the Robust Realist tenet that experiences are as they appear to 
be, to the conclusion that experiences don’t have such constituents. The sense in which 
experiences, according to Robust Realism, are exactly as they appear is restricted entirely to 
what we might call their positive phenomenological character. Robust realists need not, for 
instance, take the phenomenological fact that our experiences don’t appear to coexist with 
anything else to constitute a vindication of an extreme form of solipsism. This point might 
even be thought to undercut the foregoing argument inasmuch as it is premised upon the idea 
that certain phenomenal properties don’t appear to be structured. The argument might be 
defended by way of an appeal to the idea of experience betraying properties possessing a kind 
of positive simplicity, which, in turn, is understood to entail the negative property of lacking 
structure. This, after all, is surely how the move from the positive intrinsicality of experience 
to its non-structural-cum-dynamical constitution works.  
In any case, the foregoing argument isn’t the kind of argument I have promised to advance in 
favour of the Constitution Thesis inasmuch as it is premised upon an appeal to a particular 
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aspect of experience, the supposed simplicity of some of its properties. I have already pointed 
out that while such phenomenological appeals will form part of my argumentative platform 
throughout this thesis, they arguably constitute a weaker form of data than the kind of 
analysis of the fundamental tenets of Robust Realism upon which I promised to build my 
case for the Constitution Thesis. The issue is particularly pertinent in cases where the 
properties attributed to experience on the basis of such appeals are somewhat nebulous, as 
some might maintain to be the case with the kind of positive simplicity appealed to in the 
foregoing argument. Chalmers (1995 p. 398) himself has been willing to at least entertain the 
prospect that experiences might have “structure all the way down”, suggesting that in such a 
case, the irreducibility of phenomenal properties to physical properties might obtain 
nonetheless on account of the “kind of structure found in the physical domain, and ultimately 
in the intrinsicness of phenomenal properties, which contrasts with the relational nature of 
our physical concepts”. But intrinsicality is likely to strike those wary of the notion of 
positive simplicity as every bit as nebulous. Dennett (1988 p. 403) writes, “If even such a 
brilliant theory-monger as David Lewis can try and fail, by his own admission, to define the 
extrinsic/intrinsic distinction coherently, we can begin to wonder if the concept deserves our 
further attention after all”. I am not suggesting that such difficulties serve as adequate 
grounds for dismissing attributions of such properties on the basis of descriptive 
phenomenology. On the contrary, I think such attributions seem fitting.81 My point is merely 
81 The robust realist also has argumentative recourse here inasmuch as positive simplicity and intrinsicality seem 
like exactly the kinds of properties that would resist analysis. For a property to be simple, or intrinsic tout court, 
as opposed to merely intrinsic to the objects that instantiate it, the relational property with which Lewis (1999 
pp. 116-132) concerns himself, is plausibly for it to be the kind of property that resists explication in terms of 
anything else. The robust realist will likely maintain that far from being nebulous, their concepts of positive 
simplicity, non-relational intrinsicality and such, are perfectly straightforward but inarticulable on account of 
their being conceptually primitive, arrived at, not by any form of constructive conceptual activity, but rather, by 
way of the direct interfacing of the conceptual faculties with transcendentally real, that is, conceptuality 
transcendent, instances of the relevant properties. Chalmers (2010 p. 267), for instance, speaks of a kind of 
formation of phenomenal concepts according to which one “forms [the] concept wholly based on attention to [a 
phenomenal] quality, “taking up” the quality into the concept”.  
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that an argument for the Constitution Thesis premised upon analysis of the fundamental 
tenets of Robust Realism promises to establish all the restrictions on the constitutive nature of 
consciousness that any of the foregoing arguments succeed in establishing, and more besides, 
with less controversy. If the constitutive nature of experiences is exhausted, as per the 
Constitution Thesis, by their experienced nature, if, that is, there is no part of their 
constitutive nature that isn’t an instance of a mode of phenomenal appearing, they plausibly 
cannot be constituted by fundamental physical properties. Physical properties aren’t modes of 
phenomenal appearing unless, which seems unlikely, the very concept of structure and 
dynamics somehow entails exhaustive constitutive phenomenality. Nor can they be 
constituted by Chalmers protophenomenal properties, as such properties are non-phenomenal 
by definition. Nor can they be constituted by non-experientially constituted spirits, 
judgements, abstracta etc, or by phenomenal properties themselves qua uninstantiated 
universals.   
7. The Revelation Argument
My argument from the fundamental tenets of Robust Realism to the Constitution Thesis isn’t 
entirely new. A somewhat sketchy and informal formulation of it can be found in Hume 
(1969 pp. 240, 241): “For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by 
consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what 
they appear”. In this passage, Hume appears to move directly from the fact that sensations are 
revealed in conscious experience to a claim about their constitutive nature that seems very 
much in keeping with the Constitution Thesis. What, if anything, might give him inferential 
license to do so? As we shall see, much hinges on how this question is answered. 
Chalmers (forthcoming b pp. 12, 13) discusses an argument which occasionally appears in 
contemporary literature that makes such a move, a move, that is, from the experiential 
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revelation of phenomenal natures to the claim that their experienced nature exhausts their 
constitutive nature, an argument he calls the Revelation Argument. While he presents the 
Revelation Argument as an argument against the constitution of macro-experiences by micro-
experiences, the argument is easily adapted into a more general argument against 
consciousness having ‘hidden’ constituents of any kind, physical properties, 
protophenomena, experiential constituents that aren’t experientially revealed, mysterious 
abstract or spiritual constituents etc. Let us call such properties unrevealed properties. Thus 
adapted, it runs as follows    
(1) The nature of consciousness is revealed to us in introspection.
(2) Whatever constitutes consciousness is part of its nature.
(3) Unrevealed properties aren’t revealed to us in introspection.
(C) Unrevealed properties don’t constitute consciousness.
Is this argument sound? The answer to this question isn’t entirely clear-cut, as the argument, 
in its current formulation, admits of a degree of ambiguity. Much hangs on what the revealing 
of the nature of experience is thought to involve. It turns out that ‘reveal’, ‘revelation’ and 
such behave very much like the ‘appear’-words discussed in chapter 1. Premises (1) and (3) 
can be afforded an interpretation according to which the nature of consciousness is 
phenomenally revealed, that is, simply instanced, in experience, or a more intellectualist 
interpretation according to which the nature of consciousness is somehow cognized or 
understood. Furthermore, the meaning of the term ‘nature’ in premises (1) and (2) is beholden 
to the mode of revelation in play. Phenomenal revelation involves the actual instancing of the 
nature at issue, the revelation of the existence of the nature. Intellectual revelation, on the 
other hand, involves something like the comprehension of the nature, the revelation of the 
concept of the nature. Which interpretation does Chalmers intend? Chalmers appears to 
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equivocate on this score. While he speaks of ‘specific instances’ of phenomenal properties, 
his grounds for rejecting the argument, we shall see, are only plausible on an intellectualist 
reading (Chalmers forthcoming b p. 13). I will briefly discuss the intellectual interpretation 
and Chalmers’ rebuttal before moving on to the phenomenal interpretation, arguing that it 
does in fact vindicate the Constitution Thesis, so long as we are assuming Robust Realism.  
7.1 The Intellectualist Interpretation 
An intellectualist interpretation of premise (1) yields a much stronger claim than the 
phenomenal interpretation. The phenomenal interpretation merely has it that phenomenal 
natures are instanced in experience. That they are is a fundamental tenet of Robust Realism. 
Robust Realism, after all, is realism about such natures premised upon ones being 
immediately apprised of the fact of their existence, i.e. what makes claims to the effect that 
they exist true claims, i.e. their existence itself. In contrast, an intellectual interpretation 
demands a significant degree of understanding regarding such natures, one sufficiently robust 
to render one capable of decisively ruling out the possibility of unrevealed constituents. Goff 
(2006 p. 57), for instance, discusses an intellectualist version of the Revelation Argument 
premised upon our “having, through introspection, a transparent understanding of the 
essential nature of [our] conscious experience”. An argument premised upon our having such 
an understanding, be it sound or unsound, won’t deliver on the foregoing promise to establish 
the Constitution Thesis by way of an analysis of the fundamental tenets of Robust Realism, as 
Robust Realism does not demand that we have any such understanding. Robust Realism 
derives from a contemporary phenomenal realism eschewing the epistemic-role-essentialism 
of its predecessors. It is perfectly compatible with the instantiation of phenomenal properties 
in the absence of concepts, understanding and the like. It is likewise compatible with the 
understanding we do in fact have of the phenomenal properties instanced in our experience 
being something less than a thoroughgoing comprehension of their essence. It would seem 
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that our experiencing phenomenal properties doesn’t immediately afford us such 
comprehension of their essential nature. Far from straightforwardly revealing their essence to 
the understanding, phenomenal property instances aren’t even experienced as phenomenal 
property instances, nor our experiences as experiences. Experiential acquaintance with the 
instancing of a property that happens to have a particular logical profile is not the same as 
knowing what that logical profile is. The distinction can be seen in Strawson. Strawson  
(2006b p. 243) maintains that the properties instanced in experience are essentially 
dispositional in a strong non-Humean sense. If this is the case, they’re not intellectually 
revealed in introspection. The case for Humeanism is plausibly built, in part at least, upon a 
failure to recognise the instancing of any such powers in empirical experience. Strawson isn’t 
bothered by this. Robust Realism is premised upon an appeal to the actual categorical being 
of phenomenal properties, not their potential counterfactual being. All experiencing involves 
the actual categorical being of actual categorical properties. But Strawson (2006b pp. 195, 
204) maintains that those self same categorical properties are dispositional properties, that
their categorical nature is one and the same as their dispositional nature. The two, he claims, 
are merely conceptually distinct, not really distinct (Strawson 2006b pp. 195, 204). Strawson 
(2006b pp. 252, 261 emphasis mine) is quite candid about his willingness to abandon what he 
calls the “Full Revelation Thesis”: “In the case of any particular experience, I am acquainted 
with the whole essential nature of the experience just in having it”. In contrast, he is sure to 
be clear that he does subscribe to the robust realist tenet that experiences are exactly how they 
are experienced to be (Strawson 2006b p. 253). 
The intellectualist interpretation of the Revelation Argument diverges from the fundamental 
tenets of Robust Realism at premise (1). But even if one were to buy the intellectual 
interpretation of that premise, the intellectualist interpretation of premise (2) – ‘Whatever 
constitutes consciousness is part of its nature’ – is open to a relatively straightforward 
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objection. It is to be remembered that on an intellectualist interpretation of this premise, we 
are concerned with the concept of the nature of consciousness. The revelation of premise (1) 
isn’t the mere instancing of the nature of consciousness. It is the understanding of that nature, 
possession of an adequately rich conception of it. Premise (2), on an intellectualist reading, 
has it that the particular constituents of consciousness form part of the concept of the 
phenomenal nature it instantiates. Chalmers (forthcoming b p. 13) refutes premise (2) thusly: 
One can distinguish the nature of a phenomenal property from the grounds (or realizers or 
constituters) of an instance of that property. It is a familiar point that a single property can be 
multiply realized by different grounds in different instances, and it is not clear why the same 
should not also apply to phenomenal properties. It is then coherent to hold that the nature of a 
phenomenal property is revealed by introspection although the grounds of a specific instance 
are not (Chalmers forthcoming p. 13).   
This certainly seems like an adequate refutation of the intellectualist interpretation of premise 
(2). A great number of properties are such that their concept doesn’t stipulate specific 
constituents, so it is incumbent upon the proponent of the intellectualist version of the 
Revelation Argument to supply further reasons for thinking this is not the case with regards 
to phenomenal properties.  
7.2 The Phenomenal Interpretation 
But Chalmers surely intends to do more than refute the intellectualist interpretation of the 
Revelation Argument. If this interpretation didn’t appear somewhat perverse from the outset, 
it is almost certain to do so now. The claim that phenomenal properties are instanced in 
experience, although a somewhat weaker claim than the claim that every aspect of their 
essential nature is understood, is the all-important claim in this context. It’s what makes 
Robust Realism Robust Realism. The nature of consciousness isn’t revealed in introspection 
as something that may or may not be, as when Descartes (1988 p. 106) considers the nature 
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of a triangle prior to establishing that any such extended thing exists. It is revealed as existent, 
not by way of an understanding of its concept, as when Anselm moves from an understanding 
of God’s essential nature to his existence, but rather, directly (Anselm & Gaunilo 1984 pp. 
541, 542). Its existence itself is revealed.  
Premise (2), on the phenomenal interpretation, has it that whatever constitutes the instancing 
of consciousness’s phenomenal nature, which is said to be revealed in premise (1), is part of 
that very instance of consciousness’s phenomenal nature. Robust realists cannot plausibly 
deny this. For any property instance with a constitutive nature, its instancing is one and the 
same as the instancing of that constitutive nature. Such is the nature of constitution. 
Philosophy might sometimes speak of things without constituents, unstructured abstracta and 
such, but for things with a constitutive nature, their existence is the existence of their 
constitutive nature. If the existence of this nature isn’t revealed in introspection, nor is the 
existence of the nature thus constituted.  
In saying that it is of the very nature of constitution that the existence of something with a 
constitutive nature is one and the same as the existence of its constituents, I am taking the 
phenomenal reading of premise (2) to articulate a conceptual truth. In discussing possible 
responses to the arguments discussed prior to the Revelation Argument (those premised upon 
the impossibility of the constitution of non-structural substrates from other non-structural 
substrates or the non-simple constitution of phenomenal simples), I suggested that robust 
realists might evade the constitution thesis by retreating further into mystery, postulating 
altogether mysterious modes of constitution. At the same time, I suggested that those who 
speak of altogether inscrutable modes of constitution should have at least some conception of 
what makes the relation between a thing or property and its constituents a constitutive 
%%%!
relation, as opposed to some other type of relation. That the existence of something with a 
constitutive nature should not stand apart from the existence of its constituents seems like 
something that should pertain in any prospective case of constitution. Otherwise, what’s to 
prevent the substance dualist from saying physical properties do in fact constitute mental 
substances, in spite of the existence of the latter being completely independent of the 
existence of the former? Such a position seems manifestly absurd. Note that the invocation of 
necessity won’t help here. To say that a mental substance the existence of which is altogether 
separate from human physiology exists by necessity whenever a particular physical thing, 
say, a functioning human brain, exists is not to say that the brain constitutes the mental 
substance. The two merely necessarily coexist.  For the existence of a thing or property to 
come apart from the existence of its constituents seems an affront to the very logic of 
constitution.    
Chalmers refutation of premise (2) appeals to a duality between properties and their 
realisation that is applicable so long as one is considering properties qua concepts or 
uninstantiated universals. But there is no way of making it applicable in the case of property 
instances and their realisers, as a property instance is its constitutive realisation. It won’t do, 
for instance, to differentiate between two different senses of the term ‘existence’, one “tied to 
the realisation of a property”, the other “tied to the nature of the property”, and insist the 
“[existence]82 of consciousness in the second sense is revealed but not the [existence] of 
consciousness in the first sense” (Chalmers 2013, pers.comm., 9 May).83 How could the 
82 Chalmers used the term ‘being’, as opposed to ‘existence’ in his correspondence, as it was the term I used in
the draft paper he was responding to. I don’t believe my substituting the former with the latter significantly 
alters the sense of his claims in this context. 
83 Chalmers (2007 p. 28) has advanced an analysis of “ordinary existence claims” which does render the 
meaning of ‘exists’ context sensitive. According to Chalmers (2007 p. 30), the context of an utterance 
determines a “domain-determination function … specifying a class of entities that are taken to exist in” the 
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existence of the nature of a property qua categorical instance of that nature possibly stand 
apart from realisation facts? The realisation facts, after all, are what make the instance of the 
nature real. In particular, the fact of the instancing of the nature supervenes on the fact of its 
constitutive realisation. If we wish to omit such realisation facts from the sphere of 
introspective revelation, we must step back from acquaintance-based realism about 
phenomenal property instances to a weaker, and significantly less plausible, acquaintance-
based realism regarding phenomenal properties qua concepts or uninstantiated universals, as 
what is essentially omitted from introspective revelation is the fact of such properties actually 
being realised. We have seen that Chalmers (1996 p. 196) rejects reliabilistic accounts of 
justification of phenomenal judgements on the grounds that “they make our access to 
consciousness mediated”, saying “this sort of mediation is only appropriate when there is a 
gap between our core epistemic situation and the phenomena in question”, while “intuitively, 
our access to consciousness is not mediated at all”. But his postulation of protophenomenal 
properties opens up just such a gap, a gap between the experiential and constitutive natures of 
phenomenal property instances. At best, their experienced nature might mediate knowledge 
of their non-phenomenal constitutive existence. One only directly experiences them if their 
constitutive nature is directly experienced, and for their constitutive nature to be non-
phenomenal is presumably for their constitutive nature not to be directly experienced. It is 
world with respect to which the utterance is to be evaluated. There is a mereological nihilist domain-
determination function that renders the utterance ‘tables exist’ false, and commonsense domain-determination 
function rendering it true (Chalmers 2007 p. 30). I don’t think this is of any help to Chalmers (2007 p. 30) here 
though, at least not so long as one “imposes [the] further constraint that an “admissible domain … be consistent 
with the qualitative character of a given world”. In such a case, a domain determination function can only admit 
phenomenal property instances into the domain of quantification for a given world if the qualitative character of 
that world suffices for there to be such property instances, and one is still only immediately acquainted with the 
truthmakers for claims that such property instances exist inasmuch as one is immediately acquainted with those 
aspects of the qualitative character of the world that render it thus sufficient. 
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difficult to see how this might be so. The existence of phenomenal properties isn’t an extra-
experiential fact acquaintance-based realists infer on the basis of experience. They insist upon 
the existence of phenomenal properties because they experience them. 
We appear to be very close to having established the Constitution Thesis by way of an 
analysis of the fundamental tenets of Robust Realism. The phenomenal interpretation of 
premise (1), we have seen, articulates one of Robust Realism’s fundamental tenets, that 
instances of phenomenal properties are introspectively revealed. The phenomenal 
interpretation of premise (2) articulates a conceptual truth regarding the nature of 
constitution. What about premise (3)? It might be remembered that the above formulation of 
the Revelation Argument is an adaption of Chalmers’ formulation which substitutes 
‘unrevealed properties’ for his ‘vast array of microexperiences’. Given that unrevealed 
properties are any properties that don’t reveal themselves in the phenomenal manner that 
premise (1) has it that the nature of consciousness is revealed in, premise (3), thus adapted, is 
basically a superfluous tautology, stating that properties which, by definition, aren’t 
phenomenally revealed in introspection aren’t phenomenally revealed in introspection. All 
the heavy lifting is done by the first two premises. Once it is established that the existence of 
the nature of consciousness is phenomenally revealed in introspection, and that whatever 
constitutes the being of that nature is part of the existence of that nature, anything not thus 
revealed is ruled out as a prospective constituent. The conceptual entailment between the 
fundamental tenets of Robust Realism and the Constitution Thesis is secured. The 
constitutive nature of all that is phenomenally revealed in consciousness is exhausted by what 
is in fact phenomenally revealed. That non-phenomenal properties aren’t phenomenally 
revealed is true by definition. This is likewise true for unexperienced but nonetheless 
experiential constituents postulated by the likes of Strawson (2006b p. 261). That they aren’t 
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thus revealed is presumably what is meant in saying that they are ‘unexperienced’. Robust 
realists must rule out any such constituents on pain of straightforward contradiction. The 
situation with respect to some of the other potential constituents discussed earlier is a little 
more complicated. Consider Rosenberg’s (2004 pp. 165, 168, 239, 240, 246) ‘context 
independent’ phenomenal property instances, unextended colour, colourless extension and 
the like. It’s not true by definition that consciousness isn’t constituted by such properties. But 
conceptual analysis of Robust Realism’s fundamental tenets isn’t the only desideratum 
guiding our exploration of its metaphysical implications. Descriptive phenomenology also 
has a part to play, and it would most definitely seem that certain phenomenal properties, 
phenomenal colour and extension for instance, are only ever revealed in a state of 
interdependent coinstantiation. If context independent versions of such properties aren’t 
phenomenally revealed, and descriptive phenomenology seemingly attests to this, then Robust 
Realism rules out their participation in the constitution of consciousness on account of its 
conceptually entailing the Constitution Thesis.     
8. Conclusion
The Constitution Thesis is conceptually entailed by the definitive commitments of Robust 
Realism. Robust realists must therefore reject any account of consciousness that postulates 




Robust realists face the theoretical problem of explaining the connections between the 
experiences of individual subjects and an (apparently) metaphysically real world. In this 
chapter I argue that the metaphysical connections that robust realists typically appeal to in 
facing this challenge cannot be had. Experiences, as Robust Realism characterises them, can 
neither inhabit an objective spatiotemporal universe nor causally interact with one from 
without. I consider, first, views on which spatiotemporal properties are metaphysically 
primitive. I then consider role-theoretic functional accounts of spatiotemporal properties and 
the nomological connections such accounts invoke. 
I focus first on the issue of the spatiality of consciousness, itself part of the acknowledged 
problematic here since Descartes’ famous characterisation of consciousness as essentially 
non-spatial. In section 2, I examine Colin McGinn’s case for the Cartesian non-spatiality 
thesis, rejecting McGinn’s claim that the thesis reflects our ordinary intuition and rebutting 
his arguments in favour of it. 
In section 3, I discuss McGinn’s distinction between phenomenal and causal criteria for 
spatially locating consciousness. Discussion of the powerful motivations we have for 
adopting each criterion then helps bring forward what I believe to be the real issue regarding 
the spatiality of consciousness. Any plausible case for the phenomenal criterion for locating 
consciousness, I argue, highlights the fact that, in order for experiences to occupy a region of 
space, they must constitutively embody the appropriate dimensions. Any plausible case for 
the causal criterion highlights the differences between phenomenal and objective spatiality, 
underlining the extent to which intuitive support is lacking for the claim that objective spatial 
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properties are phenomenal properties. Combining these considerations with the Constitution 
Thesis, I present an argument to the effect that consciousness cannot be located in objective 
space so long as objective space is characterised (as it typically is) as a non-phenomenal, 
metaphysically primitive dimension. In section 4, I argue that exactly analogous 
considerations rule out consciousness being located in objective time, so long as objective 
time is characterised as contemporary realists typically characterise it (that is, as a 
metaphysically primitive, non-phenomenal fourth dimension). I suggest that the longstanding 
asymmetry in the treatment of the spatial and the temporal case is to a degree understandable, 
but nonetheless unjustified. 
In section 5, I give reasons for questioning the commonplace assumption that space and time 
are non-phenomenal. This suggests that there might still be some possibility of locating 
consciousness in space-time. Taking cues from Galen Strawson, I then develop a 
phenomenally constitutive account of space-time that might appear to allow our experiences 
to be housed within it. I conclude, however, that the phenomenal finitude of our experiences 
disallows such a possibility.  
If the argument to this point is correct, then it seems difficult to argue that our experiences are 
constitutively embedded in a dimensional manifold that is metaphysically primitive. This is 
an unhappy result for robust realists who also wish to endorse a Humean nomology, as it 
implies that experiences cannot take up position in the kind of ‘Humean mosaic’ from which 
such a nomology is ordinarily derived. Taking cues from John Foster, In section 7, I develop 
a view appealing to relations of shared token phenomenal content as the ground of Humean 
nomological relations between states of a phenomenally constituted physical universe and 
(partially) constitutively extrinsic experiences.  
In section 7.1, I argue that a four-dimensional version of this view, premised upon Foster’s 
notion of a time-field, is phenomenally specious. I contend that experiences admit of a 
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primitive non-dimensional dynamism that renders them incapable of being constituted by 
properties apt to feature in a four-dimensional metaphysics. In section 7.2, I argue that while 
a presentist version of the Fosterian view is possible, such a view is simply implausible and 
constitutes a theoretical cost for the robust realist. Robust realists of a naturalistic persuasion 
would therefore do well to explore other potential metaphysical connections between 
experiences and a metaphysically real world. 
Once objective spatiotemporal properties have been distinguished from spatial appearances, it 
becomes somewhat less plausible that we have any kind of primitive conceptual grip on 
them. In section 8, I use this fact to motivate a discussion of the role-theoretical functional 
characterisation of such properties endorsed by Foster and Chalmers.  
Finally, in section 9 I examine the kinds of causation invoked by these accounts. I consider 
and argue against structural Humean, necessitarian and non-structural Humean views. 
2. McGinn on Consciousness and Space
The view that consciousness is non-spatial is by no means without precedent, finding its 
origins in Descartes (1988 p. 99), who maintains the very idea he has of the human mind is 
that of “a thinking thing … not extended in length, breadth or height”, thereby counting the 
non-spatiality of consciousness among what he considers to be a priori knowable conceptual 
truths. Colin McGinn (1995 p. 97) speaks of Descartes’ non-spatiality thesis as though it were 
the championing of common lore: “It is hard to deny that Descartes was tapping into our 
ordinary understanding of the nature of mental phenomena when he formulated the 
distinction between mind and body in this way - our consciousness does indeed present itself 
as non-spatial in character”. Contrasting “a visual experience, E, as of a yellow flash” with 
the “complex of neural structures and events” associated with it, McGinn (1995 p. 97) writes, 
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... E seems not to have any of these spatial characteristics: it is not located at any specific 
place; it takes up no particular volume of space; it has no shape; it is not made up of spatially 
distributed parts; it has no spatial dimensionality; it is not solid ... E seems not to be the kind 
of thing that falls under spatial predicates.  
While I do think the non-spatiality of consciousness, as acquaintance based Cartesian realism 
characterises it, is a priori knowable, knowable merely by reflecting upon core Cartesian 
commitments and any viable account of the nature of spatial properties, I nonetheless find 
McGinn’s comments perplexing. Something can be a priori knowable without being obvious, 
and the non-spatiality of consciousness is far from obvious. Far from being part of our 
ordinary understanding of mental phenomena, Lycan (2009 p. 554) has recently described the 
thesis as “antique and weird”. Pre-philosophical naive realism has it that visual object-
surface-appearances are object surfaces, which, of course, have extension, and some who 
have come, by way of philosophical reasoning, to dissociate visual appearances of things 
from the things themselves have nonetheless maintained that such appearances are extended. 
Regarding Locke’s (1961 vol. 1 p. 106) claim that the ideas that the spatial properties of 
physical things give rise to are “resemblances” of those self same properties, Mackie (1976 p. 
13) writes, “He means, surely, that material things literally have shapes as we see shapes, feel
shapes, and think of shapes”. As Mackie sees it, Locke is attributing the very same spatial 
qualities to ideas as to the objects they represent. A thing being square is “its having a shape-
quality which is just like the shape-quality which we find in the experiential content to which 
the thing gives rise” (1976 p. 15).84 Other philosophers have rejected Lockean similitude, in 
84 The qualifier ‘surely’ might be thought a bit strong, as something can resemble something without being 
anything close to ‘just like’ that something. Locke’s (1961 vol. 1 p. 106) claim that the spatiotemporal patterns 
of ideas of primary qualities “do really exist in the bodies themselves” could be read as the claim that there is an 
isomorphism between the phenomenally spatiotemporal patterns embodied by ideas and the objectively 
spatiotemporal patterns embodied by the things giving rise to them. I nonetheless think Mackie’s interpretation 
likely correct, this more cautious interpretation being anachronistically out of step with the geometric naivety of 
the period, as well as the insensitivity to the x-of-appearance/appearance-of-x distinction that was characteristic 
of pre-Kantian empiricism, and much post-Kantian empiricism for that matter. In any case, heavyweight 
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its strong form at least, but have nonetheless maintained that experiences are objectively 
extended, occupying a region within the skull.  
McGinn (1995 pp. 98, 100) advances two arguments in defence of Descartes’ thesis: 
The Argument from Perception – Our states of consciousness aren’t perceived, so 
“perceptual geometry gets no purchase on them”.  
The Argument from Spatial Exclusion – A “well known metaphysical principle has it 
that no two material objects (of the same kind) can occupy the same place at the same 
time ... If the essential mark of the spatial is competition for space, as the 
metaphysical principle records, then the mental lacks that essential feature”.   
The central premise of the Argument from Perception, the claim that states of consciousness 
aren’t perceived, is not entirely uncontroversial. For anyone who thinks sense-data constitute 
“immediate objects of perception”, the geometry of visual experience is perceptual geometry 
(Jackson 1977 p. 119). But even if one thinks experiencing something altogether different 
from perceiving, it remains unclear why perceptual geometry should have no purchase on 
states of consciousness. McGinn presumably takes perception, unlike experiencing, to be a 
causally mediated physical process, and ‘perceptual geometry’ to be the geometry possessed 
by the objects which, by way of this process, are said to be perceived, and so not some 
special geometry peculiar to perception itself. I also assume he doesn’t believe there to be 
some strong conceptual connection between spatiality and perceivability. Commonsense 
would have it that there are spatial properties that aren’t perceivable, monstrously large and 
incredibly small dimensions for instance. If he is merely stating that the geometrical 
properties borne by such perceived objects cannot be borne by conscious experiences, 
similitude has had at least one proponent, Jackson (1977 pp. 77-86, 102). I’ll be discussing Jackson’s (long 
since abandoned) similitude thesis soon enough. 
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McGinn is simply begging the question against the many philosophers who have maintained 
that it can.  
Turning now to the Argument from Spatial Exclusion, far from being the essential mark of 
spatiality, it’s not clear that competition for space is essential to the notion of spatiality at all.  
Prima facie, it doesn’t seem conceptually incoherent for things to be superposed in space. 
Casper the friendly ghost’s non-physical constituents occupying the same regions of space as 
those of the wall he’s passing through is no doubt fanciful, but not an affront to the logic of 
spatial predicates. That children are capable of entertaining such an idea suggests that 
competition for space might not form part of our intuitive folk conception of spatiality. 
Obviously, this conception has little in common with the rarefied results of the conceptual 
revisions to ordinary spatial concepts motivated by scientific investigation or metaphysical 
reasoning. Some such revisions might give reason to invoke the principle. An extreme 
essentialist with regards to physical phenomena might think it principled to infer the logical 
impossibility of superposition from the nomological impossibility of superposition. Likewise, 
somebody who, in light of theoretical considerations, has abandoned metaphysical 
primitivism regarding spatial properties in favour of some kind of nomological 
constructivism, where spatial relations are born of more primitive causal relations, might rule 
out superposition on the grounds of, say, overdetermination. But these are relatively outré 
views. It would be very odd for some such view to serve as an implicit background 
assumption. I will find reason to discuss the view that physical space is nomically constituted 
later in this chapter, rejecting the possibility of consciousness taking up position space thus 
conceived for altogether different reasons, but only after having shown that the more 
conventional realist’s conception of physical space logically precludes the objective spatiality 
of consciousness.  
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3. Phenomenal vs Causal Criteria
While McGinn’s case for the non-spatiality of consciousness is arguably unsatisfactory, one 
point he makes, while once again falling short of establishing what he seemingly intends, 
serves nicely to bring into view what I believe to be the real problematic regarding the 
spatiality of consciousness. He points out that “causal criteria yield a different location for 
[experiences] from phenomenal criteria” (McGinn 1995 p. 99). Phenomenal criteria 
recommend locating visual experiences, for instance, “at various distances from perceivers 
and at various angles to their line of sight”, as Frank Jackson (1977 p. 102) did in his earlier 
dualist period. This is the obvious choice for philosophers who, like those cited above, think 
visual appearances, in cases of veridical perception, have the same or similar spatial 
dimensions to the physical object surfaces they represent. In like manner, the early Jackson 
(1977 pp. 77-86) locates sensations in various parts of the body, or, in the case of phantom 
limbs, “near, but outside, the body”. In contrast, causal criteria recommend locating 
experiences inside the head. McGinn (1995 p. 99) writes, “Well, it is true enough that [a] pain 
[in my hand] presents itself as being in my hand, but there are familiar reasons for not taking 
this at face value. Without my brain no such pain would be felt, and the same pain can be 
produced simply by stimulating my brain and leaving my hand alone”.     
McGinn seems to raise the issue of there being two conflicting criteria for locating 
consciousness in space only to dismiss one of the two instantly. He apparently thinks it 
obvious that causal criteria trump phenomenal criteria (McGinn 1995 p. 99). That 
philosophers like Jackson, who are more than aware of the causal considerations he cites, 
have nonetheless preferred the phenomenal criterion suffices to show that it isn’t entirely 
obvious. In fact, there is a prima facie plausible, though, I will argue, mistaken, case to be 
made that the phenomenal criterion is the natural choice for the robust realist. It runs as 
follows:  
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The robust realist takes experience to be exactly as it’s experienced to be. The 
experienced visual field is experienced to be a large three-dimensional spatial expanse, 
much like the expanse of physical objects it purportedly represents. Hence, the visual 
field is a spatial expanse. To locate consciousness in the brain is to deny consciousness 
the spatial dimensions it appears to have, thereby abandoning the fidelity to experience 
at the centre of Robust Realism.  
The foregoing case for locating consciousness in space by way of phenomenal criteria is 
flawed, but it does bring an important part of the problematic regarding the spatiality of 
consciousness into view, namely that how something takes up position in space is a matter of 
what spatial dimensions it possesses. Much as the proverbial square peg will never fit the 
round hole, a visual field possessing approximately the same dimensions as the expanse it 
represents, where that expanse is significantly larger than a human skull, simply won’t fit in a 
human skull. Spatial dimensions belong to the constitution of their bearers. As Foster (1982 
p. 83) puts it, “we think of material space not merely as containing material objects, but as
constituting the very form of their existence”. Something can only occupy a region of 
objective space inasmuch as it constitutively embodies the appropriate objective spatial 
dimensions. Another central aspect of the problematic comes into view when we turn our 
attention to how those who eschew the phenomenal criterion for locating consciousness in 
favour of the causal criterion might respond to the foregoing case for the primacy of the 
phenomenal criterion.   
Most contemporary philosophers would be more inclined to locate consciousness on the basis 
of the causal rather than the phenomenal criterion, but then most would also endorse some 
kind of reductivism about consciousness that denies experiences their apparent character. By 
robust realist standards, such philosophers aren’t realists about such appearances at all. Galen 
Strawson (2011 p. 288), on the other hand, is a card carrying robust realist who likewise 
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maintains that “experiences are neural goings on”. Likewise, at least some of the views 
Chalmers regards as open possibilities with respect to the metaphysics of consciousness 
situate consciousness within the skull.85 By light of the reasoning employed in the foregoing 
case for spatially locating experiences according to the phenomenal criterion, these 
philosophers have either a warped understanding of the logic of spatial predicates or 
massively erroneous beliefs about the size of the human skull. But while both Strawson and 
Chalmers think the phenomenal visual field is exactly as it’s experienced to be, they think the 
phenomenal spatial dimensions it embodies are altogether different from the physical spatial 
dimensions of the expanse it represents (Chalmers 2010 p. 122). What reason might they 
have for thinking such a thing? One might start with old-fashioned ‘relativity of perception’ 
based arguments. The aspects of visual appearances of objects comprising their apparent 
spatial dimensions differ depending on how distant they visually appear. As one walks 
towards an immobile visible object, the intrinsic constitution of the visual appearances of that 
object, in particular, the properties comprising their visual spatial dimensions, undergo 
change. Presumably, the objective spatial properties of the physical object undergo no such 
change. Such properties aren’t functions of distance relations to perceiving organisms. 
Further, one could make the case that objective spatial properties aren’t visual properties. 
Regarding them, Foster (1982 p. 58) writes, “these spatial qualities, as qualities of the 
physical world, do not have whatever is distinctive of their representation in any particular 
sense realm”. Here we are but a hop and a skip from the next key consideration within the 
aforementioned problematic, namely, that garden-variety realism has it that objective spatial 
properties aren’t phenomenal properties. Objects bearing them are thought to exist 
independently of experience. But for a robust realist merely wishing to make a case for 
85 I refer here to the various broadly Russellian views he discusses under the label of Type-F monism (Chalmers 
2010 pp. 133-137).   
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rejecting the phenomenal criterion for locating consciousness in favour of the causal 
criterion, this final point proves too much. It combines with the previously established point, 
namely, that occupying a region of space is a matter of constitutively embodying the relevant 
dimensions, and the previously discussed Constitution Thesis, to make a relatively 
compelling case for the impossibility of locating consciousness anywhere:  
The No Standard Spatial Dimensions Argument (NSSD) 
P1) Objective spatial dimensions are constitutive properties of all that exists in 
physical space.   
P2) All constitutive properties of consciousness are phenomenal properties. 
P3) Objective spatial dimensions aren’t phenomenal properties. 
C) Consciousness doesn’t exist in physical space.
Confronted with NSSD, most contemporary philosophers would likely reject P2, but rejecting 
that isn’t an option so long as one is exploring the commitments of Robust Realism. P2 
follows directly from the Constitution Thesis, which has been shown to follow from 
fundamental robust realist tenets. The other premises, while not universally accepted, 
articulate aspects of what we might call standard spatial realism. Standard spatial realism has 
it that physical space and the physical denizens thereof are non-experiential in their 
constitutive nature. A physical thing can bear physical dimensions without experiences being 
in any way implicated. Standard realism also characterises spatial properties as 
metaphysically primitive. A physical object’s spatial dimensions have no further non-spatial 
constitution. Finally, standard physical realism takes space to be a dimension, with all that 
would ordinarily be thought to connote (i.e. to comprise continuous, smoothly integrated, 
relatively homogenous dimensional properties) and characterises spatial occupation in terms 
of embodying such dimensional properties. Some take space itself, not just spatial properties, 
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to be metaphysically primitive.86 Others maintain that the metaphysically primitive 
dimensional properties and distance relations of objects are constitutive of space.87 But this is 
a schism within the standard spatial realist camp. NSSD suffices to show that some aspect or 
other of standard spatial realism must be abandoned if consciousness, as robust realism 
characterises it, is to take up position in objective physical space.  
4. Standard Temporal Dimensions and the Constitution Thesis
My reason for first discussing the issue of the objective spatiality of consciousness in 
isolation from that of its objective temporality is that there has been a historical asymmetry in 
the treatment of the two cases. As Dainton (2000 p. 60) puts it, “according to a long-standing 
tradition consciousness is essentially temporal but wholly non-spatial”. I’d now like to broach 
the question of whether this asymmetry has any basis in reason. This would be the case if it 
were something peculiar to space, something that didn’t generalise to the time case, that 
somehow excluded the spatiality of consciousness. If the case for non-spatiality rested, for 
instance, upon the metaphysical principle invoked by McGinn, according to which different 
things can’t occupy the same location at the same time, there would be reason to think so, as 
the principle has no temporal analogue. But NSSD hinges upon the standard spatial realist 
conception of spatial dimensions as non-phenomenal and constitutive of their bearers, and 
these features do generalise to the time case so long as one is assuming the temporal analogue 
of standard spatial realism, standard temporal realism. Standard temporal realism has it that 
time is a continuous metaphysically primitive non-phenomenal fourth dimension, in addition 
to the three spatial dimensions. Physical things are characterised as ‘space-time worms’, 
embodying non-phenomenal temporal dimensions much as standard spatial realism has it that 
86 For a defence of absolutism of this kind in the face of much historical criticism, see Earman (1970). 
87 For a thoroughgoing exposition and evaluation of relationism, see Hinckfuss (1975). 
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they embody non-phenomenal spatial dimensions.88 Possession of such temporal dimensions 
is likewise irreducible to possession of more fundamental non-temporal properties. In such a 
case, one can invoke the exact temporal analogue of NSSD: 
The No Standard Temporal Dimensions Argument (NSTD) 
P1) Objective temporal dimensions are constitutive properties of all that exists in 
objective time. 
P2) All constitutive properties of consciousness are phenomenal properties. 
P3) Objective temporal dimensions aren’t phenomenal properties. 
C) Consciousness doesn’t exist in objective time.
My extension of the same line of argument to temporal properties is likely to raise some 
eyebrows, this in spite of the indisputable parity of reason between the two cases so long as 
space and time are assumed to be as standard spatial and temporal realism characterises them 
to be. As the above quote from Dainton indicates, temporality is considered by many to be 
essential to experience in a way that space isn’t. Regarding the prospect of fundamental 
physics abandoning spatiotemporal categories, Strawson  (2006a p. 9) writes, “Note that if 
temporality goes, i.e. not just spacetimeTM but temporality in any form, then experience also 
goes, given that experience requires time”. No analogous concern is expressed with respect to 
spatiality. That experience requires time might strike one as so obvious as to be trivial, but as 
noted in the discussion of McGinn, that experience is non-spatial is less than a folk truism, 
and the asymmetry in the treatment of the two cases is arguably attributable to a long-
standing philosophical blind spot.  
88 For an introductory exposition of “orthodox four-dimensionalism”, see Chapter 1 of Sider (2001). 
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That experience is essentially temporal seems trivially true because we experience temporal 
phenomena. Stuff appears to change, move etc. In other words, experience is phenomenally 
temporal, temporal in its experiential nature. But this is altogether different to its being 
temporal in some non-phenomenal objective sense. Any temporal aspect of experience, 
inasmuch as its being is revealed in experience, is, in its fundamental nature, appearance. By 
contrast, standard temporal realism has it that the temporal properties of physical things 
aren’t appearances at all. It is this consideration that famously led William James (2008 p. 
643) to insist upon the difference between a succession of appearances and the appearance of
succession, a distinction which, due to its having been later taken up by Husserl (1964 p. 31), 
has become something of a standard commitment for those working within the 
phenomological tradition. In section 7.1, I will argue that in characterising phenomenal 
temporality as the appearance of succession, James laid a phenomenologically inadequate 
foundation upon which many phenomenologically inadequate theories of time consciousness 
have subsequently been built. But the distinction between objective temporal properties and 
temporal appearances remains intact, and while very few robust realists have followed 
Jackson in naively identifying experienced space with a region of objective space, some have 
seemingly opted for an exactly analogous naive realism in the case of time, taking 
experienced time to be objective time.89 By way of example, I will briefly consider two 
accounts, those of Strawson and Dainton. 
Strawson at least appears to take objective temporal properties of consciousness to register 
directly in experience. A subject’s experience, according to Strawson, “will standardly have 
89 Geoffrey Lee (2007 p. 373), a philosopher who is far more attentive than most with respect to the distinction 
between objective temporality and temporal appearances, makes an explicit comparison between this kind of 
naïve temporal realism and the kind of Naïve spatial realism endorsed by Jackson: “It is a kind of resemblance 
theory of mental representation, in the same camp as the theory that experiences have spatial and colour 
properties that match those of external objects, as if your eyes were firing brightly coloured phenomenal rays 
into the environment”.  
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for it the character of being part of a more or less continuous process of experience”, and as a 
result the subject is even apprised of the purported stop-start nature of this process,90 
experiencing consciousness as “gappy” and “continually restarting” (Strawson 2003 pp. 289, 
290, 311). These comments could be given a representationalist reading, but there is nothing 
to disabuse the reader of the far more natural direct realist interpretation.  
Barry Dainton presents a more perplexing case. His account of phenomenal temporality is an 
attempt to address the problem of accounting for the appearance of temporal succession. 
Dainton suggests that part of the answer is to have it that co-experiencing be a diachronic 
phenomenal relation pertaining to objectively successive phenomenal contents. But if the 
objective succession of such contents is a non-phenomenal relation, this alone couldn’t 
account for the appearance of succession, as the co-experienced contents bearing such a non-
phenomenal relation to each other is altogether different to their bearing the phenomenal 
succession relation the appearance of succession demands.91 As Geoffrey Lee (2014 p. 34) 
puts it, “the objective duration of an experience is not a phenomenally relevant feature of it”. 
Dainton also appears to identify experienced and objective time. 
Unlike Jackson’s identification of experienced space with a region of objective space, the 
identification of experienced time with objective time doesn’t come across as a radical affront 
to naturalism. While the former has it that phantom limb sensations occur in empty space, the 
latter merely has it that the time found in experience is the same time experience is found in, 
a view attractive in its commonsensical simplicity. I’m inclined to think it is the prima facie 
plausibility of such naïve realism that gives impetus to the intuition that experiences are 
90 He thinks each of the “intrinsically unified episodes of experience” comprising “the conscious life of a human 
being …last for a maximum of about three seconds” (Strawson 2003 p. 289).  
91 In both these philosopher’s defence, neither of them are strongly wedded to the view that objective succession 
is non-phenomenal, as standard temporal realism has it, both being at least open to the kind of pan-phenomenal 
Russellian monism to be discussed shortly. Both are nonetheless guilty of failing to see that objective succession 
can only register in consciousness if it is a phenomenal relation. Both merely consider its being so a live option 
(Dainton 2000 pp. 7-10; Strawson 2006b p. 260).  
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essentially objectively temporal. If there is an argument for the essential objective 
temporality of consciousness that isn’t founded upon the assumption that its objective 
temporal properties are directly experienced as such, I’m yet to encounter it. But it has been 
shown to be too naïve, at least so long as we continue to assume, as required by standard 
temporal realism, that objective succession isn’t one and the same as the appearance of 
succession. Of course, inasmuch as it purports to demonstrate not merely that an objective 
succession of appearances does not alone account for the subjective appearance of 
succession, but rather, that the objective succession of appearances is altogether impossible, 
NSTD goes well beyond the conclusions of James and Husserl.  
5. NSSD and NSTD: An Appraisal
As with NSSD, most contemporary philosophers, when confronted with NSTD, would reject 
P2, which I have argued to be a consequence of Robust Realism’s commitment to the 
Constitution Thesis. If the robust realist is to reject the conclusion of either argument, it must 
be by way of rejecting the premises articulating aspects of standard spatial and temporal 
realism. Yet abandonment of P1 or P3 in either seems a significant cost. P1 in each argument 
articulates, or at least has the prima facie air of articulating, what we take existence in space 
or time to mean.  
This is particularly true in the case of NSSD. To speak of a chair being in space but having no 
spatial dimensions, or having spatial dimensions merely as some kind of addendum to its 
constitution, is seemingly to do violence to the concept of a chair. The situation is a little 
different with NSTD. It might be said that P1 in NSTD articulates what existence in time 
means for a four dimensionalist. The notion of existence in time might not be as meaningful 
for the presentist, for whom existing in the present might be said to be one and the same as 
simply existing. P3 in each argument seems like plain common sense, but the foregoing 
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discussion goes some way towards rendering questionable any claim to the effect that these 
are conceptual truths. As we have seen, there has been a tendency, even among the more 
well-known philosophers, to conflate phenomenal and objective spatial and temporal 
properties, which might suggest a degree of ambiguity and even incoherence in our folk 
notions of objective spatial and temporal properties. Obviously, physics has done so much to 
refine and revise our folk conception of space and time that whether or not P3 articulates an 
aspect of our incredibly inadequate folk conceptions of spatiotemporal properties might be 
thought entirely irrelevant, but I shall argue that comparable ambiguity belies the 
sophisticated representations of these properties furnished by the physical sciences. To 
explain how, I must address an issue already touched upon in Chapter 1 in a little more detail. 
To begin with, let us return to Chalmers’ (1996 p. 118) essentially structural-cum-dynamical 
characterisation of physical theory: 
… the basic elements of physical theories seem always to come down to two things: the 
structure and dynamics of physical processes. Different theories invoke different sorts of 
structure. Newtonian physics invokes a Euclidean space-time; relativity theory invokes a 
non-Euclidean differential manifold; quantum theory invokes a Hilbert space for wave 
functions. And different theories invoke different kind of dynamics within those structures: 
Newton’s laws, the principle of relativity, the wave equations of quantum mechanics.  
While all realists maintain that such structural cum dynamical properties are really 
instantiated, they are divided as to what that means. To ask this question is to open a veritable 
can of worms. To start with, philosophers are still divided as to whether a complete structural 
cum dynamical description of reality is one and the same as a complete description of reality, 
whether or not such properties are ontologically sui generis. Spatiotemporal properties 
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feature in such theories as fundamental structural properties.92 Some maintain that the 
instantiation of such structural properties is a matter of something, some substance or intrinsic 
nature, a quiddity, to use contemporary philosophical parlance, bearing structure.93 Structure 
can’t simply exist in and of itself. In like manner, some think modally articulated dynamical 
properties such as dispositions must be grounded in some intrinsic categorical nature.94 Also, 
while Chalmers describes physics as uncovering structure and dynamics, some have 
considered this to be a pleonasm. Some have maintained that dynamics are a mere function of 
structure, others that structure is a mere function of dynamics.95 Structural Humeanism, 
which has it that claims about dispositions, laws and such merely articulate regularities 
embodied in physical reality’s four-dimensional structure, has ordinarily been motivated by 
concerns about the scrutibility of sui generis dynamical properties,96 but it might just as easily 
be motivated by an austerely naturalistic attitude of the kind that treats any metaphysical 
attempt to move beyond physics with suspicion. As Rosenberg (2004 pp. 143, 144) points 
out, current physics requires little more than regularities: “A description of coevolving fields 
is the centerpiece of quantum mechanics” and “the successful use [of Schroedinger 
equations] requires us only to assume regularity in the succession of states” they “plot … 
92 If this ceases to be the case, as some physicists are predicting, it won’t be because physics has ceased to 
model physical reality in structural terms, but rather, because a more sophisticated structured coordinate system 
has replaced the space-time of old, one in which space-time can be emulated, at least in a coarse grained 
fashion, at a higher level. Hence Chalmers (2012a p. 325) describes the properties spatial properties might 
potentially derive from as properties of more fundamental spaces, “those of a quantum-mechanical 
configuration space, or an underlying space in a theory of quantum gravity such as string theory”. Clearly, any 
such transition will only have a terminological impact upon the established dialectic. Belonging to the universe 
such theories purport to model will still be a matter of constitutive inclusion within such a ‘space’, which will 
still be a matter of constitutively possessing the ‘spatial’ properties it purports to represent. On the standard 
assumption that such properties are non-phenomenal, consciousness won’t possess the requisite pre-spatial 
‘dimensions’.  
93 See Foster (2008 pp. 46, 81). 
94 For a discussion of the considerations motivating this view, see Blackburn (1990). For argument to the effect 
that they aren’t compelling, see Holton (1999).    
95 Lewis (1986a pp. ix-xii) is the most famous contemporary proponent of the former view. In section 8, I’ll 
discuss Foster’s (2008 pp. 128-144) argument to the effect that space could be at least partially nomologically 
constituted. Rosenberg (2004 pp. 213-217) attempts a more thoroughgoing reduction of spatiotemporal 
properties to nomological properties.   
96 See Lewis (1999 p. 40).  
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against points in time”. But there have also been philosophers, like Rosenberg (2004 p. 213-
217) himself, who, rejecting Humeanism, usually on the grounds that it is insufficiently
explanatory, have endorsed the latter view, offering nomologically constitutive accounts of 
space-time.   
The point is that refinements of spatiotemporal concepts within physical theory do nothing to 
resolve the foregoing issues, all of which will loom large in the ensuing discussion. Of 
particular importance to us at present is the notion that structural properties might need 
quiddistic bearers. This is directly relevant to the foregoing question of whether or not P3 in 
each of the foregoing arguments, the claim that the relevant dimensional properties aren’t 
phenomenal, articulates a conceptual truth. The issue of whether or not such structural 
properties might be nomically constituted will be broached later. Let us for now make the 
commonplace assumption that they aren’t nomically constituted, that they are either sui 
generis fundamental properties, pure structures borne by nothing, or fundamental 
modifications of some fundamental quiddistic nature.97 Physics does nothing to settle the 
question of what intrinsic nature or natures, if any, bear the structural properties physics 
purports to pick out under the name of spatiotemporal properties. In particular, it doesn’t rule 
out the possibility that they are phenomenal natures. This idea, that phenomenal properties 
might constitute the intrinsic properties of matter, goes back to Russell (1954 p. 264): 
The gulf between percepts and physics is not a gulf as regards intrinsic quality, for we know 
nothing of the intrinsic quality of the physical world, and therefore do not know whether it is, 
97 The issue of whether physical structural properties are fundamental structural properties, or functions of more 
fundamental structural properties, as might be the case if they were properties of a Matrix like computer 
simulation in a metaphysically prior world, is much like the foregoing issue of whether or not space and time are 
fundamental structural properties within physics. It leaves the basic dialectic intact. The question of whether or 
not consciousness can take up position in the thusly expanded megaverse remains, and the foregoing questions 
about the metaphysical fundamentality of spatiotemporal properties, whether they inhere in quiddities and such, 
reemerge as questions about the most fundamental concrete structural properties, whatever they might be. Let us 
herein assume spatiotemporal properties are not only physically basic, but also metaphysically fundamental 
structural properties, understanding that this doesn’t make them fundamental tout court, in the sense that they 
might inhere in quiddities or be nomically constituted. 
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or is not, very different from that of percepts. The gulf is as to what we know about the two 
realms. We know the quality of percepts, but we do not know their laws so well as we could 
wish. We know the laws of the physical world, in so far as these are mathematical, pretty 
well, but we know nothing else about it. If there is any intellectual difficulty in supposing that 
the physical world is intrinsically quite unlike that of percepts, this is reason for supposing 
that there is not complete unlikeness. And there is a certain ground for such a view, in the 
fact that percepts are part of the physical world, and are the only part we can know without 
the help of rather elaborate and difficult inferences. 
The project of making good on Russell’s vision has been an ongoing research program ever 
since.98 Any such view that has matter possessive of an intrinsic phenomenal nature, and, at 
the same time, bearing non-phenomenal dimensional properties falls prey to arguments of the 
foregoing kind. But the foregoing quote doesn’t merely suggest that phenomenal properties 
might constitute the intrinsic properties of matter, but rather, that they might constitute the 
intrinsic properties of the physical world, which presumably includes space-time itself, and so 
might for allow for phenomenal dimensional relations, avoiding this problem. In responding 
to McGinn’s foregoing case for non-spatiality, Chalmers (1995 p. 417) suggests that the 
intrinsic nature of space itself, “the ‘medium’ in which the mathematical structures of space 
are embedded”, might feature in the solution of the problem of somehow situating 
consciousness in physical space. However, his openness to the possibility of consciousness 
having non-phenomenal constituents leads him to then shrink back from the thesis that space 
might be intrinsically phenomenal, suggesting instead that it might be intrinsically 
protophenomenal (Chalmers 1995 p. 417). The Constitution Thesis rules out 
protophenomena, disallowing any such shrinking back. If there is to be any hope of this trick 
working, it will be by way of consciousness being constitutively embedded in a phenomenal 
98 Contemporary proponents of ‘Russellian monism’ include Chalmers (in some of his moods), Rosenberg 
(2004), Strawson (2006a, 2006b) and Lockwood (1989).   
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space-time medium, constitutively bearing the intrinsically phenomenal structural properties 
which are afforded a purely structural substrate neutral representation in physics. Galen 
Strawson at least tentatively flags this as a possibility. In setting out his Russellian stall, 
Strawson (2006b pp. 247, 260) suggests that we might “in the end have to posit a universe-
wide sesmet [his acronym for a subject of experience that is a single mental thing] in order to 
posit the existence of many sesmets existing in a dimension that allows for their interaction”.  
If sense can be made of this idea, then far from articulating putatively necessary conceptual 
truths, P3 in each of the foregoing arguments might be straightforwardly false. Without 
getting too caught up in issues regarding the semantics of the terms of physical theory, there 
is at least a case to be made for the view that such terms denote the quiddistic realisers or 
realisations of physical structure and dynamics, rather than some proxy (for instance, the role 
of thus realising them). In such a case, if spatiotemporal dimensions are phenomenally 
realized, then spatiotemporal dimensions, as depicted in physical theory, will be phenomenal 
properties. I turn now to the question of whether sense can in fact be made of this idea. This 
will initially involve getting clear on what Strawson’s suggestive but not altogether clear 
remarks must mean if they are to be taken as offering a way around the foregoing arguments. 
I will then present an argument against the resulting view.  
6. Cosmopsychism and Decomposition
Strawson’s (2006b pp. 247, 248) “smallist” panpsychism has it that “simple or non-composite 
... microsesmets, e.g. electron sesmets or string sesmets,” compose “macrosesmets, e.g. 
human sesmets”. The latter are phenomenally constituted phenomenal manifolds of 
phenomenal properties, and assuming there is a universe-wide sesmet of the kind Strawson 
envisages, they will in turn be phenomenal constituents of this greater phenomenally 
constituted phenomenal manifold of phenomenal properties. Description of such sesmets as 
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phenomenally constituted phenomenal manifolds of phenomenal properties might appear 
pleonastic, my emphasising that they are phenomenal manifolds, peculiar and unnecessary. 
On the contrary, that the relevant manifolds of properties are phenomenal manifolds is an 
important non-trivial point. If reality consists of nothing but individual ontologically discrete 
human and animal consciousnesses, inhabiting no shared medium short of reality itself, 
reality as a whole will be a phenomenally constituted manifold of phenomenal properties, but 
it won’t be a phenomenally constituted phenomenal manifold of phenomenal properties. It 
won’t meet Strawson’s criterion for being a sesmet, as it won’t be an experience. Rather, it 
will be several discrete experiences that aren’t co-experienced. The phenomenon of 
manifoldness isn’t one and the same as the manifoldness of phenomena. A phenomenal 
manifold’s manifold nature is itself phenomenal, it is experienced. This is the fact Chalmers 
(2010 p. 509) and Bayne intend to capture with their “phenomenal unity thesis”, which has it 
that “necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a subject at a time is phenomenally 
unified”, where “two states are phenomenally unified when they have a conjoint 
phenomenology: a phenomenology of having both states at once that subsumes the 
phenomenology of the individual states”.99 The phenomenal unity thesis appeals to the idea 
of an objective time slice of consciousness.100 Given that the objective temporality of 
experiences is currently contested, it would be preferable if this could be avoided. The 
necessity the phenomenal unity thesis claims for itself might be thought questionable. For my 
current purposes, I will substitute the term ‘phenomenal manifold’ for the term ‘subject’, 
thereby evading the vexed issue of what constitutes a subject, and lose the ‘at a time’ bit. We 
99 Notice this talk of the phenomenology of having phenomenal states makes the experiencing/having of 
experiences something belonging to the experiences themselves. Even those who think it makes sense to talk of 
an experiencing of phenomenology that is logically distinct from the phenomenology of experiencing, 
something like an act directed upon phenomenology by an extrinsic mind, must concede, so long as they are 
scrupulous robust realists, that there’s also something it’s like to co-experience all our phenomenology, and that 
this what-it’s-like-ness belongs to the phenomenal constitution of a phenomenal manifold.   
100 Bayne (2010 p. 18) makes it very clear that “the temporal framework in question is that of clock-time, not 
that of the contents of experience”. 
%'*!
are then left with an uncontroversially necessary definitional truth: “Necessarily, any set of 
phenomenal states of a phenomenal manifold is phenomenally unified”. That the states of a 
phenomenal manifold are phenomenally unified is what makes it a phenomenal manifold, a 
manifold the manifold nature of which is phenomenal. 
Note that this modified version of the unity thesis allows for the inclusion of the 
phenomenally temporal aspects of our phenomenal manifolds within their phenomenally 
unified nature, which in turn might be thought to allow for the possibility of the universe-
wide sesmet being the co-experiencing of the entire four-dimensional spatiotemporal 
universe. There is a line of thought that might be taken to confer a degree of credibility upon 
this idea.101 The fact that we experience temporal phenomena such as change, motion and 
sound has led some philosophers to follow William James’s (2008 p. 692) lead and speak of a 
phenomenal “specious present”, phenomenally comprising more than a mere instant, within 
which such temporal phenomena are experienced.102 From here it might be argued that 
inasmuch as there can be a phenomenal appearance of any temporal duration at all, as we 
supposedly know there can be from our own experiencing of a phenomenally constituted 
specious present, there seems to be no obvious logical bar upon there being a phenomenal 
appearance of an extremely, perhaps infinitely, long duration, though it is admittedly very 
hard, perhaps impossible, to imagine such a thing.  
If Strawson’s universe-wide sesmet is a phenomenal manifold, it will be the co-experiencing 
of all the aspects of the dimensions it constitutes, including the sesmets within it and their 
various interactions. I emphasise that it constitutes these dimensions because Strawson’s  
(2006b p. 271) talk of the sesmet being universe-wide, and of “experience exist[ing] at every 
101 I will soon argue that this line of reasoning to be specious, premised upon a mischaracterization of temporal 
phenomena. 
102 In turn, James (2008 p. 602) was following the lead of E. R. Clay.  
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point in the spatial universe”, could be construed as meaning that it merely occupies every 
point of a dimension or dimensions it doesn’t constitute. If this is what Strawson has in mind, 
then the arguments of the previous section will apply here. Strawson  (2006b p. 244) writes 
“‘The universe consists of experience arrayed in a certain way.’ Plainly this view involves no 
logical contradiction”. But if consciousness is as robust realism dictates, ‘arrayed’ is taken 
non-metaphorically, as is presumably intended, and the dimensions of space aren’t 
constitutively phenomenal, it has been decisively demonstrated that it does. The universe 
wide sesmet can’t be a vast spatiotemporal array of experience, only an experience of a vast 
spatiotemporal array. The view under consideration has our experiences embedded in space 
in much the same manner that object surface appearances are embedded in the visual space of 
our individual visual fields, by featuring in the appearance of a geometrically structured field, 
appearing both to intrinsically embody the geometry appropriate to that field, and appearing 
to occupy a finite location within it. They are in space, and perhaps time, solely by virtue of 
appearing to be so. 
Chalmers (forthcoming b p. 17) has recently claimed that “a cosmopsychist view in which 
each of us is a distinct constituent of a universal consciousness ... suffers from a 
decomposition problem that seems just as hard as the combination problem [for 
pansychism]”. The combination problem is the problem of how micro-sesmets could ever 
constitutively yield macrosesmets. It arises given two background assumptions: that 
microsesmets are the quiddistic realisers of microphysical properties, and, more importantly, 
that they are already located in space-time. If Chalmers is right, in arriving at cosmopsychism 
by way of a dialectic born of problems concerning phenomenal properties being located in 
space, I am here coming at the same problem from the opposite direction. Chalmers doesn’t 
elaborate upon his claim, but I think that the decomposition problem arises for this view. The 
problem, as I see it, is that of the doubtful possibility of a finite experience, an experiencing 
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of only so much, being experienced with something else.103 The finitude of our phenomenal 
manifolds belongs to their phenomenal nature; only experiencing so much is an aspect of 
what it’s like to be us. Robust realism has it that the experienced nature of our phenomenal 
manifolds is their nature. If they are experienced to be finite, they are finite. It might not be 
immediately apparent that such phenomenal finitude rules against the possibility of our 
phenomenal manifolds being phenomenal components of a greater phenomenal manifold. 
The finitude of an entity usually doesn’t preclude its being a mereological part of something 
else. Yet straightforward part-whole mereology does not obtain in this case. The finitude of 
our experiences doesn’t disallow their being straightforward parts of a greater whole. If 
reality admitted of nothing but discrete phenomenally finite manifolds, each such manifold 
will be a partial constituent of reality. But we are considering a situation where such 
phenomenally finite manifolds are experienced to be parts of a greater experienced whole, 
one constituting the co-experiencing of their phenomenally finite natures. Such a state of 
affairs is impossible. To experiencing what I experience is to experience only so much, what 
I experience and nothing else. For something to be the experiencing of exactly what I 
experience among other things is for it to experience what I experience and nothing else and 
something else, a manifest contradiction. A godlike mind can no more experience the finitude 
of our experiences without its phenomenal nature embodying that finitude than it can 
experience the colours of our phenomenal manifolds without its phenomenal nature 
embodying those colours.  
103 Phenomenal finitude affords experiences the “inherent boundaries” that form the basis for Rosenberg’s (2004 
pp. 75-90) “boundary problem”. Rosenberg (2004 p. 81) takes it for granted that these are “middle-level 
boundaries”. I am arguing that on the current cosmopsychist view, they can’t be.  
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7. Intransitive Co-Consciousness
Call the foregoing argument the Argument from Finitude. If sound, it rules out our 
phenomenal manifolds being experiential components of a greater phenomenal manifold. 
Such a universe constituting manifold was the last remaining option for a metaphysically 
primitive dimensional manifold in which our experiences might be constitutively embedded. 
That our experiences can’t constitutively feature within such a primitive structured dimension 
has further implications. In particular, it raises difficulties for those who account for causal 
transactions with experiences in Humean terms. If the argument is sound, experiences are 
incapable of featuring in a ‘Humean mosiac’ the broader patterning of which might serve as 
the basis for the derivation of a Humean nomology. The robust realist who still wishes to 
retain a metaphysically realist stance regarding the physical world appears therefore to be 
limited in choice to either a neo-Cartesian view that has it that our phenomenal manifolds are 
constitutively extrinsic to the spatiotemporal universe, or to the abandonment of metaphysical 
primitivism regarding space and time in favour of some form of spatiotemporal 
constructivism somehow allowing for the constitutive inclusion of our phenomenal 
manifolds. Both such views typically invoke non-Humean nomology. Advocates of the neo-
Cartesian view will presumably claim significant metaphysical connections between 
experiences and the physical universe, particularly those parts comprising the neural 
correlates of consciousness. Non-Humean causal relations have at least historically played 
this role. Likewise, those who don’t take spatial properties as primitive have tended to 
advocate a views according to which spatial properties and relations are a function of, or 
constituted by, non-Humean nomological properties and relations.  
The robust realist of Humean persuasion may have an answer to this objection. Humean 
scruples are arguably consistent with a neo-Cartesian view that maintains a constitutive 
connection between our phenomenal manifolds and space-time, something tighter than mere 
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causal transactions from without. This view takes methodological cues from John Foster’s 
constructive metaphysical project. It is worthy of discussion, in spite of its apparent oddity, as 
one of the few Humean views available within this set of commitments.104 
In setting out the foregoing cosmopsychic view, I temporarily gave credence to the idea that 
the experience which, according to the view, is constitutive of the entire universe, might be 
the co-experiencing of the entire extensity of time. This is a four-dimensionalist view, the 
universe-constituting-experience instantiating a phenomenal ‘time-field’, to borrow Foster’s 
terminology. Had the finitude of experiences not presented an insuperable problem with 
respect to the situating of our experiences in such a universe, the issue would have arisen 
about how, exactly, our experiences were to be thus situated, both spatially and temporally. 
Consider temporal location. In order for something to be constitutively incorporated within a 
time-field of the kind endorsed by the four-dimensionalist, one that is, in a sense, staid and 
immutable, it must have a constitutive nature appropriate to doing so. Presumably it must be 
likewise staid and immutable. That our experiences do in fact have such a nature seems to be 
implicitly assumed by most contemporary robust realists (Chalmers 2010 p. 444; Dainton 
2000, p. 177; Strawson 2003 p. 311). The fact we experience temporal phenomena has been 
taken by some to indicate that our own phenomenal manifolds are themselves instantiations 
of phenomenal time fields comprising the co-experiencing of short runs of phenomenally 
successive contents, a specious present, with each such specious-present-constituting-
phenomenal-manifold having the kind of staid and immutable existence the four-
dimensionalist attributes to all denizens of space-time. I have argued that our experiences are 
incapable of being situated in a primitive four-dimensional manifold, phenomenal or non-
phenomenal, but if such a characterisation of our phenomenal manifolds is 
104 One more will be discussed a little later. 
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phenomenologically correct, the robust realist is tied to it whether or not our experiences are 
capable of being thus situated. Foster’s ideas are relevant at this point. He takes our 
phenomenal manifolds to be instantiations of such time fields, but rather than assuming their 
situation within a primitive time dimension, Foster takes this as the departure point for a 
constructivist account of the streams of consciousness of individual subjects.  
Foster suggests that ‘streams’ of consciousness, a “subjective time dimension” for “each 
mind”, might be formed by way of the sharing of token phenomenal contents by distinct 
phenomenal manifolds, each of which comprises such a specious present. Each specious 
present “will be a sensation of a temporal pattern – the realization of a time-field”, and a 
subjective time dimension consists of many such time-fields ‘overlapping’ by way of 
partially shared contents (Foster 1982 pp. 257, 258). One such specious present, s1, might be 
the experiencing of A followed by B and then B by C, another, s2, the experiencing of the 
very same succeeding of B by C but also of that self same C being followed by D, and so on. 
(To be clear, the succession of B by C in s2 is the very same succession of B by C in s1, not a 
second tokening of the same phenomenal type). While A belongs to the same unified 
experience as B and C, and B and C to the same unified experience as D, no experience 
unites A and D. Note that Foster’s construction works on the assumption that the phenomenal 
relation of co-consciousness that pertains between all the components of a phenomenal 
manifold, by virtue of which they collectively comprise a phenomenal manifold, is an 
intransitive relation.  
My use of cautionary scare quotes when speaking of such time fields ‘overlapping’ is that 
such talk runs the risk of conjuring misleading images of experiences taking up relations 
within a shared dimension, instead of constituting a subjective time dimension by virtue of a 
shared content relation. Likewise, the description of multiple experiences thus related as a 
stream is apt to invoke a misleading spatial image, that of a linear series of experiences. 
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There is nothing preventing some ‘later’ specious present in the ‘series’ begun in the previous 
paragraph, say, the co-experiencing of X followed by Y followed by Z, from thus 
‘overlapping’ with the co-experiencing of X followed by Y followed by A, and this in turn 
‘overlapping’ with the co-experiencing of Y followed by A followed by B, and this in turn 
‘overlapping’ with the very same specious present we started out with, the co-experiencing of 
A followed by B followed by C. The specious present comprising of A followed by B 
followed by C isn’t distanced from that comprising of X followed by Y followed by Z in a 
time dimension. In conjunction with the other experiences involved, they constitute a 
subjective time dimension for an individual subject, and so are not constrained by 
dimensional constraints.  
Foster next unifies the various individual ‘streams’ constructed in the foregoing manner 
within an intersubjective temporal framework. Thus far, no primitive temporal relations hold 
between distinct ‘streams’ thus constructed. Their components are neither simultaneous with, 
prior to, nor subsequent to each other. Foster’s (1982 p. 278) exposition is a little convoluted 
at this point, but the important point for our purposes is that he invokes “a time dimension in 
… that component of ultimate reality which lies outside human minds” such that the “time of 
the component may form the basis for a temporal framework in which the human events are 
located”. Foster (1982 pp. 278-280) provides a specific example of what this component 
might be like. Metaphysical specificities aside, what matters is that the component embodies 
the structure the realist assumes the physical universe to embody.105 One could be forgiven 
105 While Foster’s specific account of the nature of the component has little bearing on the ensuing dialectic, it is 
nonetheless worthy of a mention as it is a variation on the foregoing cosmopsychist view. While the foregoing 
view has it that there is one universe constituting experience, which constitutes an experiencing of the entirety 
of space-time, Foster (1982 p. 279) has it that a series of distinct phenomenal manifolds constituting the 
experiencing of the entire universe for a short duration, a specious present, form a stream in the manner just 
illustrated. For reasons of exegetical flow, I did not elaborate this option previously as an alternative form that 
cosmopsychic realism might take, but it should be clear that having done so would have added nothing to the 
debate as such a series offers no more of a possibility of constitutively incorporating our individual experiences 
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for saying it is the physical universe. We will find reason later for thinking things might be a 
little more complicated, that the nomological topology yielded by the psychophysical laws 
pertaining between this component and the constitutively separate human streams of 
consciousness constructed in the foregoing manner might be more deserving of that title, but 
this is a mere semantic point which need not hold us up here, where the aim is to get clear on 
Foster’s metaphysics. If we temporarily identify this component with the physical universe, 
we can describe Foster’s view as a neo-Cartesian view according to which our streams of 
consciousness are extrinsic to space and time, not just space, as traditional Cartesianism has 
it, but are nonetheless indexed to times by way of causal relations pertaining between them 
and the parts of the component comprising their neural correlates.106  
Foster’s view invokes non-Humean nomology of the kind that I wish to set aside for later 
discussion. But the intransitive co-consciousness relations he invokes form the basis for the 
Humean view I am developing here. The view I have in mind has it that there are particular 
physical states instantiated within a four-dimensional cosmopsychic universe of the kind 
discussed previously, such that in every instance of their instantiation, certain components of 
those states (which, of course, are phenomenal) also feature in an additional phenomenal 
manifold in altogether different phenomenal relations. A strong type-type correspondence 
pertains between the relations these components bear to each other as components of the 
relevant physical states and those they bear to each other in the additional manifolds. The 
additional phenomenal manifolds are then the kinds of phenomenal time-fields our 
experiences are said to instantiate. A region of space time featuring a continuous series of the 
than a single unified space-time constituting experience. No experiencing of all and only what we individually 
experience occurs in the series. 
106 Foster’s (1982 pp. 277, 278) specific account of the nature of the component, as outlined in the previous 
footnote, might be more accurately described as Berkeleyan, but he acknowledges that this is only one possible 
form the component might take. Later, he writes, “The reason I have confined myself exclusively to mentalistic 
examples is that there are no others available: we cannot form any transparent conception of what a non-mental 
reality might be like. But I have not established that the ultimate reality has to be transparently conceivable”.  
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relevant physical state types (say, a series of brain states had by a human being in a state of 
wakefulness) will correspond to a set of such time-fields, which, by reference to the temporal 
properties of the constituents they share with those brain states, might also be said to 
constitute a series.  
If one liked, one could still have it that the aforementioned ‘overlap’ relations also pertain 
between the time-fields in the series. They could be matched by a constitutive overlap in the 
corresponding brain states. Time-fields s1, the experiencing of A followed by B and then B 
by C, and s2, the experiencing of the very same succeeding of B by C but also of that self 
same C being followed by D, could correspond to the brain states b1 and b2. These brain 
states in turn share a temporal part p which is of a kind which tends to have components 
united into a separate phenomenal manifold so as to constitute the phenomenal appearance 
exemplified in s1 and s2 by the succeeding of B by C.107 Though this Humean variant on 
Foster’s view is capable of incorporating such ‘overlap’, it is somewhat unclear what 
motivates its postulation in the first place. That the individual time-fields within such 
subjective time dimensions share property instances with states that are subject to a primitive 
kind of temporal ordering does a better job of conferring temporal seriality upon them than 
the posited ‘overlap’. It will be remembered that the individual time-fields constituting such 
subjective dimensions aren’t placed at any genuine dimensional distance from each other by 
way of such ‘overlap’ relations. What’s more, such ‘overlap’ doesn’t suffice to account for 
experienced change because ‘overlap’ itself isn’t experienced. It is a non-phenomenal relation 
between phenomenal relata, much like the co-existence relation between the aforementioned 
discreet phenomenal manifolds invoked in the foregoing discussion regarding the nature of a 
107 I say p need only be of a kind that tends to have its components thus united because it need not do it in every 
instance. Perhaps its kind only does so when featuring in particular ‘wider’ states like b1 and b2. The important 
point is that if p features in two such consecutive states, the very same token instances of additional phenomenal 
relations between its components might feature in the additional phenomenal manifolds corresponding to each 
of those states. 
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phenomenal manifold, those inhabiting no shared medium short of reality itself. This is 
plausibly another instance of the invocation of non-phenomenal relations to account for 
aspects of phenomenology, in this case, its putatively stream-like nature.  
The Humean credentials of this view should be relatively clear. While the individual time-
fields sharing constituents with the various brain states aren’t themselves located within the 
primitive Humean mosaic that the cosmopsychic universe instantiates, an objective law-like 
type-type relation pertains between various brain and time-field states. Such law-like 
relations are the product, not of inscrutable non-Humean necessitation relations, but rather, of 
the constitutive connections which pertain consistently throughout reality, the instantiation of 
a metaphysical, as opposed to a straightforwardly temporal, regularity.   
7.1 Phenomenal Dynamism 
My concern with respect to the foregoing view is that I believe it to be phenomenologically 
inadequate.108 More specifically, I think it illicitly makes use of a spatial metaphor in an 
attempt to downplay those features of experience the robust realist must admit, yet that 
present intractable problems for it. The problematic metaphor is that of a time-field. This 
metaphor robs experience of its genuinely dynamical aspect. It is not the experiencing of 
phenomenal contents strewn across a time-field. It is, among other things, the experience of 
phenomenal contents changing. The change, of course, is phenomenal change, the 
appearance of change,109 but just as phenomenal structure (as possessed by the visual field for 
instance) is at the same time the appearance of structure and the structure of appearance, 
108 Let the reader be forewarned that in this section in particular, the fact that our discussion is premised upon 
the conditional assumption of Robust Realism is implicitly assumed, as opposed to being perpetually restated. In 
particular, when making descriptive phenomenological claims, I will typically say that experiences are thus and 
so, as opposed to more cumbersome qualified statements like ‘naïve phenomenology seemingly dictates that 
experiences are thus and so, and we are working on the assumption that they are exactly as they phenomenally 
appear to be’, taking it as understood that such phenomenal reports, while an essential part of the kind of 
investigation being undertaken here, can be, and often are, mistaken.    
109 The cessation of consciousness at death, or upon transition into dreamless sleep, would count as an instance 
of the changing of appearances that isn’t, at the same time, an appearance of change.   
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phenomenal dynamics are arguably both the appearance of dynamics and the dynamics of 
appearance. What I am suggesting is that our experience of change is at the same time the 
changing of our experience, that our experiencing is the experiencing of itself changing.110 
The time-field metaphor is an attempt to portray the phenomenal specious present as 
something unchanged by the change taking place within it, something which somehow 
absorbs and neutralises the phenomenal dynamics within so they might take up position as 
fixed unchanging constituents of a four-dimensional stream. In contrast, I am suggesting that 
on this metaphysics, and given the underlying robust realist motivation, there can’t be an 
experience of change that leaves experience unchanged.  
Recall James, and later, Husserl’s, characterisation of the difference between experience 
being in time and it being of temporal phenomena as that between a “succession of 
appearances” and an “appearance of succession”. Although this undeniably alerted many 
philosophers for the first time to the peculiar issue of time consciousness, there is a sense in 
which it entrenched a misleading metaphor as the departure point for further enquiry. The 
term ‘succession’ denotes dimensional ordering, being just as appropriate in spatial context as 
it is in temporal contexts. While it comes quite naturally to think of time by way of spatial 
analogies, with events ordered in time much like numbers on a ruler, experience serves as the 
primary source of intransigent data for this conception of time. If change were experienced as 
a phenomenal succession relation between phenomenal contents, with the succeeded 
phenomenal content’s nature remaining intact for its having been succeeded, four-
dimensionalism would likely be pre-theoretic common sense, as opposed to being a 
counterintuitive idea accepted only on the basis of theoretical arguments.  
110 This is not to say that it is the experiencing of itself changing as the experiencing of itself changing. 
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Barry Dainton (2000 pp. 114, 159), who convincingly critiques much of Husserl’s account of 
time (and the positing of such phenomena as protentions and retentions), describing it as “a 
purely theoretical construction going far beyond the phenomenological data”, nonetheless 
subscribes to the same succession based characterisation of phenomenal temporality: “... the 
succession of thoughts and perception is itself something we experience; the succession is not 
just a succession of experiences, it is a succession within experience”. Dainton champions 
Foster’s overlap theory, albeit in a form which assumes the overlapping takes place within an 
objective time dimension, holding it to be a plausible account of how such “phenomenal 
passage” might be accommodated within a four dimensionalist framework (Dainton 2000 pp. 
165, 177). Regarding the temporal patterns instanced by individual specious presents, 
Dainton writes: 
What is the character of these temporal patterns – is it static or dynamic? The answer is clear: 
It is dynamic, the flow or passage in experience is included in the phenomenal content of 
experience. The total experience that results from my seeing a ball move between P1 and P2 
does not consist of stationary image of the ball at two different places. The content is a ball 
moving. Movement or animation is, as it were, built into the content from the start (Dainton 
2000 p. 176).  
In speaking of dynamism, movement and animation being ‘built into the content’ of 
phenomenal specious presents, Dainton is clearly using the static connotations of an 
architectural metaphor to counterbalance the dynamism he is imputing to their content. For 
all the dynamism of its content, the nature of the phenomenal specious present is fixed and 
unchanging. Yet surely this is implausible. Dainton’s view wouldn’t give rise to problems if 
the contents in question were contents these experiences merely represented. A conscious 
thought of an angry person need not be angry for instance. But the topic here is the 
phenomenal contents of such experiences, contents they embody. The phenomenal content of 
our visual field is coloured because it embodies phenomenal colours, dimensional because it 
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embodies phenomenal dimensional properties. Our experiences are likewise dynamical 
because they embody phenomenal dynamics. If Robust Realism is correct, our experiences 
can’t embody these dynamic properties and be static and unchanging anymore than our visual 
fields can embody phenomenal colour and be colourless.  
In place of such dynamics, Dainton offers us an appearance of succession. The total 
experience of a ball moving is the co-experiencing of phenomenal content comprising the 
appearance of a ball being at P1 and phenomenal content comprising the appearance of the 
same ball being at P2. The experience is said to be of the former content being succeeded by, 
or “flowing into”, the latter content, but this is not to be taken as the former content changing 
or transmuting into the latter content. The nature of the former content is unaffected by its 
being succeeded by, or flowing into, the latter content. This idea is familiar enough. It is the 
standard four-dimensionalist conception of change. The difference in this case is that 
Dainton’s is a theory of experienced change, and not merely change – he claims that we 
experience change to be this way. Clearly, this is not so. When one experiences a ball move, 
one doesn’t co-experience phenomenal contents comprising appearances of the ball being in 
however many different places.111 One experiences change in one’s visual field, where 
‘change’ is taken in its naive dynamical sense, a sense having no more of an essential 
connection with the four-dimensionalist notion of succession than phenomenal colour does 
with surface reflectance properties. Phenomenal change (like many phenomenal types, 
phenomenal space, aural phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology etc) is a primitive notion 
not susceptible to further analysis. But we are seemingly as aware of it as we are any of the 
others. In the spirit of Robust Realism, holding he is reporting on plain phenomenological 
facts, Dainton (2000 p. 178) writes “Since the phenomenal is the realm of appearance, if it 
111 In particular, one definitely doesn’t take in several distinct total states of the visual field. 
%(-!
seems to exhibit flow and passage, it does”. Whatever is to be made of the flow and passage 
Dainton speaks of, experience definitely seems to change. So the very same considerations 
should lead one to conclude that it does.  
That experiences lack the immutable nature required if they are to serve as building blocks 
for a four-dimensionalist’s time medium should, I believe, be clear from introspection. That’s 
not what they’re like, and the robust realist works on the assumption that what they’re like is 
how they are. Wiggle your fingers before your eyes. Does the token qualitative nature of the 
experience you have in doing so seem like something that might stay exactly as it is forever? 
The view that phenomenal property instances are thus staid and immutable, in conjunction 
with the robust realist commitment that experience acquaints us with the instancing of such 
properties, leads to an even stronger claim. It is not that we are experientially acquainted with 
property instances that potentially could thus ‘eternally’ exist, but rather that we are 
acquainted with their thus existing ‘eternally’. The instancing of properties in a staid and 
immutable four-dimensional reality is, after all, their eternal and immutable instancing. If 
phenomenal properties are properties of this kind, to be acquainted with anything less is to be 
acquainted with something short of their instancing.  
In summary, the same kinds of considerations typically invoked by robust realists as grounds 
for rejecting physicalism can likewise be invoked as grounds for rejecting constitution by 
properties apt to feature in a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. Physicalism, as we have seen, 
is typically rejected on the basis of a phenomenological appeal to intransigent features of 
experience, their immediacy, lack of internal structure, intrinsicality and such, in combination 
with an appeal to intuitions about what can be entailed by physical facts alone. No amount of 
topic-neutral information, it is said, can yield the kind of topic-specific information betrayed 
in experience. Something purely structural, we are told, can never entail something non-
structural. But does it not seem equally certain that the kinds of staid and immutable 
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properties populating the four-dimensionalist picture of reality could never constitute 
primitive dynamism, genuine change, of the kind we seemingly encounter in experience? 
Robust realists are seemingly obliged to reject an exhaustively four-dimensional metaphysics 
on the very same grounds that they reject physicalism. 
7.2 Presentist Cosmopsychism? 
If Robust Realism is incompatible with four-dimensionalism in any case, the question might 
arise whether a presentist cosmopsychism is in any way tenable. This would trade the 
foregoing experience of the entirety of four-dimensional space-time for a phenomenal 
manifold embodying the present state of the universe. There would be nothing specious about 
the present state of the universe as constituted by such a phenomenal manifold. The term 
‘present’, in this case, refers not to a point-like moment on a dimensional continuum, but 
rather, to whatever is in fact present in reality. The present state of the universe admits of 
genuine dynamism. The present is changing, but this is real change, not things differing at 
different points on an immutable continuum change. The universe constituting phenomenal 
manifold is both the appearance and embodiment of primitive phenomenal modes of mutation 
not subject to further analysis, be that in terms of distinct ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ components, or 
anything else. The modes of mutation themselves are present. Obviously, to experience the 
entire present state of the universe is not to experience what you or I experience and nothing 
else, so the Argument from Finitude is not seen off by this possibility. Our own experiences 
cannot exist within such a universe. But a presentist adaption of the foregoing Humean view 
might be thought worthy of consideration. Such a view, once again, would have it that in all 
instances of particular state types within the phenomenally constituted universal present, 
property instances constituting those state types appear in altogether different state types in 
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phenomenal manifolds constituting subjectivities like ours.112 Again, there would presumably 
be a strong type-type correspondence pertaining between the initial state types and the 
different state types their constitutive components feature in.   
I have no decisive argument against such a view qua metaphysical possibility. At the same 
time, I don’t think there’s much to recommend it. The robust realist wishing to retain as much 
of the naturalist picture as possible will likely object to the notion of a presentist universe 
simply because of the authority of contemporary physics which arguably supplants a neatly 
delineated space and time, separately treated, with a space-time manifold in which the two 
are inextricably constitutively linked. Any view characterising the universe as stuff merely 
distributed in space undergoing primitive non-dimensional change is likely to strike such a 
robust realist as intolerably unscientific. This is something of an inversion of an old problem. 
Russell (1954 p. 384) long ago pointed out that relativistic physics presented a problem for 
the Cartesian view that experiences, while completely non-spatial, were nonetheless in time. 
Geoffrey Lee (2007 p. 341) thinks Russell makes “a strong case for thinking that mental 
events occur in time and space”. He writes, “The only way to avoid this argument would be 
to claim that they are neither in space nor in time, but that is an extreme position – for 
example, it would make the problem of mental and physical interaction particularly 
intractable” (Lee 2007 p. 30). An extreme position this might be, but it is one the robust 
realist wishing to retain four-dimensional realism regarding the physical world seems forced 
to accept. The question of how intractable a problem it presents with respect to the problem 
of mental and physical interactions will be addressed shortly, but it is worth noting that in 
Foster we have already encountered a phenomenal realist who works under the assumption 
that experiences are primitively situated in neither time nor space. The more naturalistically 
112 The relevant state types can, and, plausibly, in many cases would, be phenomenal states of mutation, the 
property instances, likewise, instances of modes of phenomenal mutation.   
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inclined robust realist will likely wish to explore such avenues first, in hope that it might be 
possible to retain Robust Realism and scientific scruples of this kind.    
A second problem for the view is that it seemingly does away with any kind of relationship 
between the spatiality of our experiences and that of physical space by virtue of which the 
former might be said to bear a representational relationship to the latter. Jackson’s 
identification of the phenomenal dimensions possessed by object appearances in our visual 
field with those of the real objects they represent is implausible, but we surely want the two 
to stand in some kind of essential relation. Were our experiences occupants of a four 
dimensional space-time manifold, more sense might be made of the idea of space and time 
serving as the causal basis for our spatial experiences, the manifold constituting the 
appropriate kinds of correlations and intermediate pathways between our spatial and temporal 
experiences and the spatial and temporal properties of constitutively prior events. In contrast, 
the view currently under consideration has it that the present of our phenomenal manifolds is 
the very same present experienced by the universe-wide sesmet. There are no constitutively 
prior events, or causal pathways, on this view. What is present is all there is. I leave this view 
unrefuted in any strong sense, but don’t think this fact alone will earn it many adherents.  
8. Topic-neutrality, Spatiotemporal Functionalism and Nomological Constitutivism
In discussing the foregoing view we have nonetheless touched upon an issue of some 
significance, namely, that some kind of essential relation is generally presumed to pertain 
between the spatiotemporal properties we experience in our phenomenal manifolds and the 
objective spatiotemporal properties of physical objects. That objective extension, and, if the 
physical world is four-dimensional,113 duration, are never encountered in experience might be 
thought to render both extension and duration somewhat opaque. Phenomenal realists who 
113 A potential means of reconciling this with dynamism regarding experience will be discussed shortly. 
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are sensitive to the distinction between objective spatiotemporal properties and 
spatiotemporal appearances, and who are also metaphysical realists with regards to objective 
spatiotemporal properties, are wont to maintain that although we are unaware of the nature of 
such properties qua intrinsic properties of phenomenology transcendent things, we are 
nonetheless in a position describe them in topic-neutral terms.114 But as Chalmers (2012a p. 
335) points out, this would suggest that our very concept of space is a role-theoretic
functional concept. The essential connection between subjective and objective spatiotemporal 
properties is relevant here. Chalmers (2012a p. 335) writes, “On such a view, spatial concepts 
pick out that manifold of properties that serves as the normal causal basis of a corresponding 
manifold of properties in our spatial experience. Temporal concepts pick out that manifold of 
properties that serves as the normal causal basis of a corresponding manifold of properties in 
our temporal experience”. Understanding of the notion of phenomenology transcendent 
extension, for instance, doesn’t require having some “primitive grip” on a notion of extension 
that generalises beyond experienced extension (Chalmers 2012a p. 325). On the contrary, 
phenomenology-transcendent extension is a functional notion that implicates experienced 
extension. Chalmers suggests that objective spatiotemporal expressions might be “Twin-
Earthable, perhaps picking out classical properties in a Newtonian world, relativistic 
properties in a relativistic world, and string theoretic properties in a string-theory world” 
(Chalmers 2012a p. 326). Once conceptual primitivism regarding objective spatiotemporal 
properties has been abandoned, the metaphysical primitivism that has been assumed thus far 
with respect to spatiotemporal properties seems likewise open to question. We have thus far 
assumed space and time to be dimensions, with all that would ordinarily be thought to 
connote, to comprise continuous, smoothly integrated, relatively homogenous and, most of 
all, metaphysically primitive dimensional properties, and we have characterised occupation of 
114 For an example of how such topic-neutral descriptions might go, see Foster (1982 pp. 75, 76). 
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them in terms of embodying the dimensional properties they constitute or are constituted by, 
depending on whether one conceives of such dimensions in absolutist or constructivist terms. 
Foster (2008 pp. 128-144) provides an example of a situation where the functionally relevant 
manifold of properties diverges considerably from traditionally conceived dimensional 
properties, and takes the possibility of such a situation, in combination with the plausibility of 
functionalism regarding space, as reason to reject the primitive dimensional conception of 
spatial properties in favour of a more thoroughgoingly nomic conception. Foster (2008 p. 
128) asks us to envisage an external reality E comprising of time, a space S of the primitive
dimensional kind,115 mobile occupants of S, E-particles, and the E-laws governing their 
behaviour. To account for E’s “relationship to us ... as the systematic controller of our 
sensory experiences”, he posits “link laws, which make provision for, and regulate, forms of 
causal interaction between E and the realm of human mentality”, referring to link laws and E-
laws collectively as E-relevant laws. His example runs as follows: 
Let us suppose that, with one crucial exception, the E-relevant laws impose the same 
constraints on events across the whole of S and time. The exception is this. Within S there are 
two wholly separate spherical regions, R1 and R2, of the same size, and a one-to-one 
correlation C between R1 points and R2 points, such that the distances between the points in 
each region are the same as those between their C-correlates in the other, and everything is 
nomologically organised, both with respect to what takes place within E and with respect to 
the causal traffic between E and human mentality, exactly as if – by the standards of what 
would be required for organisational uniformity – R1 and R2 were C-wise interchanged (with 
each point transferred to the position, relative to the space that lies outside the regions, of its 
C-correlate) (Foster 2008 p. 129).
Foster maintains that given that all the nomological gruesomeness invoked in this scenario 
has no bearing on “empirically projected topology”, i.e. that everything relevant to the 
115 For simplicity’s sake, he conceives of S in Newtonian and absolutist terms (Foster 2008 p. 126). 
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exchanging of R1 and R2 is empirically inscrutable, it is the “functional – organisationally 
simulated – topology” born of the combination of E and the link laws, inverting the primitive 
dimensional locations of R1 and R2, that best deserves to be called physical space. This space 
isn’t a metaphysically primitive dimension. It’s a nomological construct, a system of 
constraints on experience.116 One might imagine far greater discrepancies in S’s organisation 
being ironed out at the level of the link laws, and the greater the part played by the link laws 
in the constitution of space as a nomic system, the more one might be inclined to entertain the 
possibility of doing away with S altogether. If space is a nomic system rather than a primitive 
dimension, the notion of being in space becomes somewhat metaphorical on this account. 
Being in space becomes a matter of featuring in space as a nomic economy; given that spatial 
functionalism defines space in terms of its nomic relatedness to experience, experience 
couldn’t feature more heavily.  
It might be suggested that Foster’s example be extended so as to cover temporal properties by 
replacing S with a primitive space-time dimension and replacing R1 and R2 with 
appropriately analogous space-time regions, and having link laws likewise render their 
absolute dimensional location functionally irrelevant. There are complications here, owing to 
the fact that experiences, as I have already discussed, are primitively dynamical, admitting of 
a brute phenomenal species of change that is not analysable, as four-dimensionalists would 
have it, in terms of immutable natures occupying distinct regions of an immutable time 
dimension. Presumably, the primitive space-time dimension replacing S on this account will 
be such an immutable dimension, and the events therein will be immutable events comprising 
116 Gregg Rosenberg (2004 213-217), another philosopher writing in the spirit of Robust Realism, proffers far 
more sophisticated nomologically constitutive accounts of both space and time, though they are seemingly 
premised upon a constitutive account of experience that has already been ruled out by the Constitution Thesis, 
one where properties appearing constitutively interdependent and inseperable in experience are the constitutive 
product of the bonding of ‘context independent’ instances of those self-same properties. For this reason, I won’t 
discuss them directly in text, though I discuss him further in my footnotes.     
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only of change of the latter kind. If whatever it is that constitutes the being of the link laws is 
likewise immutable, a problem emerges. Phenomenal change, one of the temporal aspects of 
experience that aspects of this immutable nomic network must causally subserve in order to 
‘play the time role’, is testament to the mutable nature of experience. It is the phenomenal 
mutating of experience’s nature. Unlike the four-dimensionalist’s change, phenomenal 
change is a changing, however small, of the nature of fundamental reality itself. It’s difficult 
to make sense of the idea of an immutable reality causally subserving this, as no alteration in 
the immutable reality corresponds to that taking place in the experience – experience moves 
from being one way against this immutable background to being another. Recall 
Wittgenstein’s aphorism that “A wheel that can turn while nothing else turns with it is not 
part of the mechanism”. The advocate of this picture might well reply that it is the turning of 
the wheel itself, the phenomenal transition, which is necessitated by the immutable reality, as 
must be the case if that reality is to play the time role. But this is no less problematic. If an 
immutable nature renders a phenomenal change’s being necessary, it does so ‘for all time’, so 
to speak, while phenomenal change, far from being immutable, is the paradigm of transience. 
If the being of phenomenal change is to be rendered necessary by an immutable nature, it 
must be re-necessitated over and over as each phenomenal change transpires, thereupon 
ceasing to be. And if infinitely many reoccurrences of every phenomenal event seems 
undesirably counterintuitive, one would do well to attribute a similarly primitive dynamism 
to whatever it is that constitutes the being of the link laws, perhaps having it that their 
experience necessitating activity constitutes, or is subject to, some kind of dynamical passage 
across S, assuming one thinks it necessary retains such a primitive dimension.  
9. Causing Consciousness
My discussion to this point is premised upon the coherence of the idea of a system of nomic 
constraints of the kind Foster envisages. Foster’s heavy duty realism about laws, which has 
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them constitutively stand apart from that which they ‘govern’, is likely to offend the 
sensibilities not only of Humeans, but also, perhaps, of the majority of contemporary 
necessitarians, who would be more inclined to claim such laws to be a function of the 
necessitating powers possessed of matter (whether grounded in its categorical nature, as 
quidditists about powers maintain, or the sum of its nature, as those that think physical 
entities are categorically ungrounded propensities maintain). But those who wish to posit 
nomological connections between phenomenal manifolds and something extrinsic to them 
could do worse than to conceive of such connections as Foster does. I have argued that 
consciousness is unable to take up position in the kind of primitive dimension that might 
serve as a “Humean mosaic” which such nomological connections might be read off. 
Moreover, while necessitarian views, on which nomological powers inhere in denizens of 
space, are intuitively attractive, this is arguably due to the fact that the nomic economy they 
support is ordinarily thought to be completely housed within space-time. That power-
quiddities or categorically ungrounded propensities located in a primitive space-time 
dimension should somehow necessitate aspects of reality which are extrinsic to that 
dimension seems no less problematic than the supposition that non-power-imbued denizens 
of such a dimension can do so in conjunction with constitutively separate laws. In fact, the 
foregoing considerations regarding the mutable nature of phenomenal change might be said 
to speak in favour of the latter view. If the power-quiddities or dispositions of the former 
view are borne by, or constitute, immutable four dimensional natures, and if their being 
renders the being of transient phenomenal existents necessary, then such existents must be 
perpetually recreated, whereas the enacting of laws might constitute, or be subject to, 
dynamical passage.  
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The unusual nature of the causal transactions under consideration on this account is coming 
into view. Regarding Cartesian causal transactions between spatial denizens and non-spatial 
minds, Lycan (2009 p. 558) writes “By now we can all tolerate action at a distance. But 
action at a distance is at least at a distance”. In the case I am currently considering, not only 
are there no primitive distance relations between consciousness and whatever serves as the 
causal basis for its phenomenally spatial content – be this a manifold of quiddistic or non-
quiddistic dimensional properties, of purely nomological properties, some combination of the 
two, or something altogether different such as an occasionalist god – there are also no 
primitive temporal relations between consciousness and whatever serves as the causal basis 
for its phenomenally temporal content. Consciousness might be said to stand in 
spatiotemporal relations by virtue of its implication in a space-time constituting nomic 
network. But this view faces difficulties similar to those facing Foster’s overlap theory. In 
order to be a constitutive account of a subjective time dimension, Foster’s overlap theory 
couldn’t have it that the overlapping of phenomenal specious presents was their overlapping 
in an objective time dimension Likewise, there can be no appeal to primitive distance 
relations, and, more importantly, no appeal to primitive relations of temporal precedence in 
the explication of the nomic relations that are constitutive of consciousness’s 
spatiotemporality. If NSSD, NSTD and the Argument from Finitude are collectively sound, 
consciousness can’t bear any such relations to anything, as it is incapable of taking up 
position in a primitive dimension. The temporal priority and spatial proximity ordinarily 
associated with causality is absent in the case of the causation of aspects of consciousness. 
Such causation is non-temporal causation at no distance whatsoever.   
The notion of a non-temporally prior cause is not without precedent, and I shall close this 
section by considering and then applying a parallel discussion in the philosophy of religion. 
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In his Second Way, Aquinas is generally thought to be speaking, not of temporally prior 
originating causes, but rather, of non-temporally-prior sustaining causes (Rowe 2007 pp. 
337, 338).117 It might then be asked what kind of priority the purported causes of aspects of 
consciousness have with regards to those aspects of consciousness in virtue of which the two 
stand in an asymmetric cause-effect relationship to each other. In setting out Aquinas’s 
Second Way, Sobel (2004 p. 179) takes the difficulty of the notion of “nontemporal 
ontological priority ” to be reason enough to replace the premises making use of that notion 
with the following premise: “If something x stands in a series of efficient causes that lead to 
y, then x is other than y”. This ensures that sustaining causes don’t “loop back on 
themselves”. Mere preservation of the irreflexive and transitive logical structure of the 
priority relation between sustaining causes and their effects might suffice for a sympathetic 
reconstruction of Aquinas’s argument, but it arguably renders the essential nature of the 
relation somewhat opaque. Soon after, Sobel (2004 p. 180) makes some attempt to shore up 
the gap:  
Whatever else they would be, sustaining causes would be necessary for the existence of the 
things they sustained. But that’s not all they would be, for they would be sustaining these 
things and so engaged in ‘activity’ somehow sufficient for their existence.  
This characterisation, taken in combination with the foregoing claim regarding the irreflexive 
and transitive nature of the non-temporal priority relation a sustaining cause holds with 
respect to its effect, offers about as much in the way of elucidation of the notion of a 
sustaining cause as I think is possible. I would, however, add one more clause. While the 
irreflexive nature of the priority relation rules against something being a sustaining cause of 
itself, it doesn’t rule against something else of which it is a mereological component being its 
sustaining cause. Were this allowed, the mereological sum of my consciousness and anything 
117 Though admittedly, these are often thought to be temporally contemporaneous with their effects. 
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else could be said to count as a sustaining cause of my consciousness, as if anything is 
necessary for the existence of my consciousness, the existence of my consciousness is – and 
the existence of my consciousness definitely suffices for the existence of my consciousness. It 
might be objected that the existence of my consciousness doesn’t constitute activity. I’d reply 
firstly by recalling Sobel’s cautionary use of scare-quotes in speaking of the activity of 
sustaining causes, and secondly by saying that while such an objection might work with 
respect to immutable natures, the being of consciousness is on a plausible robust realist 
account essentially active, and its existence in that active state surely constitutes activity that 
suffices for its existence. The functionalist about space-time doesn’t think the causal basis of 
the spatial aspects of experience is the mereological sum of the actual phenomenal being of 
those aspects of experience and anything else you like. Sustaining causes don’t constitutively 
incorporate their effects.  
But if the sustaining cause of an aspect of consciousness doesn’t constitutively incorporate 
that aspect of consciousness, how could its being, activity or whatever possibly suffice for the 
existence of that aspect of consciousness? Whatever else might be necessary for the existence 
of an aspect of consciousness, the existence of its phenomenally constitutive nature is. If the 
being or activity of the sustaining cause doesn’t incorporate this phenomenally constitutive 
nature, the existence of the aspect of consciousness in question remains a further fact. Herein 
lies the central problem with the idea of anything making an aspect of consciousness happen, 
so to speak. Something in reality supposedly serves to make the aspect of consciousness 
happen. If that something doesn’t constitutively incorporate that aspect of consciousness, it 
falls short of making the aspect of consciousness happen, as the ‘happening’ is a further fact. 
On the other hand, if it does incorporate it, rather than making it happen, it merely 
constitutively incorporates the happening, which seems to put into question the nature of the 
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relationship of sustaining causation. It might be suggested that, while that which in reality 
serves to make the aspect of consciousness happen doesn’t constitutively incorporate that 
aspect of consciousness, it nonetheless renders its existence logically necessary. The term I’d 
contest in this case is ‘renders’ which implies further necessitating activity.118 Any such 
necessitating activity deserves to count among those aspects of reality serving to make the 
aspect of consciousness happen, and once again, it either does or doesn’t constitutively 
include that aspect of consciousness.  
My objection here is not to non-Humean talk of necessary connections between matters of 
fact.119 Rather, it is to the possibility of a particular kind of nomic asymmetry between 
consciousness and anything with which it might, by logical necessity, coexist. The possibility 
being questioned here is that in which something enjoys a kind of ontological priority with 
regards to consciousness (such that consciousness’s existence is beholden to that something 
in a manner in which that something’s existence is not beholden to consciousness), and where 
this ontological priority itself affords that something causal priority over consciousness. 
Certainly this does not follow merely as a matter of what we might consider as the logic of 
the situation, which is worth setting out. If a cannot possibly exist without some entirely 
constitutively distinct b existing too, it does not follow that a makes b exist. They may well 
necessarily coexist. Perhaps, if a could exist without b, but b could not exist without a, there 
is a sense in which the existence of b might be said to be beholden to the existence of a in a 
118 Jennifer McKitrick (2006 p. 6) makes the same point with respect to Rosenberg’s use of the term ‘constrain’.
Rosenberg (2004 pp. 151, 152) claims to be concerned not with ‘causal production’, how something might “in 
some sense come “out of” another”, but with ‘causal significance’, where a “theory of causal significance … 
will be a theory of symmetric and asymmetric state-constraint between individuals. But as McKitrick (2006 p. 
6) points out, “to constrain something that is potentially A or B so that it becomes B is to cause it to become B”.
Without such a causally productive notion of constraint, Rosenberg is seemingly left with mere symmetric and
asymmetric relations of necessary coexistence, which fail, as we shall see, to account for causation.
119 Though in truth, I don’t see any reason to believe there are such connections. 
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manner that a is not to b. Yet such a possibility would in fact speak against a’s making b 
exist, as a’s existence is on this supposition perfectly compatible with b’s nonexistence. It 
might be argued that in such a case, a might nonetheless be said to have causal priority over b 
because of the modal facts: b is counterfactually dependent on a in a way that a is not on b. 
The closest possible world in which a doesn’t exist is one in which b doesn’t exist (as on this 
view it is logically necessary that a exist in order for b to exist), while the closest world in 
which b doesn’t exist need not be one in which a doesn’t exist. While it may be true that if 
such asymmetric logical coexistence relations held, they would support such counterfactuals, 
their being such arguably still wouldn’t suffice to make them relations of causal priority. 
While Humean counterfactual accounts of causation do much violence to the ordinary folk 
concept, such accounts generally sustain a workable notion of causal explanation in the face 
of the Humean premise that there are no necessary connections between matters of fact. 
Meanwhile, those who reject the Humean premise generally do so on the grounds that the 
law-constituting uniform structure of the vast Humean mosaics subserving the distinctively 
structural causal explanations proffered by Humeans is conspicuous enough to itself demand 
explanation. Humeanism, in Chalmers (2012a p. 338) words, “renders our own world a 
cosmic coincidence world on which pervasive regularities are not explained by anything 
more basic than themselves”. If there are aspects of reality A such that consciousness can’t 
exist without A existing but A can exist without consciousness existing, A’s existence does 
nothing to explain consciousness, as whether or not consciousness also exists remains a 
matter of cosmic whim. Even if one rejects the foregoing claim that the relation between 
cause and effect is essentially explanatory, it nonetheless remains plausible that the non-
Humean’s sole reason for insisting upon an inscrutable form of logical necessitation is its 
purported explanatory value. What reason might there be for postulating asymmetric logical 
coexistence relations?      
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I have thus far focused upon non-Humean forms of causation, as consciousness is unable to 
feature in a structured primitive mosaic from which Humean causal relations with it might be 
derived. But there might be thought to be another option available for the Humean. The 
Humean might maintain that the fact that, if the extra-phenomenal causes of consciousness 
didn’t exist, consciousness wouldn’t exist, is a primitive modal fact, not subject to further 
analysis. It is not true in virtue of some closeness metric between our world and one exactly 
the same but without consciousness. This is convenient, as the closeness is generally 
characterised in terms of things remaining as they are in our world prior to the point of 
divergence articulated in the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional under consideration, 
then carrying on in accordance with the laws that best describe the behaviour of things in our 
world. I have argued that consciousness can only bear temporal relations to entities or states 
of affairs if such relations are constituted by its causal relations, so there would be a problem 
of circularity in appealing to such temporal relations in explaining the causal relations 
consciousness stands in. It also isn’t true on account of the fact that in taking away the extra-
phenomenal cause, one takes away the necessitating powers that make consciousness happen, 
which is equally convenient as this idea has also been refuted. Its truth has no actual 
truthmaker. Once again, it is a primitive modal fact. This is nonetheless a strange view to 
hold. It has it that counterfactual facts about what would happen if our world were slightly 
different are in no way a function of the nature of our world. Causal facts aren’t settled by the 
nature of the actual world. Primitivism about what one might call purely modal facts, facts 
about the kinds of things that are possible and necessary, has at least some degree of intuitive 
appeal. The nature of our world has seemingly no bearing on facts about what could and 
couldn’t be. But a similar primitivism about the foregoing kinds of counterfactuals seems 
positively ludicrous. How might one come to be apprised of such primitive modal facts? 
Certainly not by empirical investigation, as supposedly, nothing in the actual world has any 
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bearing upon them. Certainly not by appeal to what is conceivable or imaginable, as taking 
modality as primitive presumably entails the severing of any kind of essential connection 
between modal facts and conceivability facts, and even if there were such a connection, it 
would presumably be between conceivability and logical possibility and necessity, and the 
view under consideration is a Humean view that makes no appeal to logical necessity. 
Anyone who actually believes that causal facts are settled in a manner entirely independent of 
actuality, given the eccentric nature of the view, has a hefty burden of proof. For this reason, 
I shall generally leave this possibility aside in the remaining discussion of the thesis. 
10. Conclusion
Robust realists aren’t in a position to invoke the metaphysical connections between 
experiences and the physical world that they typically invoke. Robust Realism rules out the 
possibility of experiences being located in a metaphysically primitive space-time manifold, 
be it non-phenomenally or phenomenally constituted. It also rules out those accounts of 
causal relations to experience that survive the extrication of experience from any such 
manifold, and, therefore, against a functionalist account of space-time grounded in such 




This chapter is dedicated to establishing a thesis regarding the logic of relations I call the 
Relations Thesis. Informally put, it is the claim that relations relate what things are. 
Whatever else might be involved in the pertaining of a relation between things, what they are 
is involved. In section 2, I put forward a slightly more scholastic formulation, intended to be 
broad enough to apply to any potential relata in any remotely plausible metaphysics that the 
robust realist might adopt.  
In section 3, I differentiate the Relations Thesis from the Axiom of Internal Relations, the 
Bradleyan doctrine that Russell and Moore famously argued against. I argue that the 
Relations Thesis is perfectly compatible with the existence of external relations, and Russell 
and Moore both appear to retain a commitment to the Relations Thesis in the wake of their 
rejection of the Axiom of Internal Relations.  
In section 4, I acknowledge that inasmuch as any potential formulation of the thesis will 
inevitably invoke some relation or other, there appears to be the potential for a kind of radical 
and systematic misunderstanding. This is a structural issue of a kind familiar in philosophical 
attempts to state global conditions that can apply to, among other things, representations. I 
then demonstrate that Sellars’ logically perspicuous language, Jumblese, shows, through its 
allegorical structure, what the Relations Thesis constitutes an attempt to say.   
In section 5, argue for the Relations Thesis through considerations of modality. My tactic 
here is to start with a weak claim, contingently applying to all actual contingent relations 
between contingent things, and then build up a stronger version of the thesis by considering 
the further relations that arise when modalities are added to the metaphysics.  
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This argumentative method faces an obvious problem, as it cannot take one beyond the 
bounds of contingency, and cannot, therefore, establish the Relations Thesis in its full 
generality. In section 6, I close the remaning gap by arguing that it is plausibly the implicit 
assumption of the very truth of the Relations Thesis that motivates postulation of the more 
canonical necessarily existent objects in the first place. If this is right, then at the very least 
there is a presumption in favour of the positing of the full Relations Thesis in any 
metaphysics within which Robust Realism is to be expressed or defended. 
2. The Relations Thesis
My initial informal construal of the Relations Thesis – Relations relate what things are – is 
likely strikes the reader as trivial. It is, which is exactly why it is a severe indictment upon a 
theory if it is at odds with it. But its very triviality might arouse suspicion that the principle 
I’ll ultimately be defending and calling philosophers out for offending against moves beyond 
it in some significant way. Perhaps the best way to allay such suspicion is to come right out 
with the most metaphysically committal version of the thesis that I might wish to endorse. 
Here it is:    
The Relations Thesis – For all relata in any relation, something that suffices for it to be 
the case that there are such relata must be involved in the pertaining of the relation. 
The admittedly awkward ‘something that suffices for it to be the case that there are such 
relata’ formulation is adopted in aid of inclusiveness, reflecting a desire for the thesis to be 
broad reaching enough to transcend any particular metaphysical commitments, applying to 
whatever entities might make their way into any remotely plausible ontology. Were the thesis 
to be restricted in scope so as to apply only to relations between concrete particulars, 
‘something that suffices to constitute the relata’ might be apt, as the constitutive nature of 
concrete particulars suffices for their existence. But some are committed to the existence of 
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things without constituents, and hence without constitutive natures, e.g. unstructured 
abstracta. Likewise, if the thesis were restricted in scope to relations between things that 
actually exist, ‘something that suffices for it to be the case that the relata exist’ would suffice, 
but Meinongians maintain that, in some sense, there are non-existent objects.120  
I might be said to stray slightly from the initial informal construal of my thesis with the 
formulation just discussed inasmuch as it might be maintained that there are things such that 
whatever suffices for the fact that they are isn’t what they are. It might be maintained, for 
instance, that there are fictional things so long as human beings engage in the practices of 
fiction production, consumption etc, but that neither those practices nor anything comprising 
them are what fictional things are. Were this the correct metaphysics of fictional objects, the 
truth of the Relations Thesis would still allow for relations between things the pertaining of 
which doesn’t involve what they are. But note that this makes the Relations Thesis weaker 
than the initial construal, not stronger. Relations between things involve what those things are 
or whatever accounts for the fact that they are. The Relations Thesis can be seen as 
implicating truthmakers for the claims that there are the relevant relata in the fact of the 
pertaining of any relation. The pertaining of a relation between a concrete object, a 
structureless universal and a Meinongian object, if there can in fact be such a relation, must 
involve aspects of reality accounting for the existence of the concrete object and the 
structureless universal, along with something making it true that there is such a Meinongian 
object.      
The terms ‘must’ and ‘can’ in the Relations Thesis are intended to elevate it to the status of a 
conceptual cum logical claim, whatever that amounts to. It’s not just that every relation that 
does in fact pertain happens to be such that its pertaining involves the relevant truthmakers. 
120 For a defence of Meinongianism, see Routley (1980). 
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Rather, such involvement is part of what it is for a relation to pertain. The claim is intended to 
be stronger even than the claim that for all relations pertaining in all possible worlds their 
pertaining involves the relevant truthmakers, as it is meant to apply equally to relations that 
hold across and between such worlds. If some world is the closest possible world to ours 
where Mitt Romney wins the 2012 election, a relation pertains between that world and ours, 
and something sufficing for the existence of our world, as well as something sufficing for 
whatever mode of existence the relevant possible world has, will be involved in its pertaining. 
Likewise, if Romney’s counterpart in that world is more corrupt than Romney, a relation 
pertains between Romney and his counterpart, and once again this involves aspects of reality 
sufficient for the mode of being each of the two presidential candidates has. 
3. The Axiom of Internal Relations
The Relations Thesis might be thought to look dangerously similar to the infamous ‘axiom of 
internal relations’ criticised by Russell and Moore. Such a thought, though mistaken, 
wouldn’t be entirely unjustified, as superficially speaking, there is a resemblance. Consider 
the following characterisation of the axiom by Russell (1994 p. 139):   
‘Every relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms.’ Let us call this the axiom of 
internal relations. If this axiom holds, the fact that two objects have a certain relation implies 
complexity in each of the two objects, i.e. it implies something in the ‘natures’ of the two 
objects, in virtue of which they have the relation in question.    
Much of this description of the axiom could be taken to communicate what I wish to 
communicate with the Relations Thesis. There is a sense in which I think it trivially true that 
“every relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms” and that there is “something in 
the ‘natures’ of the [related] objects, in virtue of which they have the relation in question” 
(Russell 1994 p. 139). But taken in the sense in which I would take them to be true, such 
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claims are in no way incompatible with the position Russell (1994 p. 139) directly contrasts 
with that which he takes the axiom to express: 
According to the opposite view, which is the one that I advocate, there are such facts as that 
one object has a certain relation to another, and such facts cannot in general be reduced to, or 
inferred from, a fact about the one object only together with a fact about the other object 
only: they do not imply that the two objects have any complexity, or any intrinsic property 
distinguishing them from two objects which do not have the relation in question. 
The position Russell advocates is only at odds with the view that every relation is grounded 
solely in the natures of the related terms, that there is something in the natures of the objects 
solely in virtue of which they have the relation in question, the view that every relation is 
‘intrinsic to its relata’, to appropriate Lewis’s (1999 p. 26) terminology. I definitely don’t 
think it trivial that relations are intrinsic to their relata. In fact, like Russell, I think it 
mistaken. I merely think there is a trivial sense in which every relation is at least partially 
grounded in the natures of the related terms, for concrete particulars, their nature qua 
concrete particulars, for property instances, their nature qua property instances, for properties 
qua universals, their nature qua universals, for non-existents, their nature qua non-existents, 
and so on, and I take what suffices for it to be the case that there are such terms to be 
determinative of the requisite natures. On this score, Russell appears to be in complete 
agreement with me. Shortly after having given the axiom of internal relations short shrift, he 
claims that a judgement “that two terms have a certain relation” is true inasmuch as there is a 
corresponding “complex object” which “consists of the two terms related by the relation” 
(Russell 1994 p. 158 emphasis mine). In speaking of the related terms, he clearly means the 
related things themselves, so the truth-making object he speaks of consists of them, what they 
are, or, in the least, their natures in the foregoing sense. Their natures partially or wholly 
ground the relation by partially or wholly comprising that object.      
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Might this be the kind of grounding relation that Moore (1922 p. 309) is speaking of when he 
issues the following comments at the end of his famous rebuttal of the axiom? 
Yet it is worth noting, I think, that there is another sense of “grounded” in which it may quite 
well be true that every relational property is grounded in the nature of any term which 
possesses it. Namely that, in the case of every such property, the term in question has some 
quality without which it could not have had the property. In other words that the relational 
property entails some quality in the term, though no quality in the term entails the relational 
property.  
It might be argued that my grounding requirement is more basic. It is not that possession of a 
relational property requires that a thing have some quality or other, it is that it requires that 
very thing, or its nature in the foregoing sense. To attribute a property to something, relational 
or otherwise, might not be tantamount to positing it qua existent, as Kant (2007 pp. 504, 505) 
famously claimed, but it is nonetheless the positing of it qua whatever kind of thing it is. 
Having said this, I think it reasonably obvious that my grounding requirement is entailed by 
Moore’s. The quoted passage appears shortly after Moore (1951 p. 308) has drawn a 
distinction between a thing’s qualities and its relational properties. For something to have a 
quality, taken in Moore’s sense, is presumably for an aspect of reality making for the 
instancing of such a quality to be an inherent part of an aspect of reality making for the being 
of that something. If the aspect of reality making for the instancing of the quality, taken alone 
or in conjunction with other aspects of reality, doesn’t make for the being of that something, 
then they surely can’t be said to be qualities of it. In saying this, I have weighed in on a 
metaphysical debate. I have assumed that there is no real distinction between a thing and 
what Moore calls its qualities. To quote Galen Strawson (2006b p. 207), “‘Inherence in a 
substance’ is ... a dummy phrase used simply to express the fact that the properties or 
attributes in question are concretely instantiated (‘exist’)”. It might instead be maintained that 
quality possession is a matter of an instantiation relation pertaining between a quality qua 
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universal and a thing qua bare particular. In such a case, Moore’s grounding requirement 
arguably doesn’t entail mine, as the possibility of such an instantiation relation pertaining 
without implicating what makes for the being of the quality instantiated or the thing 
instantiating it hasn’t been ruled out (that’s what my grounding requirement does). I do not 
think the truth of the Relations Thesis in any way beholden to the truth of either account of 
quality possession; if the latter account is correct, then I think the Relations Thesis true of all 
relations including instantiation relations between universals and bare particulars. I could just 
as easily take the metaphysically inclusive high road here as well, but I think it worth noting 
that inasmuch as I am assuming Robust Realism regarding qualia in this thesis, I am 
assuming the truth of the former account. In experience we encounter categorical phenomenal 
property instances, not some nexus between phenomenal properties qua universals and the 
bare particular that is the experience possessing them. It’s difficult to imagine why anyone 
whose metaphysics allowed for a non-relational property-instance-based account of quality 
possession in some cases might revert to a relational universal-and-bare-particular-based 
account at some other point.     
Whether or not Moore is tacitly endorsing the Relations Thesis in the passage cited above, the 
asymmetry of entailment he appeals to is the crucial factor in distinguishing that thesis from 
the axiom of internal relations. Involvement is a not a symmetric notion; taking a bath 
involves getting wet, but getting wet needn’t involve taking a bath. Likewise, that the 
pertaining of a relation necessarily involves what suffices for it to be the case that each of its 
relata exist, subsist, or whatever, doesn’t in any way imply that what thus suffices necessarily 
involves the pertaining of that relation. The claim that what thus suffices for the relata does in 
fact necessarily involve the pertaining of the relation is a more accurate rendering of the 
axiom of internal relations than that provided above by Russell. Moore characterises the 
axiom thusly: “in the case of every relational property, it can always be truly asserted of any 
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term A which has that property, that any term which had not had it would necessarily have 
been different from A”. In case the difference isn’t immediately clear, Russell characterises 
the axiom as the claim that all relations are intrinsic to their relata taken collectively, Moore 
as the claim that all relations are intrinsic to their relata taken individually. On this 
characterisation, every relation a thing has might be described as essential to and constitutive 
of its nature, taken in the foregoing sense. My piano’s maintaining whatever distance from 
the moon it does is something to which it owes its being, as anything not that distance from 
the moon would not be my piano.   
Like Moore, and most philosophers that followed him, I think this view mistaken. Anything 
not the same distance from the moon as my piano is not my piano, as my piano, as a matter of 
fact, is that distance from the moon. But to say that anything not that distance from the moon 
wouldn’t be my piano is an altogether different claim, a false one. Countless possible 
situations in which that distance relation is tinkered with leave my piano intact. In contrast, 
all situations bereft of appropriate counterparts to the localised intrinsic spatiotemporal 
components of my piano are situations in which my piano doesn’t exist. The Relations Thesis 
only claims that a constitutively sufficient set of those spatiotemporal components must be 
involved in the pertaining of any relation with my piano, not absolutely everything. That 
absolutely everything is thus involved is plausibly entailed by the axiom, as everything bears 
some relation or other to everything else, and, according to the axiom, owes its being to doing 
so, though it admittedly only follows that absolutely everything is therefore involved if the 
Relations Thesis holds as well. I think it likely that most advocates of the axiom would also 
have subscribed to the Relations Thesis, if only because it is intuitively highly plausible and 
I’ve found explicit rejection of it nowhere.121 But the Relations Thesis is equally compatible 
121 In Bradley’s case, a better reason would be that the intuition that relations must implicate their relata is 
arguably the engine of his infamous regress. 
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with rejection of the axiom, and taken in combination with such rejection it preserves the 
intuitive asymmetry of the part-whole relation. Absolutely everything owes its existence to 
every little thing, but every little thing doesn’t owe its existence to absolutely everything. As 
Moore (1922 pp. 288-289) pointed out, the axiom nullifies this intuitive asymmetry, as it 
arguably would the intuitive non-symmetry of involvement, taken in its most general sense. If 
the axiom were true, A’s involving B would be a relational fact belonging to B’s very nature. 
B’s nature would involve A’s involvement with it, plausibly thereby involving A itself 
(though once again, the plausibility of A’s involvement with B involving A itself is 
something I’m yet to argue for). 
4. A Communicability Issue
Enough has been said regarding the axiom of internal relations. At this point I wish instead to 
draw attention to a problem concerning the very communicability of the Relations Thesis. As 
should be clear from the last sentence of the previous section, involvement itself is a non-
symmetric relation. The Relations Thesis appeals to this particular non-symmetric relation in 
order to make the universal claim about all relations I wish to make, but other non-symmetric 
relations would have done just as well. My initial informal construal simply had it that 
relations relate what their relata are. Elsewhere, I have spoken of relations implicating their 
relata and of relata grounding the pertaining of relations. I have also taken Russell’s claim 
that relational claims are made true by a corresponding complex object which, among other 
things, consists of the relevant relata, as tacit endorsement of the Relations Thesis. If I might 
avail myself of the language of facts without this being taken as indicative of a commitment 
to the existence of facts qua semantic abstracta, I’d also be just as happy to construe my 
thesis in terms of supervenience: 
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The Relational Facts Supervenience Thesis – All relational facts necessarily supervene 
either solely upon facts sufficing for it to be the case that there are the relata those 
relational facts relate, or upon such facts in combination with other facts.     
But inasmuch as I invoke any such relations in formulating my theses I might be said to fall 
short of communicating what I wish to communicate, as it is not my intention to highlight an 
entailment between all relations and some particular relation, involvement, supervenience or 
whatever, but rather, to highlight a fact about the structure of relations themselves. The 
Relations Thesis says an involvement relation necessarily pertains between the pertaining of 
any relation and stuff that accounts for the being, subsistence, or whatever of its relata. It 
might be thought possible for someone to agree that this is so but miss the point entirely, 
thinking the pertaining of the involvement relation itself doesn’t implicate its relata in the 
manner I intend to claim all relations do. It involves them, as this is supposedly the case with 
regards to the pertaining of any relation whatsoever, but the relation of involvement itself 
isn’t relata implicating. Obviously, it won’t do to make a further clause that involvement 
implicates its relata, as implication is but another relation the pertaining of which might be 
thought not to incorporate its relata in the manner I intend to convey. The same goes for 
supervenience. The supervenience relation which the Relational Facts Supervenience Thesis 
claims holds between all relational facts and the sufficiency facts it cites might be thought not 
to involve, implicate, incorporate etc, both the relational fact and the sufficiency facts. Every 
attempted ostension towards features intrinsic to relation instances might instead be taken as 
saying all such instances possess some incomprehensibly wholly extrinsic relational property. 
Having said all this, I think it highly unlikely that any of the foregoing formulations have 
induced any such Bradleyan vertigo. I’m sure every construal of the thesis has been taken in 
the manner intended. I am sure of this because I think nobody so forlorn a thinker as to think 
relational facts are thus disunified. It is nonetheless noteworthy that were it the case that 
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someone conceived of relations as being other than how I intend the above theses to say they 
are, there is every chance that no attempted formulation of my thesis would suffice to 
communicate what I intend to that person. I might do well to abandon language in favour of 
some non-discursive form of demonstration, say, hitting him or her with a stick like a Zen 
master. Perhaps I might thereby show what I cannot say.  
There is in fact a case to be made to the effect that the purported communicability issue under 
discussion hinges upon a distinction between saying and showing. Regarding the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, Sellars (1962 p. 12) writes, “If one so uses the term ‘ineffable’ 
that to eff something is to signify it by using a name, then Wittgenstein’s view would be that 
what are ordinarily called relations are ineffable”. Claims which, due to our ordinary 
language’s lack of grammatical perspicuity, purport to mention them merely “call attention to 
those features of discourse about what is or is not the case in the world which ‘show 
themselves’, i.e. are present in a perspicuous language not as words, but in the manner in 
which words are combined” (Sellars 1962 p. 9). In Sellars’s perspicuous language, Jumblese, 
to represent that n objects satisfy an n-adic concept, for any n>1, one simply concatenates 
their names somehow, without invoking any further signs. To represent that a single object 
satisfies a monadic concept, one writes the name for that object in some particular style, 
colour or font. The claims ‘a is higher than b’, ‘a is fat’, ‘a is between b and c’ and ‘a is 
leaning’ might be respectively expressed as follows: 
a
b a bac a 
Jumblese’s perspicuity is born of its allegorical structure – with the objects as with their 




Assuming the Relations Thesis understood, what might be said in its favour other than that it 
seems obvious to the point of being trivial? To begin with, I’d like to make the case for the 
plausibility of the following restricted version of the Relations Thesis: 
The Contingently Existing Actual Relations Thesis – The pertaining of any contingently 
existing actual122 relation between contingently existing actual things involves123 
aspects of reality sufficient for the being of each related thing.  
The plausibility of this claim can be brought into view by considering the closest possible 
situation to the actual situation in which some such relation pertains that lacks counterparts 
for whatever makes for the actual existence of one of the relata, i.e. a situation identical 
except that one of the relata doesn’t exist. I am less than five meters from my piano at 
present. Plausibly, the closest possible situation to the actual situation that makes this so and 
that lacks my piano is one qualitatively identical in all respects but that it lacks counterparts 
for the constituents of my piano. My counterpart in that situation most definitely wouldn’t be 
five meters from his piano. He might be five meters from some Meinongian non-existent 
piano, but that is a relation of an altogether different kind. At present, I am only concerned 
with relations the pertaining of which might be said to supervene solely upon contingent 
actuality. There are many such relations, infinitely many perhaps, and in every case, simple 
modal considerations of the foregoing kind suffice to demonstrate the role the being of their 
relata plays in their pertaining. The closest situation to any actual situation in which such a 
relation pertains that lacks a counterpart for one of the actual relata is a situation in which the 
122 The intended contrast class for ‘actual’ is ‘possible’. What actually exists is what categorically exists in the 
world, i.e. universe, in which we exist. This usage originates with Lewis (1970 pp. 184, 185).  
123 Note the lack of a logical ‘must’.  
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relation doesn’t pertain. This is surely testament to the difference making power of the being 
of the relata.  
Working outwards from this result, consider a theory of fictional objects according to which 
the being of actual fictional objects, the objects of the contingently existing fictional lore of 
the actual world, is sustained solely by the contingent being of that fictional lore. Given such 
a theory, the same means of demonstration could be used to show that contingently existing 
actual relations between actual fictional objects and contingently existing actual objects, or 
other actual fictional objects for that matter, always implicate what makes for the being of 
each relata. It is contingently the case that John Lennon did less detective work than Sherlock 
Holmes. That such an asymmetric relation pertains between Lennon and Holmes is true, 
assuming the foregoing theory, solely on account of how contingent actuality is. Presumably, 
in a world with identical fictional lore about Holmes but in which Lennon’s counterpart does 
more detective work than is attributed to Holmes in that lore, or one where Lennon remain 
the same but the counterpart lore about Holmes has it that he never managed to secure a case, 
this is not so. Given such an account of actual fictional objects, the same modal 
considerations as above suffice to demonstrate that what makes for the being of Lennon and 
Holmes is involved in the pertaining of the relation. Note that the fictional nature of actual 
fictional objects isn’t doing any special work here. The result clearly generalises so as to 
apply to things of any kind so long as their being is solely sustained by aspects of contingent 
actuality. Assuming an actualist constructivism about propositions, according to which the 
being of propositions is sustained by the contingencies of actual linguistic practices, or an 
actualist constructivism regarding numbers, according to which the being of numbers is 
sustained by the contingencies of actual mathematical practices, or perhaps even an actualist 
Meinongianism, according to which facts about non-existent objects are sustained by the 
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contingencies of naturalised and nominalistic intentional facts, the same would be true of 
contingent actual relations between and with them. 
Moving further outwards again, the same counterfactual considerations suffice to show that 
all non-actual contingent relations between non-actual contingent existents, fictions, 
constructively-sustained-abstracta etc, non-necessary relations between non-necessary 
existents, fictions, constructively-sustained-abstracta etc in merely possible worlds, are such 
that their pertaining involves what makes for the being of their relata. One merely need 
consider the closest possible situations to the possible situation in which any such relation 
pertains bereft of counterparts for what makes for the being of any one of its relata. In every 
such case, the relation will not pertain. The upshot of all this is that in every possible world, 
all contingent relations between contingent existents, fictions, constructively-sustained-
abstracta etc involve what makes for the being of their relata, and if something is true in all 
possible worlds, it is necessary. We have regained our logical ‘must’, thereby establishing the 
following thesis:  
The Contingent Relations Between Contingents Thesis – All contingent relations 
between contingent things of any kind must involve something sufficient for it to be the 
case there are such things.  
6. Special Philosophers Objects
The problem now becomes that of moving further outwards, beyond the bounds of 
contingency, so as to take in all those other objects metaphysicians are wont to postulate, 
objects purported to somehow transcend the play of contingent matters of fact, objects 
purported to be necessarily existent. Most philosophers don’t subscribe to the actualist 
psychologism about numbers mentioned previously. On the contrary, many think 
mathematical truths transcend not only the contingencies of human mathematical practices, 
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but contingency writ large, being made true by a mathematical reality that likewise 
transcends contingency writ large (Benacerraf & Putnam 1983 pp. 18, 19, 261). Many also 
maintain that to think is to entertain one of an infinite number of propositions the existence of 
which also transcends contingency writ large (Loux 2006 p. 126). A select number go so far 
as to maintain that all illogical objects such as round squares have some peculiar mode of 
being that likewise transcends contingency writ large (Nolan 2013 pp. 369, 370). The 
necessary existence of such objects, or, in the case of the aforementioned illogical objects, the 
necessity of their having whatever mode of being they are meant to have, rules against the 
possibility of extending the same method of demonstration used previously. This method 
involved an appeal to the possibility of the non-being of one of the relata in some relational 
fact in order to show difference making power of the aspects of reality making for the being, 
subsistence, or whatever, of that relata. We have no such possibilities to appeal to in this case, 
as the non-being of a necessarily existent object is an out-and-out impossibility. A different 
means of demonstration will be required if we are to reach out into the domain of the 
necessarily existent. 
I think there is a way forward here. It involves an appeal to the motivations for postulating 
the being of such objects. Why do philosophers postulate universals? Because different things 
can have something in common. But why must that something exist? Well, because if it 
doesn’t exist, it can’t be what they have in common. Why not? Well, to be a feature of 
something, something must be. Why? Why must a universal exist in order for a particular to 
instantiate it? At this point, an appropriate response would likely give voice to the intuition 
the Relations Thesis intends to give voice to. For something to instantiate something, the 
thing it instantiates must exist. Obviously, this claim lacks the generality of the Relations 
Thesis, being specifically concerned with the relation of instantiation, rather than relations in 
general, but the intuition that it is so is unlikely to be based on some special knowledge of the 
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purported instantiation relation, as that is shrouded in mystery. Rather, it is likely to be based 
on the intuition that a thing can no more instantiate something else without that something 
else than it can scrub, love, be taller than or distance itself from something else without that 
something else. 
Were it considered possible for particulars to actually instantiate universals without there 
being universals, for thoughts and linguistic acts to actually express propositions without 
there being propositions, for thoughts to actually be directed towards illogical objects without 
there being illogical objects, surely there would be countless philosophers saying we can have 
it all, so to speak, at no ontological cost. Nominalist reconstruction of abstracta talk is, after 
all, a thankless task of questionable success. Likewise, if intentional relations to non-existent 
objects could be had without it being the case that there were such objects, why would 
anyone contend with the difficulties that beset Meinongian metaphysics. That there aren’t 
countless philosophers saying such things is suggestive of an implicit commitment to the 
claim that any relation’s being borne to a thing requires that very thing. Such objects are 
among Philosophy’s more controversial creations. Whenever they are postulated, it is 
because they are thought to do some kind of theoretical work, featuring somehow in 
explanations of more mundanely familiar phenomena, not just to idle away in their own 
intrinsic glory.124 The purportedly explanatory relation they are said to bear to mundane 
reality prompts their postulation, and it need not do so unless the Relations Thesis is true. 
7. Conclusion
The Relations Thesis plausibly articulates a logical truth about the nature of relations. For all 
relata in any relation, something that suffices for it to be the case that there are such relata 
must be involved in the pertaining of the relation.  




This chapter examines another aspect of the Robust Realist program, the nexus between 
experience and representation. In section 2, I discuss the entailment and exclusion relations 
that hold between key tenets of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP) and 
various views premised upon an external-relation-based characterisation of acquaintance. 
This motivates a critical evaluation of PIRP’s central tenet, the claim that experiences possess 
real intentionality qua experienced.    
In section 3, I present a basic argument against the claim that the intrinsic constitution of 
experiences can suffice for the pertaining of straightforward aboutness relations between 
those experiences and things belonging to a constitutively extrinsic reality. This is intended to 
demonstrate the challenge the Relations Thesis presents to phenomenally grounded 
intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality isn’t generally characterised in terms of primitive 
aboutness relations, but rather, in terms of narrow non-object-involving content, with narrow 
contents typically characterised as semantic abstracta.  
After some scene-setting in section 4, in section 5 I then argue that if abstract objects aren’t 
constitutively identical to phenomenally revealed property instances, the Relations Thesis is 
inconsistent with the claim that relations to abstract objects are phenomenally revealed. In 
section 6, I then argue that such contents cannot be nominalistically reduced to anything that 
might be experientially given. 
In section 7, I address the two major objections to the foregoing arguments. One is an 
objection deriving from the experiential phenomenon of experiencing things as instances of 
objective types. I contend that the objection rests upon a familiar fallacy of phenomenological 
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description that can be remedied by attending to such phenomenology. The second is an 
objection made by David Chalmers, premised upon our supposed knowledge of the kinds of 
things we are capable of representing. In reply, I argue that an appeal to such knowledge 
would be question begging in this context.  
In the final three sections of the chapter I then consider Robust Realism in relation to the 
claim that experiences possess real intentionality qua experienced.  In section 8, I present my 
reasons for rejecting this claim, and in section 9 I use this result to argue that if robust realists 
are to save the representational relations between phenomenal states and phenomenal 
judgements that their position is premised upon, they must endorse an external-relation-based 
account of acquaintance. In section 10, I then use the conclusions of chapter 4 with respect to 
spatial and causal connectedness to highlight the difficulty of accounting for the unmediated 
acquaintance relation such a view postulates. I consider and reject three other candidate 
relation types the robust realist might seek recourse in: phenomenal relations (section 10.1), 
shared phenomenal content relations (section 10.2) and comparative relations (section 10.3). I 
conclude, as a result of the survey undertaken in the chapter, that the costs incurred by the 
robust realist in explaining intentionality put the view into serious question.  
2. Three Key Theses: PI, OI and AM
In the introduction of his recent edited volume entitled Phenomenal Intentionality, Uriah 
Kriegel (2013 p. 2) speaks of a newly emergent research program, the Phenomenal 
Intentionality Research Program, or PIRP, that is premised upon the idea that there is a kind 
of “intentionality a mental state has purely in virtue of its phenomenal character”. To say that 
mental states are possessed of intentionality purely in virtue of their phenomenal character 
would suggest that such intentionality is something their phenomenal character has qua 
experienced. The ink formations on this page are identical to sentence tokens, but not qua ink 
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formations. Rather, they are identical to sentence tokens qua participants in a Wittgensteinian 
‘form of life’ or some such. Advocates of PIRP, PIRPers herein, take such intentionality to be 
an experientially given aspect of phenomenal states, on par with their supposed intrinsicality, 
unity, dynamism and so forth. In short, it would seem that PIRPers endorse the following 
claim:  
Phenomenal Intentionality (PI) – Experiences admit of intentionality, real intentionality 
(a qualification I’ll explain shortly), in virtue of their being experienced.125  
In Chapter 1, I briefly discussed how there is a push among contemporary phenomenal 
realists to reverse the damage done to the notion of phenomenology by their forebears, most 
notably with respect to the elimination of those aspects of phenomenology one would be 
intuitively inclined to refer to as cognitive, conceptual, intentional and such. Once the 
existence of such phenomenology is acknowledged, as it plausibly must be if one is to abide 
by robust realist scruples, the emergence of questions regarding the contribution, if any, such 
phenomenology might make to actual bona fide conception, intentionality and such is almost 
inevitable. PI is one possible answer to the question of the relation between intentional 
phenomenology and actual intentionality, i.e. that phenomenal intentionality is a species of 
actual objective intentionality.   
Given that PI attributes such intentionality to experiences qua experienced, their possession 
of it must be secured by their experienced nature alone, at least so long as we are assuming 
Robust Realism, which affords their experienced nature no further extra-experiential 
constituents. Such intentionality must therefore be underived, owing its existence to no 
125 Not all proponents of phenomenal intentionality endorse PI. Strawson (2010 pp. 342-344), for instance, is 
sure to make clear that he doesn’t take what he calls “cognitive EQ (experiential qualitative) content” to be 
genuine cognitive content. For Strawson (2010 pp. 343-346), cognitive EQ content only comprises a “sense” or 
“conception” in virtue of its manner of participation in a wider economy, not simply in virtue of its being 
experienced. Proponents of PI include McGinn (1997 pp. 300-303), Kriegel (2003 p. 288) and Chalmers (2010 
pp. 398, 436; 2012b pp. 6, 7).   
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further facts, intentionality-laden or otherwise. Not only do PIRPers maintain that the 
intentionality attributed by PI is underived, they think it is the sole form of underived 
intentionality, so they also subscribe to the following thesis: 
Original Intentionality (OI) – For all forms of intentionality that aren’t the kind of 
experienced intentionality PI speaks of, it is only by virtue of some relation they bear to 
actual or possible instances of intentionality that are of the kind PI speaks of that they 
are forms of intentionality at all.  
It is this further commitment to OI that allows PIRP to constitute a research program. Kriegel 
(2013 p. 1) contrasts PIRP with the ‘Naturalist-Externalist Research Program’, or NERP, 
which has been the predominant research program dedicated to the understanding of 
intentionality since the late seventies. These two research programs are dedicated to 
exploring two different prospective means by which intentionality might be “injected into the 
world”, two different prospective sources of original intentionality (Kriegel 2013 pp. 2, 3). 
NERPers think “intentionality makes its first appearance on the scene” when certain 
“tracking relations” hold between physical states of organisms, more often than not, their 
brain states, and states of their wider environment (Kriegel 2013 p. 2). PIRPers, in contrast, 
think the experientially given intentionality PI testifies to is the sole form of original 
intentionality on which all other forms of intentionality are parasitic. Kriegel (2013 p. 3) 
writes, “once this phenomenal character appears, and brings in its train “original 
intentionality,” intentionality can be “passed around” to things lacking this (or any) 
phenomenal character”.  
Regarding prospective means of justifying PI, Kriegel (2013 p. 7) writes, “One consideration 
unlikely to win converts but central in motivating sympathizers is the idea that phenomenal 
intentionality is simply introspectively manifest: attending to one’s stream of consciousness 
in the right way brings out that some conscious episodes are intentional”. For anyone aware 
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aware of Kriegel’s commitments, this will seem an affirmation of PI premised upon 
phenomenological acquaintance with the aspects of experience that supposedly make PI true. 
But ‘introspection’ means different things to different philosophers. Some philosophers use it 
to refer to events occurring within phenomenology, the phenomenon of introspection, while 
others take it to be an operation performed on, or with respect to, experience, by a mind that 
is somehow acquainted with experience without being a constitutive part of it, the 
introspection of phenomena. To explain the project of “rational reconstruction” undertaken in 
the Aufbau, Carnap (1967 § 101) offers a fictitious account of a subject who “during the first 
part of his life, merely absorbs the given, without working upon it, and then, in the second 
part of his life, synthesizes the retained material ... without absorbing, during this part of his 
life, any more of the given”. Inasmuch as the subject’s operations on the given aren’t 
themselves given, the relationship between cognising subject and the phenomenal in this 
fiction is in fact an apt caricaturing of the way this relationship is actually characterised in 
much classical empiricist philosophy.126 It should nonetheless be noted that classical 
empiricists characterized acquaintance as an immediate relation, one capable of underwriting 
the kind of non-inferential knowledge of phenomenal states Robust Realism demands. The 
opaque, topic-neutral and mediated conception of the mind-experience relationship, whether 
or not it does in fact find its origins in Kant, doesn’t really take hold until the mid twentieth 
century. It would therefore appear that many classical empiricists at least tacitly assumed the 
following thesis regarding the relationship between cognition and experience: 
126 The only difference between this fiction and Carnap’s actual view, for instance, is that in the fiction it is as if 
the cognising subject’s operations also stand apart from the given temporally, somehow presiding over the entire 
objective-time-ordered array of experiences comprising his early life, rather than being locked inside this 
ordering themselves. 
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Acquainted Mind (AM) – Acquantance, the relation underwriting our non-inferential 
knowledge of phenomenal properties, is an immediate relation between experiences and 
a constitutively separate intellect.  
Many PIRPers are likely to see themselves as reversing the damage born of the historical 
influence of AM. They would likely blame its strict delineation of the cognitive and the 
phenomenal for the caricatured accounts of phenomenology that came to hold sway among 
classical empiricists. But there is a risk of overstating the tension between PIRP and AM. PI 
and OI don’t rule out the possibility of further non-phenomenal mental states that interface in 
some way with experience. Rather they stipulate that if there is a mind extrinsic to 
phenomenology that introspects phenomenology from without, that mind owes the very 
intentionality that makes it a mind to the experiences it thus introspects. This is exactly the 
opposite view to that held by those classical empiricists who characterized the visual field as 
a meaningless array of colour qualia that the acquainted intellect, in time, came to ‘take’ as 
signifying features in the external world (much as the competent English speaker, acquainted, 
in a less scholastic sense, with certain ink formations, takes them as signifying various 
properties, things, states of affairs and such). It is exactly this kind of derivative relation that 
Siewert (1998 p. 191) is speaking against when he insists that a possessor of the kind of 
original intentionality under discussion not have it by virtue of something else that ‘supplies 
it with an interpretation’.127 But the fact that classical empiricists held AM in conjunction 
with the denial of OI doesn’t render it compulsory to do so. PIRP is perfectly compatible with 
127 There is, of course, a sense in which the ink formations on this page need not be supplied with a further 
interpretation, when encountered by an English speaker, in order to mean what they mean. A competent speaker 
need not avail him or herself with any kind of interpretative cipher to extract meaning from this page. This is not 
what Siewert means: “My making a certain utterance by itself is not an intentional feature – for there must also 
obtain some condition that, as we might say, supplies it with an interpretation” (Siewert 1998 p. 191). The 
condition, in such a case, is that of there being agents who, by virtue of their having minds that are already 
somehow possessed of intentionality, have conferred the status of being a sign upon the utterance. Likewise, 
PIRPers reject any account of the intentionality of experiences that has it that an introspecting mind, already 
possessed of intentionality confers intentionality upon them. They endorse OI, the opposite thesis. 
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a deflationary version of AM, one which has it that there is a non-phenomenal mind that is 
both immediately acquainted with, and derives its intentionality from, phenomenology.  
There is likewise some risk of wrongly assuming an essential connection between PIRP and 
Robust Realism. Consider first a more ‘inflationist’ version of AM, which has it that the 
acquainted mind’s activity constitutes intentionality-laden intellection in a manner altogether 
independent of experience. Such a view would constitute the rejection of OI, and, therefore, a 
rejection of PIRP, but it would do no violence to phenomenology. Experiences might also 
possess original intentionality.  
It might nonetheless be thought that one can only adopt a ‘fully inflated’ version of AM, 
which also rejects PI, by deflating phenomenology in some way or other. But even this isn’t 
clear. Inasmuch as experiences genuinely do appear to admit of aspects one would be 
intuitively inclined to refer to as cognitive, conceptual or intentional, any phenomenal realist 
wishing to stay off Dennett’s slippery slope is compelled to concede the existence of such 
phenomenology qua phenomenology. But the further tendency among the philosophers 
reintroducing such phenomenology to take it to be, not just the appearance of thought, 
conception, intentionality and the like, but genuine thought, conception and intentionality, 
doesn’t seem likewise compulsory. Perhaps the various forms of phenomenology simply 
aren’t the objective phenomena they might be said to constitute appearances of. Perhaps they 
are merely shadows cast by the genuinely conceptual and intentionality laden activity that a 
phenomenology extrinsic mind constitutes. The sense in which the robust realist is committed 
to phenomenal properties being exactly as they appear is restricted to how they phenomenally 
reveal themselves, not what they phenomenally reveal themselves as. Experiences aren’t 
experienced as experiences. Robust Realism nonetheless has it that they are experiences. In 
contrast, they are experienced as being embedded within a world, but if the arguments in 
Chapter 4 are sound, they aren’t.  
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But PIRPers take objective intentionality to be an experientially given property of 
experiences, much like their intrinsicality or unity. If they’re right, experiences themselves 
speak against the possibility of their being mere appearances of intentionality. Indeed, to 
speak of experiences being experienced as being conceptual, intentional and the like might 
even be taken to concede the very point at issue. There is at least some prima facie 
plausibility in the suggestion that if appearances are experienced as anything at all, they are 
genuinely conceptual, as their being experienced as things is one and the same as their being 
experienced to come under concepts, and their being intentionally contentful might plausibly 
be thought to be entailed by their being thus conceptually inflected. If experiences really do 
betray objective intentionality qua experienced, the robust realist is forced to accept as much. 
Given that my primary objective is that of getting clear on the implications of Robust 
Realism, this suggests an obvious way forward for this project. We first address ourselves to 
PI, both to its phenomenological adequacy and the degree to which it is logically compatible 
with central tenets of Robust Realism, only concerning ourselves with the fully inflated 
reading of AM if it proves problematic. I will argue that it does prove problematic. In fact, I 
will be arguing that both PI and AM are untenable, and that this renders the real 
representation Robust Realism is premised upon untenable. 
3. ‘Real’ Aboutness and the Relations Thesis
The idea that experiences are possessed of an intrinsic intentionality was discussed briefly in 
Chapter 1. There I made a distinction between the phenomenon of aboutness and the 
aboutness of phenomena. The phenomenon of aboutness is something the robust realists 
cannot plausibly deny. Thought phenomenology has a pseudo-relational character whereby it 
‘connotes’ relations it doesn’t in fact embody. But the representation that PIRPers attribute to 
experience isn’t mere pseudo-representation, but rather, real representation, something more 
like the aboutness of phenomena. To straightforwardly characterize it that way would be to 
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make straw men of most, if not all PIRPers. Nonetheless, there is a useful toy example here 
by means of which one can get a basic sense of the problematic. Consider the view that the 
intrinsic constitution of experiences alone suffices for it to be the case that experiences are 
straightforwardly about altogether constitutively separate things in the external world.  
It should be relatively obvious that this contradicts the Relations Thesis. Claims to the effect 
that things are about other thing are relational claims, and in a situation where such 
constitutive independence pertains between the two relata of such a relation, the relation can’t 
pertain solely on account of the constitutive nature of one of them. Were proponents of the 
view that experiences, qua experiences, have real representational properties to characterize 
such properties as aboutness relations to extrinsic things, they would face an argument along 
the following lines: 
P1) For all things x and all relations R, if x is one of the relata of R, then something 
that suffices for the existencem of x must be involved in the pertaining of R.  
P2) For any phenomenal state s and any other thing y, if y is constitutively extrinsic 
to s, then the existence of s’s experienced nature, or any part thereof, doesn’t 
suffice for the existencem of y.  
C1) For all things x, all relations R, and any phenomenal state s, if x is one of the 
relata of R, then  x is constitutively extrinsic to s only if something that isn’t s’s 
experienced nature, or any part thereof, is involved in the pertaining of R. 
P3) For all phenomenal states s and relations R, s can constitute the phenomenal 
revelation of R only if everything involved in the pertaining of R is s’s 
experienced nature or a part thereof.  
P4) For any relation R of the form ‘y is about z’, y and z are relata of R. 
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C2)  For any relation R of the form ‘y is about z’, if y is a phenomenal state and z is 
something constitutively extrinsic to y, y cannot constitute the phenomenal 
revelation of R.  
A thing’s ‘existencem’ is simply its existence so long as it does in fact exist. In the case of a 
Meinongian object, its existencem is something minimally sufficient for it to be the case that 
there is such an object (hence the ‘m’ subscript). P1 in this argument is the Relations Thesis. 
As for P2, Robust Realism has it that the experienced nature of any phenomenal state is 
identical to its constitutive nature. If one substitutes ‘constitutive nature’ for ‘experienced 
nature’, P2 plausibly articulates a conceptual truth, what it means for something to be 
constitutively extrinsic to something else. P3 returns us to the considerations of Chapter 3. 
The pertaining of a relation is the existence of that relation, and something’s existence is only 
phenomenally revealed inasmuch as something sufficient for its existence is phenomenally 
revealed. P4 is arguably a trivial definitional truth. On the assumption of Robust Realism, the 
argument seems both valid and sound, and its conclusion denies that the intrinsic constitution 
of experiences can suffice for the pertaining of straightforward aboutness relations between 
those experiences and things belonging to a constitutively extrinsic reality.     
This is the challenge for PIRPers. Intentionality is generally characterised in terms of 
relations of aboutness, directedness and such. Kriegel (2013 p. 17) characterizes the problem 
of identifying “the kind of phenomenal character whose appearance injects intentionality into 
the world” as that of identifying “the phenomenal signature of directedness”. He even goes so 
far as to suggest that phenomenal directedness might be a “sui generis phenomenal feature” 
(Kriegel 2013 p. 18). For such talk not to be in violation of the Relations Thesis, one would 
assume that it must be either a merely experience-internal relation between experience-
internal aspects, in which case it plausibly doesn’t pertain to the ‘real’ world in the desired 
manner, or an aspect of experience qua participant in ‘wider’ facts, in which case it’s not an 
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aspect of experience qua experienced, or a mere phenomeno-notional pseudo-relation, which 
likewise doesn’t pertain to the ‘real’ world in the desired manner. PIRPers seemingly think 
there’s another option here, a kind of directedness pertaining to experience that isn’t a 
straightforward instantiation of a two place relation between experience and what it is 
directed at, but that isn’t merely the instantiation of a phenomenal property that phenomeno-
notionally ‘connotes’ a kind of relatedness that isn’t in fact instantiated. The phenomenal 
appearance of world-representation is, at the same time, the world-representation of 
phenomenal appearance. Somehow, experiences manage to intrinsically achieve some kind of 
purchase on extrinsic reality. How might this be done? 
4. Narrow Contents
To be clear, no proponent of PIRP endorses the view that experiences represent extrinsic 
reality in the crude form I have outlined – that is, by instantiating a primitive aboutness 
relation to constitutively extrinsic things. Firstly, there is general acknowledgement of the 
fact that Russellian representation – ‘wide’, “object-involving” representation – can’t be 
secured solely by virtue of the phenomenal nature of experience (Chalmers 2010 p. 356). 
Rejection of this possibility is presumably premised upon tacit acknowledgement of 
something akin to the Relations Thesis. There is another, equally good, reason not to 
characterize phenomenal representation in terms of the straightforward instantiation of 
aboutness relations. Regarding the shape an account of the representational nature of sensory 
experiences might take, Siewert (1998 p. 242) writes: 
However such a theory is worked out, it obviously has to allow somehow that one may have 
a sensory experience of some sort even when it is not linked to the fulfillment of its condition 
of accuracy in that instance. For if we said, for example, that its looking to me as if there is 
something X-shaped there is neither accurate nor inaccurate, unless it is caused by there 
being something X-shaped there, then we have the problem that it can never inaccurately 
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look to me as if there is something X-shaped. And so if we made this tight an environmental 
link prerequisite for sensory intentionality, we would make inaccurate sensory appearances, 
misperception, or misrepresentation impossible. But there can be no accurate sensory 
appearances if inaccurate sensory appearances are impossible.  
PIRPers typically do not, therefore, characterize the extrinsic-reality-representing 
characteristics of experiences in terms of their straightforwardly instantiating an aboutness 
relation to an extrinsic reality, as they wish for the manner of representation to be of a kind 
that doesn’t prejudge that there is such an extrinsic reality. Regarding the kinds of minds 
postulated in Cartesian skeptical scenarios, bereft of any extrinsic environment, Siewert 
(1998 pp. 243, 244) writes:  
… we will likely find it natural to describe them as suffering from a systematic and total 
hallucination – that is, we will want to say, the way it looks to them is wholly inaccurate … 
If we suppose we can conceive of the kind of situation in which the break between 
environmental character and phenomenal character is this radical, we would have as much or 
more right to take this to indicate that the missing environmental link is unnecessary for 
sensory intentionality, as we would to take it to show that sensory phenomenal features are 
insufficient for it.  
PIRPers, therefore, are wont to attribute a ‘narrow’, non-object-involving intentional content 
to experiences. Kriegel (2013 p. 19), for instance, writes, “I suspect that in phenomenal 
intentionality the referential connection to the world works roughly as suggested in the 
descriptive theory of linguistic reference, rather than as suggested by direct-reference 
theories”. Chalmers likewise claims that the Edenic intentional content he attributes to 
perceptual experience requires no specific object in order to be satisfied (Chalmers 2010p. 
446). From here I will assume, then, that the non-object-involving intentional content the 
PIRPer posits is a form of narrow content. 
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5. Semantic Abstracta and the Relations Thesis
It’s not clear this solves the problem. If we were to take typical characterizations of narrow 
contents at face value, experiences possessing such contents qua experienced would remain 
in breach of the Relations Thesis, as such contents are typically characterized as semantic 
abstracta. Chalmers (2010 p. 363 emphasis mine), for instance, overtly distinguishes such 
contents from the “psychological features of an individual”, the former being “abstract 
entities to which psychological states may be related ”.128 But if the semantic contents of 
experiences are neither identical to nor constitutively supervenient upon the contingent 
psychological properties constitutive of those experiences, the Relations Thesis 
straightforwardly rules against them being properties the experiences possess qua 
experienced.  
If there is a realm of necessarily existent abstract objects, numbers, propositions and such, 
then various relational facts will be logically entailed by the (presumably contingent) states of 
affairs involving the instantiation of phenomenal properties: that those property instantiations 
coexist with those various entities, that they are non-identical to all of them, maybe even that 
they represent some of them. But to say that the instantiation of a phenomenal property 
logically entails the pertaining of a relation between that property instance and some abstract 
object is not to say that the property instance alone suffices for the pertaining of that relation. 
On the contrary, the Relations Thesis demands that the pertaining of the relation implicate 
aspects of reality sufficient for the existence of the abstracta, and presumably, no part of the 
experience suffices to constitute any such abstracta. Were this the case, the abstracta would 
be identical to some categorical phenomenal, and, presumably, contingent, feature of the 
128 While Chalmers (2010 pp. 362, 363, 435) invokes this description in relation to a particular kind of content, 
the Fregean content he believes experiences possess on account of their “core inferential roles”, he presumably 
intends for it to apply to content in general.      
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experience, and therefore not necessarily existent after all. The relation therefore can’t 
intrinsically inhere in the experience, and hence can’t be an experienced aspect of it. 
6. Nominalising Semantic Abstracta
The only option, therefore, is presumably to deny that such abstract object talk should be 
taken at face value. Many who avail themselves of semantic terms like ‘content’ and 
‘proposition’ aren’t fully-fledged platonic realists about meaning facts. There is a widely, 
though, indeed, not universally, held belief among naturalistically inclined philosophers that 
all truths about the representation of semantical content are ultimately settled by 
nominalistically respectable facts, be they facts of public language use, or facts about 
particular tracking relations the items of a neurally instantiated ‘language of thought’ bear to 
various extrinsic properties and things. Some, like Robert Brandom (1994 p. 134), have 
suggested a path from pragmatics to a nominalistically respectable semantics. Others simply 
use the language of high semantics, feeling relatively safe in their assumption that some kind 
of nominalistic reduction is at least possible in principle. After all, the idea that once all the 
relevant ‘interpretation supplying’ factors are in place, some heretofore non-existent pathway 
to platonic heaven opens up, has an air of metaphysical excess about it. But if the thesis that 
phenomenal properties are identical to real representational properties is to be believed, all 
the nominalistically respectable facts accounting for experiences representing semantically 
appraisable contents must supervene on their concrete, categorical experienced nature. Unlike 
the ink formations of this page, which only represent such contents by way of their 
immersion in a broader context of linguistic practice, phenomenal properties are supposed to 
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represent such contents without any such additional help. It might therefore be suggested that 
this experienced nature constitutes their semantic content.129  
Some such nominalistic reduction of semantic abstracta to phenomenally immanent concreta 
would appear to be the only means by which accounts of the phenomenal revelation of 
narrow contents might be brought in line with the Relations Thesis. It’s important to be clear 
on what is required here. It’s not enough for experiences merely to constitute such contents. 
Things can constitute properties without doing so by virtue of their intrinsic nature alone. 
Such is the case with the constitution of the various tokens of English language sentences and 
terms on this page by ink formations on paper. Our experiences can likewise constitute things 
without constituting them by virtue of their intrinsic experiential nature alone. If there were 
no other phenomenal properties than those of my own experience, my own experience would 
constitute the totality of all phenomenal properties in existence, but it wouldn’t do so qua 
experienced. The fact of their being so wouldn’t be an experienced aspect of them.  
The kinds of contents generally attributed to experiences are semantic functions, outputting 
semantic values on the basis of their arguments. Descriptions, for instance, are functions from 
129 David Pitt comes close to endorsing such a view. He defends the view that phenomenal properties constitute, 
as opposed to represent, intentional contents, but he makes the claim with respect to phenomenal property types, 
which he characterizes as “mind-independent abstract objects” to which phenomenal property instances bear an 
instantiation relation (Pitt 2009 pp. 119, 121). Pitt (2009 p. 121) seems to think he has to make this move in 
order to prevent his view, which, after all, is a form of psychologism, from being the kind of subjectivising 
psychologism Frege famously railed against: “It is to … “token psychologism” that Frege’s objections … most 
clearly apply … One may propose that the logical objects in question be identified, not with psychological 
tokens, but with psychological types”. But there is a case to be made that the whole issue of psychologism is 
overblown. Putnam (1975 p. 222) writes: “… the whole psychologism/Platonism issue appears somewhat a 
tempest in a teapot, as far as meaning-theory is concerned … For even if meanings are ‘Platonic’ entities rather 
than ‘mental’ entities … ‘grasping’ those entities is presumably a psychological state (in the narrow sense) … 
And taking the psychological state to be the meaning would hardly have the consequences that Frege feared, 
that meanings would cease to be public. For psychological states are ‘public’ in the sense that different people 
… can be in the same psychological state”. Of course, by ‘the same psychological state’, Putnam presumably 
means the same psychological state type. Were it compulsory to characterize the type-token relationship in the 
Platonic manner advocated by Pitt, we’d have made no progress. But Putnam’s claim that psychological states, 
by themselves, account for facts of ‘grasping’ contents, straightforwardly articulates the nominalist intuitions 
spoken about previously, and there is a more nominalistically respectable, if not entirely nominalist, 
characterization of type-token relations that promises to do justice to these intuitions. A commonplace 
characterization of universals has it that they are “wholly present” in the case of any instancing of them, wholly 
present ‘in’ the instancing (Lewis 1999 p. 10; Armstrong 1989 p. 98). 
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wider states of affairs, or some such, to referents. The semantically appraisable contents they 
contribute to, in turn, are functions from wider environmental facts to appropriate 
assignments of truth-values. For an experience to be a function from x’s to y’s’ seems very 
much like a relational fact. If this is so, and relata of such a relation can't be ruthlessly 
nominalistically reduced to some aspect or other of the intrinsic, experienced nature of the 
experience, then such a relational claim cannot be made true by that nature alone.130 If, as 
Chalmers (2010 p. 341) suggests, the essential mark of intentional contents is their having 
“conditions of satisfaction”, experiences qua experiences can only constitute such contents 
qua contents inasmuch as they constitute the having. Otherwise, the experiences might well 
constitute such a function, but not qua experienced. They will constitute it in the same way 
my experience, in the foregoing example, constitutes the totality of all phenomenal facts.  
The relata to be reduced, in this case, are the semantic entities serving as arguments and 
outputs for such functions. The inputs are various forms of possibilia, possible worlds, 
potential states of affairs and the like. A function, after all, is not identical with any particular 
realization of its nature qua function. Advocates of the view that certain aspects of 
phenomenology are themselves functions from possible ways things might be to extensions, 
referents, evaluative norms or whatever, are likely to think such aspects only ever actually 
determine one set of such values, those appropriate to the actual way things are. Being such a 
concretely instantiated semantic function seems very much like a counterfactual notion, the 
property of having particular extensions, referents, or appropriate assignments of truth values 
if found in particular situations.  
130 In fact, in order for an experience to constitute such a function qua experienced, it won’t do for the relata 
alone to thus reduce – the relation itself must be a relation belonging to the intrinsic phenomenal constitution of 
the experience, all of which are phenomenal relations. To put things more generally, any claim about experience 
will attribute some monadic property or implicate it in a relation. For those that implicate it in a relation to be 
made true by its experienced nature alone, every relata in the relation must reduce without remainder to some 
aspect or other of that experienced nature, and the relation to a phenomenal relation that nature reveals. 
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Of course, this is of no help so long as the counterfactual properties of categorical property 
instances are thought to be determined by extrinsic factors. But we have already encountered 
a view regarding dispositional properties, which might be thought the very paradigm of 
counterfactual properties, that would appear to hold some promise of getting around the 
problem of the seeming extrinsicality of arguments and outputs, the view that dispositional 
properties are in fact identical to intrinsic categorical properties. I briefly touched upon 
Strawson’s endorsement of this view in Chapter 3, arguing that the fact that our experiences 
weren’t experienced as dispositional was no reason to take it to be at odds with Robust 
Realism. It is a relatively common view, something of a default for those that endorse a non-
Humean quidditist metaphysics, the idea being that the intrinsic nature sustaining the 
structural facts depicted in physical theory also serves to ground the dynamical facts, 
rendering the law-like evolution of the structure necessary. Of course, dispositions are a 
different kind of counterfactual property to the property of having particular referents or truth 
values in particular counterfactually articulated contexts. Still, if any view genuinely 
promises the reduction of counterfactual properties to intrinsic properties, there is at least 
some chance that the invocations of possibilia in descriptions of the semantic functions under 
consideration might be a kind of loose talk, analogous to invocations of propositions by 
philosophers of a more nominalist persuasion. I will assume then that some sense can be 
made of the idea of experiences being intrinsically and experientially possessive of non-
Humean dispositional propensities or powers.131 Could their doing so facilitate a nominalistic 
131 Though we have encountered good reasons for thinking they can’t be. Dispositional properties, thus 
characterized, seem very much like intrinsic propensities to cause things in the non-Humean manner discussed 
in Chapter 4, intrinsic propensities to make further things happen. If the arguments there were sound, this is 
something of an incoherent notion. If the ‘happening’ is constitutively extrinsic to the so-called intrinsic 
propensity, then at most, it necessarily coexists, symmetrically or asymmetrically, with the propensity. The 
propensity doesn’t make the ‘happening’. If, in contrast, the ‘happening’ is intrinsic to the propensity, the 
propensity does indeed make the happening, but by way of constitutive inclusion. Neither such relation suffices 
for the kind of causal relation propensities of this kind are generally postulated to account for. In light of this, 
the term ‘propensity’ seems something of a misnomer.  
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reduction of the properties by virtue of which they constitute the semantic functions they are 
said to constitute to their experienced properties alone?  
Arguably not. Non-Humean powers significantly reduce the amount of extrinsic relata 
serving to make counterfactual claims about their bearers true, but they don’t reduce it zero. 
Even on non-Humean views, counterfactual properties don’t inhere in the intrinsic nature of 
things.132 A thing’s intrinsic powers aren’t the sole truthmakers for the subjunctive 
conditionals articulating counterfactual claims about it so long as they aren’t the only things 
depicted in the antecedent of such conditionals that are relevant to the pertaining of the 
consequent. The proponent of non-Humean powers will maintain that certain things will 
necessarily dissolve if added to water, not on account of some closest possible world function 
working from their wider four-dimensional environments, but on account of their intrinsic. 
But this is true on account of how that intrinsic nature will behave in a situation where it 
interacts with constitutively distinct natures. The fact that something is soluble still has as 
much to do with the nature of water as it does the intrinsic properties of the thing itself. 
Likewise, the fact that an experience is apt to yield certain semantic values taken in 
conjunction with some wider state of affairs has as much to do with the nature of the state of 
affairs as it does the experience.   
132 Strawson (2008 p. 275) writes: “I’ll continue to speak in the traditional way of dispositional properties, rather 
than of power properties, although I think the second term is better … Actually, ‘potential’ is the best term, in its 
old meaning – ‘potent’, ‘possessing potency or power’ – but this, the first OED meaning, has been drowned out 
by the second meaning, ‘possible as opposed to actual’, and this is unhelpful, because potential properties in the 
first meaning are of course actual properties”.  
%--!
7. Objections
7.1 Seeing As 
At this stage, an exasperated PIRPer might accuse me of making the same kind of error A.D. 
Smith (2000 p. 488) accuses Berkeley of with respect to depth phenomenology. One might 
remember from Chapter 1 that Berkeley (1962 p. 186) rejected the possibility of phenomenal 
depth on the basis of what he thought such depth would have to be like, i.e. a “line turned 
endwise to the eye”. Smith’s (2000 p. 488) response was to suggest that “we can appreciate 
how an experiential awareness of depth is visually possible by seeing how it is actual” Smith 
(2000 p. 488). Might I too be missing the woods for the trees, putting forward arguments 
stipulating what real phenomenal intentionality must be like in order to exist when 
phenomenology straightforwardly testifies to its being? I have not as yet addressed the 
undeniably familiar phenomenon of experiencing as. Previously I acknowledged that a 
degree of prima facie plausibility accrues to the claim that inasmuch as experiences are 
experiences as anything at all, they are genuinely conceptual, which plausibly entails PI. The 
reason I gave for tentatively thinking this is that their being experienced as things is one and 
the same as their being experienced to come under concepts. Am I, like Berkeley, insisting 
upon the impossibility of something that experience plainly shows to be possible? 
On the contrary, I believe exactly the opposite situation pertains here. Proper attention to 
actual ‘seeing as’ phenomenology should suffice to disabuse one of the foregoing sequence 
of faulty a priori reasoning plausibly deriving from the invocation of extra-phenomenal 
objective notions in the description of seeing as cases.133 Phenomenally speaking, seeing 
something as a chair is not a case of what is phenomenally presented being ‘brought under 
133 One might remember that Berkeley’s mistake was also plausibly the result of his application of the logic of 
objective spatial predicates to their phenomenal namesakes. It is the PIRPer, not I, who wishes to align 
intentionality phenomenology with objective intentionality. 
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the concept chair’. There isn’t the appearance as of a phenomenal complex standing in some 
relation to some appearance as of the objective concept of chair-hood, as though the concept 
of chair-hood were somehow hovering over it. The visual appearance as of a chair is no 
different to that of an object, colour or shape. The visual ‘chairliness’ of the appearance has 
no more separate existence with respect to the colour and shape of the appearance of the chair 
than the colour does of the shape. What’s more, such chairliness is nothing like the objective 
property of being a chair. An instance of the latter property is something you can sit in. You 
can’t sit in an instance of visual chairliness. It’s a property of visual appearances. Any 
essential connection it might bear to the objective property of being a chair is a further fact. 
Compare visual spatiality. In Chapter 4, several means of tying visual spatiality to objective 
spatiality were examined. None worked.134  
7.2 Chalmers’ Appeal to Certainty 
Chalmers’ (2010 p. 414) ‘Edenic’ account of the perceptual contents of experience has it that 
experiences intrinsically represent primitive properties that are instantiated neither in those 
experiences themselves nor anywhere in the actual world. He does, therefore, make some 
attempt to address the issue of how representational relations might pertain in the absence of 
their relata: 
If perfect redness is never instantiated in our world, then we have never had contact with any 
instances of it. If so, one might wonder how perfect redness can be represented in the content 
134 Chalmers maintains that certain phenomenal properties represent non-phenomenal properties, not because 
they appear as non-phenomenal, but on the somewhat weaker grounds that they don’t appear as phenomenal. 
Regarding the property of perfect redness that phenomenal redness supposedly represents, he writes, “… it 
seems that an object can be perfectly red without anyone experiencing the object as perfectly red. The 
phenomenology of color does not seem to be the phenomenology of properties that require a perceiver in order 
to be instantiated” (Chalmers 2010 p. 409). This seems like fallacious reasoning, of a piece with the fallacious 
reasoning Ryle (1949 p. 21) famously attributes to Descartes: “Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just 
bits of not-clockwork”. The fact that phenomenal redness doesn’t appear as what it in fact is, a phenomenal 
property, doesn’t mean it appears as something other than what it is, a non-phenomenal property. Phenomenal 
redness plausibly doesn’t appear as anything at all, it simply appears, and the philosophically naïve subject takes 
it to be, as opposed to represent, objective redness.  
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of our experiences. Construed as an objection, this point turns on the tacit premise that 
representing a property requires contact with instances of it. In reply, one can observe that we 
can certainly represent other uninstantiated properties (the property of being phlogistonated, 
Hume’s missing shade of blue) and even represent uninstantiable properties (being a round 
square) (Chalmers 2010 p. 416).   
But the sense of certainty in which we can “certainly represent other uninstatiated properties” 
isn’t the peculiar epistemological certainty that supposedly accrues to phenomenal 
judgements by way of acquaintance with phenomenal property instances. We are exploring a 
view according to which certainty regarding phenomenology trumps the certainty accruing to 
our common sense framework, including our commonsense views regarding what we’re 
capable of representing in thought. Many bullets have had to be bitten on this score already. 
The foregoing claims can’t simply be assumed immune. It is understandable how one might 
mistakenly think as much, given that traditional Cartesianism treats contentful thought as the 
paradigm of certainty. But in Chapter 2, we encountered reasons for thinking that it is the 
topic-specific immediacy of the conscious mind, as opposed to any intellectual property 
thereof, that underwrites Cartesian certainty. Such certainty should only extend to intentional 
contents inasmuch as they are immediately phenomenally given, and the claim that they are 
thus given is what is presently under scrutiny.  
It might also be argued that for Chalmers to cite such commonsensical certainties in the 
foregoing context is to put the cart before the horse. He would appear, after all, to be 
responding to a phenomenon that presents a potential problem for his account of 
representation, the representation of uninstantiated properties, by way of an appeal to 
certainty regarding that very phenomenon. This seems somewhat akin to the materialist 
responding to the problem of consciousness by appealing to certainty regarding 
consciousness. The question, in the latter case, isn’t whether we are conscious, but whether 
materialism has the resources to account for such a fact. Likewise, the question of whether 
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Chalmers’ particular account of representation is capable of accounting for the representation 
of uninstantiated properties is a different question from that of whether or not we do in fact 
represent such properties. Chalmers (2010 p. 418) acknowledges that his response isn’t 
entirely adequate, but thinks “the residual question” is merely that of “how our mental states 
get to have a given Edenic content”. Extending foregoing analogy, one might say that he is 
postulating a mere explanatory gap while I’m arguing, as per the dualist in the case of the 
mind-body problem, that his account invokes a logical impossibility. In the case of the mind 
body problem, it is the physical constitution of mind-stuff. In this case, it’s the intrinsic 
constitution of extrinsic relations.   
In any case, the problem as I have developed it, is not that of how one might represent a 
property in the absence of any of its instances, but rather, of how one might represent a 
property in the absence of that property qua instance, universal, possibilia, or in any other 
potential mode, how one might represent the property without the property. Chalmers 
maintains that such properties are experienced qua universal. In having an experience of 
phenomenal redness, for instance, one is acquainted with “the universal primitive redness” 
(Chalmers 2012b p. 7). Were acquaintance to mean the same thing in the case of universals 
that it does in the case of particulars, unmediated contact with whatever suffices for the 
existence of the object of acquaintance, this could only be the case if the universal of 
primitive redness was straightforwardly identical to the instance of phenomenal redness or 
some instantiated aspect thereof qua instantiated. It would have to be a phenomenal property 
instance, contingently existent and transient as all such phenomenal property instances are. 
It’s not clear what could possibly be gained by such an identification. The only thing that 
could afford such a universal any epistemic significance is the special logical relation it bears, 
qua universal, to its instances, and that relation would remain experience extrinsic. At most, 
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therefore, this might count as an instance of experiences constituting something without 
doing so qua experienced.  
Chalmers (2012a p. 402) differentiates between two different forms of acquaintance: “There 
is acquaintance with concrete entities (oneself, one’s experiences, the current time), which 
involves a sort of immediate indexical ostension of them. And there is acquaintance with 
abstract entities (properties, relations, and other abstract objects), which involves a sort of full 
understanding of them”. But this would appear to turn the universal the experience is 
supposed to constitute an understanding of back into an external relatum, in which case, such 
understanding cannot be experientially revealed on pain of violating the Relations Thesis. Of 
course, we have already seen that it’s not always entirely clear how seriously philosophers 
want their talk of abstract objects to be taken, and Chalmers elsewhere describes 
acquaintance with universals as “some sort of internal grasp of what it would take for 
something to instantiate the property” (Chalmers 418). But such talk of what it would take for 
a subject to instantiate a property seems very much like an invocation of the sufficient 
conditions for such instantiation. Are these sufficient conditions instantiated in experience? 
No. If they were, the property itself would be. They are, after all, sufficient conditions for the 
instantiation of the property. One could revert to the claim that experience constitutes 
acquaintance with the universal of the altogether different property of being a sufficient 
condition for the instantiation of the initial property, but this just takes us back to where we 
started. There is no point in the emergent recursive pattern at which some kind of magic 
occurs, and intrinsic representation of extrinsic reality is finally established. In fact, to call 
such representation magical is something of an understatement. Arguably, many things that 
would be described as instances of magic if they happened in the actual world, things 
levitating, or appearing ex nihilo, are conceptually coherent, at least by the cannons of 
ordinary logic. The notion of something representing matters beyond its intrinsic constitution 
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by virtue of its intrinsic constitution alone, on the other hand, would appear to do monkey 
business with the fundamental logical concept of a relation.  
8. Goodbye PI
It would seem that robust realists can only retain PI, and, therefore PIRP, if they are willing 
to revise logic in the name of metaphysics. Such a thing isn’t entirely out of the question. In 
chapter 1, I suggested that if the nature of experience itself constituted some kind of affront to 
logic, as would be the case, say, if it embodied some kind of de re contradiction, robust 
realists might well see this as reason enough to revise logic accordingly. Edwin Mares (2010 
p. 60) writes,
There are some clear cases in which philosophers have allowed their metaphysics to shape 
their logical views. Quine, at various times in his career would refuse to use second-order 
logic because having quantifiers binding predicate variables would commit him to accepting 
universals or classes in his ontology. Another example is David Lewis’ abandonment of 
modal logic in favour of a first order logical theory that directly represents his counterpart 
theory.   
But I have argued that nothing about experience forces PI upon us in this way. The objective 
intentionality of phenomenal appearance isn’t straightforwardly entailed by the phenomenal 
appearance of objective intentionality. As with other phenomenal counterparts of objective 
phenomena, phenomenal spatiality, phenomenal colour, sound and so on, phenomenal 
intentionality need not be identical to, nor entail the existence of, objective intentionality. 
Experiences really don’t seem to embody the genuine relations requisite for their constituting 
real intentionality. One might object that to say this is to simply beg the question and insist 
upon the Relations Thesis. Experiences really do embody such relations, in spite of the 
absence of the relevant relata, and we should therefore abandon the Relations Thesis. This 
move comes with a heavy theoretical cost: revision of so fundamental a logical concept as 
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that of a relation is certain to have other ramifications, and as there is a strong tendency to 
mistake phenomenal appearances of objective properties for objective properties of 
phenomenal appearances, evidence motivating such a revision is inherently undermined. I 
will give this view no further consideration in this thesis.  
9. Inflating AM
If the foregoing case against PI is correct, then experiences cannot intrinsically represent a 
reality extending beyond their intrinsic constitution. But to say this is not to say that they 
can’t represent such a reality at all. Robust realists who are convinced by the foregoing 
arguments need not give up altogether on the idea that experiences are somehow 
representative of the real world. They need only acknowledge that if experiences represent 
the world, they do so in virtue of their participation in wider states of affairs, as opposed to 
their experienced nature in and of itself.  
But the demise of PI has implications that extend beyond the problem of how our minds 
represent the world. In Chapter 1, I pointed out that Robust Realism is premised upon the 
pertaining of genuine representational relations between phenomenal states and phenomenal 
judgments, judgments to the effect that one has such states, that they have the particular 
natures that they have, and so on. If PI is untenable, as I suggest, and for the reason that I 
maintain it to be so, i.e. the logical impossibility of intrinsically constituted extrinsic 
relations, an account of this representation arguably has to extend beyond the borders of 
phenomenology too. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, the phenomenology of demonstrative 
thought about one’s entire phenomenal manifold seems no different to that of demonstrative 
thought of some objective phenomenon like a house or street. It doesn’t appear to somehow 
take the entirety of one’s phenomenology, of which it itself is a constitutive part, as its 
transcendentally real object. It is merely an intrinsic component part of one’s entire 
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phenomenal manifold, most of which is constitutively extrinsic to it. If cognitive 
phenomenology cannot intrinsically represent the phenomenology extrinsic to it, it cannot 
constitute the real representation that Robust Realism is premised upon.  
Robust Realism logically depends upon the possibility of real representational relations 
pertaining between judgments and experiences in a way that it doesn’t depend upon any 
representational connection with the world. Were it possible to demonstrate that even when 
one takes wider states of affairs into account, no representational relation can pertain between 
experiences and an experience extrinsic world, accepting Robust Realism would involve 
biting yet another bullet. If experience can’t be represented in judgement, on the other hand, 
Robust Realism is straightforwardly incoherent. Note that not any kind of representational 
relation will suffice. Robust Realism requires topic-specific representation of experience in 
judgement. It is topic-specific phenomenal judgment, after all, that places Robust Realism at 
odds with physicalism. Were all phenomenal judgment topic-neutral, the Robust Realist 
would have no reason to object to the canonical topic-neutral physicalist solution to the 
problem of consciousness.   
At the outset of this chapter, I flagged AM, a thesis that seems to at least be implicitly 
assumed by many classical empiricists. AM has it that an intellect that is constitutively 
separate to phenomenology nonetheless stands in an unmediated relation of acquaintance 
with it, which thereby renders that intellect capable of forming the kind of topic-specific 
phenomenal judgments that Robust Realism requires. The thesis was shelved while I assessed 
the plausibility of PI, with which it stood in a degree of tension. Inasmuch as PI has proven 
untenable, and experiences cannot, therefore, intrinsically constitute the kinds of real 
representations of phenomenal properties and states that Robust Realism requires, it would 
seem that robust realists are somewhat beholden to the plausibility of AM. Robust realists 
presumably subscribe to at least a minimal form of concept empiricism with respect to 
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phenomenal properties, according to which the acquisition of topic-neutral conceptions of 
them is at least partially grounded in contact with instances. The mind doesn’t acquire all its 
phenomenal concepts by way of intellectually grasping them qua uninstantiated universals, 
and then form judgements that experiences just happen to make true. Immediate contact with 
instances presumably plays some role, whether or not abstraction from phenomenal concepts 
formed on the basis of such contact facilitates the attainment of further phenomenal 
concepts.135  
As might have been ascertained from the last paragraph, the proponent of AM need not set 
the kinds of boundaries with respect to the operations of the intellect that created trouble for 
PI. The facts pertaining to the intellect’s formation of phenomenal judgements can be as 
‘wide’ as one likes, taking concrete states of affairs, facts about relations they bear to abstract 
objects, and anything else one might care to imagine. All that matters is that the mind 
forming such judgements has unmediated topic-specific contact with an experience, and that 
this contact at least partially informs the formation process.  
10. The Problem of AM-Connectedness
One is intuitively inclined to think that the acquainted mind postulated by AM forms 
phenomenal judgements by way of interaction with experience, and, while the mind 
presumably cannot control the entire course of experience, that the mind’s interactions with 
experience have at least some effect. Attention phenomenology, for instance, might be 
thought an upshot or accompaniment of its attending activity. Yet, as I have argued in 
Chapter 4, talk of interaction of this kind cannot be construed as spatial interaction or causal 
interaction. It’s difficult to imagine what remains of the notion of interaction once one rules 
135 Even if one were to subscribe to a queer rationalism of this kind, where minds form topic-specific 
phenomenal judgements in a manner entirely independent of direct acquaintance with instances, such direct 
acquaintance would presumably be required for such judgements to be justified, as opposed to merely true. 
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both these options out. The difficulty is apparent in attempted descriptions of such 
interaction. For instance, regarding his paradigmatically topic-specific “direct phenomenal 
concepts”, Chalmers (2010 pp. 267, 279) speaks of qualities of phenomenal properties the 
mind attends to being “taken up” into concepts, and elsewhere describes such concepts as 
containing within them “a “slot” for an instantiated quality such that the quality that fills the 
slot constitutes the content”. Such talk is intended to be metaphorical, but there is no 
indication as to what remains when such claims are stripped of metaphor – the metaphor flags 
a theoretical need for explanation, rather than the explanation itself. The acquaintance 
relation that AM postulates between experiences and the intellect, herein referred to as AM-
connectedness, will presumably have to feature somewhere in any account of such 
interaction, but once again, it’s difficult to know what is meant by a term like ‘acquaintance’ 
once the spatial proximity inherent in the folk concept is removed.136  
Spatial, and other ‘dimensional cohabitation’ relations, and causal relations, are somewhat 
distinctive inasmuch as they are external relations that aren’t merely functions of the 
comparative natures of their relata. That two constitutively separate things occupy a certain 
distance from each other isn’t merely a matter of similarities and differences in their intrinsic 
natures, or comparative similarities and differences those natures bear in turn to anything or 
everything else occupying that continuum. (Something that is intrinsically indistinguishable 
from something that is five feet from a river isn’t also, therefore, five feet from a river). Such 
relations hold between particulars in their particularity, not merely between particulars qua 
136 It’s worth noting that even if, contrary to the arguments of Chapter 4, spatial and or causal relations between 
intellects and experiences were in fact possible, it’s not clear, in any case, how the pertaining of such relations 
could be in any way relevant to the pertaining of an immediate acquaintance relation between them. If 
acquaintance relations were somehow a function of spatial relations, they would be spatially mediated relations. 
As for causal relations, while there is such a relation as that of being the immediate cause of something, such a 
relation wouldn’t seem to be what’s desired in this instance, as acquaintance is typically characterized as a more 
‘passive’ relation, preceding and facilitating cognitive interaction with experiences. It would therefore seem that 
even if such relations were to pertain, they would be irrelevant. 
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tokens of certain types. Causation, both Humean and non-Humean, is likewise a relation 
between particulars qua particulars. 
10.1 AM-Connectedness as a Phenomenal Relation 
Dimensional cohabitation and causal interaction are plausibly the only naturalistically 
respectable relations that are capable of metaphysically uniting constitutively extrinsic things 
qua particulars. But we aren’t working within a strictly naturalistic framework. We are 
working within the framework of Robust Realism, and Robust Realism admits of an 
altogether different species of metaphysical relation between particulars qua particulars, 
namely, phenomenal relations.  
Chalmers (2010 p. 286) thinks it plausible that acquaintance is a phenomenal relation: “I 
think there is something to the idea that our special epistemic relation to experience is 
revealed in our experience”.  Elsewhere, he expresses sympathy for the view that 
“phenomenal awareness is an acquaintance involving relation by its very nature”, and that 
such awareness is “irreducibly a phenomenal relation” (Chalmers 2012b p. 5). But while 
Chalmers (2010 p. 269) is noncommittal regarding whether the immediate interfacing of 
cognition with experience facilitating the formation of topic-specific phenomenal concepts 
and such is an experience internal relation, AM straightforwardly stipulates that it isn’t. It is 
an external relation that an experience stands in to something constitutively distinct from it. 
The pertaining of an AM-connectedness relation between an intellect and an experience 
couldn’t possibly be revealed in the experience, as the constitutive nature of the intellect is, 
by definition, outside the experience, and the Relations Thesis demands the involvement of 
that constitutive nature in the pertaining of the relation. 
Might AM-connectedness be a phenomenal relation that isn’t internal to the experience it 
relates to the intellect, a relation that isn’t revealed in that experience, but that is nonetheless 
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a phenomenal relation? Not if AM-connectedness is to be a relation immediately acquainting 
an intellect with the entire phenomenal manifold comprising a subject’s experience. 
Presumably this must be the case if such acquaintance is to underwrite cognitive appreciation, 
however attenuated, of subjective experience as a whole. Phenomenal relations relate 
phenomenal relata, and so for the intellect AM postulates to stand in any kind of phenomenal 
relation, the intellect must itself be phenomenally constituted. Moreover, phenomenal 
relations relate phenomenal relata phenomenally. Their pertaining requires the instantiation of 
a complex phenomenal state that phenomenally “subsumes” the sufficient conditions for their 
pertaining (Chalmers 2010 p. 501). But it was argued in Chapter 4 that our entire phenomenal 
manifolds cannot be coexperienced with anything else, as they themselves comprise what it’s 
like to experience what we experience and nothing else.  
10.2 AM-Connectedness as a Shared Phenomenal Content Relation 
We have encountered one other species of metaphysical relation that promises to unite 
particulars qua particulars. One might remember from Chapter 4 that some philosophers have 
entertained the idea that the co-consciousness relation that pertains between all the 
components of a phenomenal manifold might be an intransitive relation, such that distinct 
phenomenal manifolds can share token phenomenal content. Such a shared content relation 
isn’t a phenomenal relation, as it doesn’t relate its relata phenomenally. It is, nonetheless, a 
relation between phenomenal relata, or, at least, between relata comprising of phenomenal 
parts. And so, for a constitutively distinct intellect to bear such a relation to an experience, it 
must itself be at least partially phenomenally constituted.137  
137 If it is only partially phenomenally constituted, a further question arises, that of what relation between the 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal part serves to unite them into a singular intellect. Let us call this relation 
mindmaking-connectedness. The problem of mindmaking-connectedness seems very much like that of AM-
connectedness. The only resources available for solving it, in the absence of dimensional, causal and 
phenomenal relations, are appeals to further relations of shared phenomenal content, or comparative relations of 
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Yet such a relation also fails to appropriately ground AM-connectedness. In this case, it is the 
immediacy of such a relation that seems dubious. Since a phenomenally constituted 
constitutively extrinsic intellect could only ever have some phenomenal content in common 
with an entire phenomenal manifold – lest we encounter, once again, the problem of 
experiencing the phenomenal finitude of that manifold in conjunction with other things – any 
relation the intellect bears to the manifold as a whole will presumably be mediated by the 
relation it bears to something less than the whole. Given that the rather outré assumption that 
the intellects AM-connected with experiences are at least partially phenomenally constituted 
themselves, and share phenomenal parts with those experiences, has no theoretical payoff, I 
assume its falsity herein.   
10.3 AM-Connectedness as a Comparative Relation 
In the absence of spatiotemporal, causal, phenomenal and shared phenomenal content 
relations, experience and the intellect would appear to be radically disconnected, much like 
the possible worlds of David Lewis’s (1986b pp. 69, 70) metaphysics, with no metaphysical 
ties qua particulars. It would therefore seem that their AM-connectedness must be a function 
of their comparative natures, much like Lewis’s (1986b pp. 70, 71) counterpart relation. 
Assuming a multitude of such intellects, and a numerically identical number of phenomenal 
manifolds, it is presumably the comparative similarities and differences between the various 
intellects, in concert with the comparative similarities and differences between the various 
phenomenal manifolds, that serve to forge the supposedly one-one correlations between 
intellects and manifolds. If the comparative features of intellects are to be capable of 
underwriting AM-Connectedness to a phenomenal manifold of some particular character, 
then potential variability in the comparative character of such intellects must presumably be 
the kind to be to be discussed shortly. Obviously, if further shared phenomenal content relations suffice to 
complete the story, the intellect is phenomenally constituted after all. 
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proportionate to the potential variability in comparative character of phenomenal manifolds, 
both structural and intrinsic.  
Comparative relations binding intellects and experiences in this way might be said to satisfy 
the immediacy requirement inasmuch as there is no mediating factor involved. Such a 
characterisation of AM-connectedness is nonetheless fraught with problems.  
(i) Privileged Mapping – An initial concern is that it relies on a special privileged mapping
from comparative properties of intellects to altogether different comparative properties of 
experiences.138 Isomorphisms are cheap; if there is one potential means of mapping 
comparative properties of the aforementioned intellects and experiences so as to bring them 
into one-one correspondence, there’s sure to be others that yield altogether different one-one 
correspondences.139 Yet what makes any such mapping the right mapping? Inasmuch as 
Robust Realism is a form of transcendental realism, its proponents might not be too worried 
by this objection inasmuch as they are presumably committed to there being some such 
privileged relationship between thoughts and their referents. But it is worthwhile noting that 
inasmuch as Robust Realism admits of a slum of qualitative simples, Lewis’s (1999 pp. 13, 
46, 47, 66) well known solution of privileging an “elite” class of “perfectly natural 
properties” as referents falls short of providing a complete solution in this case. Such a class, 
in this case, would be inordinately large, comprising, for instance, every potential 
permutation of every phenomenal colour property. The elite mapping in this case would still, 
therefore, have to invoke an inordinate amount of inexplicably privileged correspondences 
138 An intellect presumably doesn’t forge an acquaintance relation with a phenomenal manifold of a certain 
character by constitutively embodying a separate instance of that very same character. In fact, it couldn’t, unless 
it was itself some ungodly mereological amalgam of such a manifold and other stuff that is completely 
disconnected from it. Such an amalgam could only be something more than a gerrymandered mereological 
object if there were already some altogether different basis for forging connections between metaphysically 
disconnected phenomenal and non-phenomenal individuals.   
139 For more on this, see Chapter 2 of Putnam (1981).  
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between comparative properties of intellects and irreducibly primitive phenomenal properties. 
I take this to be a theoretical cost for the position.  
(ii) Dynamic Change – Let us assume, in any case, that such a privileged correspondence
somehow obtains. Another potential problem for this view derives from the primitive 
dynamism of experience discussed in Chapter 4. For a mapping relation between a particular 
intellect and a particular phenomenal manifold to be sustained, the intellect must admit of 
dynamical change that is inexplicably in concert with the dynamical change of the 
phenomenal manifold, such that the special mapping relation that AM-connects them is 
sustained. Otherwise, AM-connectedness would be transient and changeable, with intellects 
dropping in and out of AM-connectedness with one or more distinct phenomenal manifolds.  
(iii) Overdetermination – A closely related problem is that of overdetermination. Consider a
possibility in which there are two experiences embodying the comparative properties apt to 
AM-connect them to a particular phenomenal manifold. Do they both do so? If there are 
likewise two qualitatively indistinguishable phenomenal manifolds, are both AM-connected 
to both manifolds? 
(iv) Justification – A bigger problem for the view under consideration is that it undermines
the intuitive appeal of the robust realist’s account of the justification of phenomenal 
judgement, an account that is almost certainly premised upon the assumption that AM-
connectedness is a relation that unifies intellects and experiences, in some metaphysically 
significant sense, in their particularity. Let us assume, as per the view, that an intellect has 
comparative properties apt to forge a privileged, though purely comparative, isomorphic 
relationship with a phenomenal manifold of some maximally specific nature. Let us likewise 
assume, as per the view, that the strongest metaphysical relation the intellect is capable of 
bearing to such a manifold is that of coexistence in absolute isolation from it. Finally, let us 
imagine that the intellect makes a judgment to the effect that a phenomenal property that such 
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a phenomenal manifold would constitute the instantiation of is in fact instantiated. The claim 
that the existence of such a phenomenal manifold might serve to make the judgment true has 
some semblance of plausibility given the realist assumptions temporarily in play. But this set 
of assumptions only gives us the desired result if an intellect making a judgement about 
something in complete isolation from it would be justified in making such a judgement so 
long as that something is as the judgement dictates. This seems to be an unholy assimilation 
of justification to truth. One might attempt to save such a theory by maintaining that it just so 
happens that, whenever an intellect instantiates the comparative properties apt to AM-connect 
it to a phenomenal manifold of a particular character, there exists a phenomenal manifold 
with such a character. But as Chalmers (1996 p. 194) points out, 
… if our beliefs about consciousness were justified only by a reliable connection, then we 
could not be certain that we are conscious. The mere existence of a reliable connection 
cannot deliver certainty, for we have no way to rule out the possibility that the reliable 
connection is absent and that there is no consciousness at the other end. The only way to be 
sure here would be to have some further access to the other end of the connection; but that 
would be to say that we have some further basis to our knowledge of consciousness.  
If there is a case to be made for certainty regarding the pertaining of the kind of comparative 
property based AM-connectedness between radically metaphysically disconnected intellects 
and experiences that is presently under discussion, I’m yet to encounter it.  
(v) Undermining Robust Realism – This brings us to the most obvious problem for such an
account, that it seems totally disconnected from those phenomenal considerations that 
motivate Robust Realism in the first place. Experiences seem to embody particular 
phenomenal property instances, and Robust Realism is premised upon their seeming to do so. 
It is this appearing of phenomenal properties in their particularity that is meant to justify 
phenomenal judgements, not a queer relation they bear, qua instances of a type, to a radically 
disconnected intellect.  
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The disconnect between experience and the intellect being considered at present is far more 
radical than that which underwrites the topic-neutral accounts of phenomenal properties that 
robust realists characteristically reject. In fact, when one considers the robust realist’s reasons 
for rejecting such topic-neutral theories, the current view would appear, at best, to be on an 
equal footing with them. Topic-neutral views only denies us a topic-specific cognitive grasp 
of the intrinsic nature of experiences, not that they have such a nature. One can imagine a 
view, however implausible, that affords experiences the very same nature that Robust 
Realism affords them but denies a topic-specific grasp of that nature. The robust realist 
rejects topic-neutral views because experiences appear to immediately reveal their topic-
specific nature, taking it for granted that their appearing to do so can be cognitively 
accounted for. Experiences also appear to reveal phenomenal properties in their particularity, 
and it would very much seem that robust realists likewise take it for granted that such a fact 
can be cognitively accounted for. Topic-neutral views typically account for this much. 
Subjects stand in a relation of topic-neutral conception to their own particular experiences, 
not any experiences of a particular kind. But it would seem that robust realists might be 
wrong to take such things for granted. If, for instance, the faculty of judgment cannot directly 
interface with phenomenal properties qua particular instances, which seems to be the case, it 
cannot form the special kinds of phenomenology apt judgments that the robust realist 
believes to be made possible by the immediate givenness of particular instances of 
phenomenal properties. 
11. Conclusion
The Relations Thesis entails that phenomenal states cannot intrinsically represent a reality 
extending beyond their intrinsic constitution, even in a narrowly circumscribed non-object-
involving sense. Cognitive phenomenological states cannot, therefore, sustain the 
transcendentally real representations of phenomenal properties that Robust Realism is 
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premised upon. Robust realists seem to be beholden to AM in order account for such 
representations, but there doesn’t seem to be any viable candidate, given Robust Realism, for 
the AM-connectedness relation that AM posits. This places Robust Realism itself in question. 
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Afterword 
The exploration of Robust Realism undertaken in this thesis is motivated by the possibility 
that Robust Realism might constitute a principled form of resistance to Daniel Dennett’s 
eliminativist strategy. Over the course of the thesis, I have given my reasons for concluding 
that Robust Realism is not only a costly position, but also possibly incoherent, inasmuch as it 
appears to disallow the very representational relations that define it.  
One might take this to be good grounds to accept Dennett’s own position. I am not sure that 
this follows. Recall that Robust Realism makes two claims: 
1) The claim that our justification for accepting the existence of phenomenal properties
is in our unmediated access to instances of such properties.
2) The claim that Dennettian Dissolution is never acceptable.
Might it be possible to abandon 1 and retain 2? I’m by no means confident that such an 
option is in fact tenable, but in the dialogic context it requires some investigation. Note that 1 
divides into two distinct commitments,  
i) We have unmediated access to instances of phenomenal properties.
ii) Our having such access somehow feeds into an account of transcendentally real
representations of such properties and the justification thereof.
While rejection of (i) would itself appear to constitute an invocation of Dennettian 
Dissolution, and therefore a rejection of (2), (ii) plausibly takes us beyond phenomenology, 
as I have argued in Chapter 6 that phenomenology cannot intrinsically sustain 
transcendentally real representations of phenomenology. Abandonment of (ii) fits well with 
the Zen-like nature of non-deflationary accounts of phenomenal experience, for which such 
experience already constitutes a kind of transmission beyond concepts. The only difference is 
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that in this case experience remains beyond concepts. Lao-tzu famously proclaimed that “The 
Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao” (Baird & Heimbeck 2006 p. 371). Perhaps, in 
similar fashion, the qualia I have been speaking of throughout this thesis cannot be the 
transcendentally real qualia I had hoped to speak of. Perhaps my arguments only serve as 
demonstrations of the kinds of antinomies that arise when we attempt to bring ‘the 
transcendental’ under empirical concepts.  
Such a view does not count as a form of phenomenal realism inasmuch as it eschews all 
cognitively-inflected attitudes towards qualia, realist or otherwise, in favour of a non-
cognitive acknowledgement of the inexpressible. I personally prefer it to the deflationist 
option. Dennettian Dissolution has always struck me as perverse in its refusal of what seems 
an apparent fact of experience, and continues to do so.140 Of course, to place qualia beyond 
the realms of possible discourse is to bow out of the qualia debate, but perhaps entering the 
debate was a mistake in the first place. Deflationists have always dismissed more inflated 
qualia talk as nonsense, and perhaps they were right to do so. The qualia invoked in such talk 
were a defective empirical concept, the finger, rather than the moon we try to point to.  
140 My intuitive response to the Dennettian claim that my intellect is tricking me into thinking I encounter 
phenomenal properties is that in such a case, my intellect is doing too good a job. A trick performed this well 
ceases to be a trick. 
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